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ABSTRACT
Models to be used for analyses of economic risks from
events which occur during U.S. LWR plant operation are
developed in this study. The models include capabilities to
estimate both onsite and offsite costs of LWR events ranging
from routine plant forced outages to severe core-melt accidents
resulting in large releases of radioactive material to the
environment. The models have been developed for potential use
by both the nuclear power industry and regulatory agencies in
cost/benefit analyses for decision-making purposes.
The new onsite cost models estimate societal losses from
power production cost increases, new plant capital costs, plant
decontamination costs, and plant repair costs which may be
incurred after LWR operational events. Early decommissioning
costs, plant worker health impact costs, electric utility
business costs, nuclear power industry costs, and litigation
costs are also addressed.
The newly developed offsite economic consequence models
estimate the costs of post-accident population protective
measures and public health impacts. The costs of population
evacuation and temporary relocation, agricultural product
disposal, land and property decontamination, and land
interdiction are included in the economic models for population
protective measures. Costs of health impacts and medical care
costs are also included in the models.
The newly developed economic consequence models are
applied in an example to estimate the economic risks from
operation of the Surry #2 plant. The analyses indicate that
economic risks from LWR operation, in contrast %;o public health
risks, are dominated by relatively high-frequency forced outage
events. The implications of this conclusion for U.S. nuclear
power plant operation and regulation are discussed. The
sensitivities and uncertainties in economic risk estimates are
also addressed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF REPORT
The risk to society posed by potential accidents at
commercial nuclear power reactors in the U.S. has been a
focus of research for the past decade. Significant efforts
have been made to estimate the potential public health
impacts of severe LWR accidents. Another aspect of LWR
accident risk involves the societal economic impacts or
costs of an accident. Financial risk measures can be
defined independently of accident public health risks, or
cost measures can be defined to represent all of the
negative attributes of the consequences of an event. This
report develops and employs analytical methods to
investigate the economic or financial risks posed by U.S.
-20-
LWR accidents.+
Recent developments in the U.S. nuclear power
regulatory process have created a need for analytical tools
which provide estimates of the economic risks of reactor
accidents. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
has recently proposed safety goals for guidance in the
regulatory decision-making process regarding LWR safety.
The goals include criteria for public health risks imposed
by plant operation, along with a cost/benefit criterion to
be used in evaluating plant improvements for potential risk
reduction [Nu80a, Nu82a]. Ideally, the NRC should
incorporate information regarding both costs and benefits
(or costs avoided) into decisions regarding LWR accident
risk reduction systems. It is necessary to understand the
LWR economic risk spectrum to estimate the risk reduction
potential of various plant safety system modifications and
develop logical decision bases regarding the effectiveness
of plant improvements. Also, it is important to identify
+ The terms "economic risk" and "financial risk" are used
synonymously in this study to refer to the frequencies and
societal costs of LWR events. Costs include the benefits
foregone and losses due to accident occurrence.
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the range of events for which licensee financial incentives
for accident prevention exist so that regulation can be
focused appropriately.
Another issue which has recently been under review by
the NRC is the insurance requirements for U.S. nuclear
power reactors. The requirements for licensee purchase of
onsite property damage indemnity insurance have recently
been upgraded by the NRC in light of the experience with
severe accident costs at Three Mile Island Unit 2 ;Lo82].
Requirements for offsite property damage liability,
currently limited by the Price-Anderson Act, have also been
under recent review. It is necessary to combine accident
cost and frequency estimates to evaluate the spectrum of
LWR economic risk for consideration in decisions regarding
nuclear power reactor insurance requirements.
Analysis of LWR economic risks is useful for
decision-making within the U.S. nuclear power industry.
The accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 dramatically
demonstrated that plant licensees may incur very
significant costs for events which have negligable offsite
costs. After the accident at TMI, nuclear industry
attention has focused on estimates of the financial risks
-22-
borne by utilities which own shares of nuclear power plants
[St81]. The nuclear insurance industry is also very
concerned with the frequencies and costs of nuclear power
reactor accidents for rate-making and risk coverage
purposes.
The goal of this report is to develop LWR accident
economic risk analysis methods and estimates for use in the
regulatory decision-making process. Therefore, the
estimates and methods developed focus on LWR accident costs
from a societal viewpoint. There are many groups or
organizations which may ultimately bear some of the costs
of an LWR event. The transfer payments between parties
which lead to the ultimate distribution of costs after an
accident are addressed in less detail in this report. The
potential transfers after accidents are complex because of
the many groups with an interest in the nuclear power and
electric utility industries. Societal costs are estimated
in this report by accounting for losses which directly
affect the plant licensee, the public, the nuclear
industry, or the electric utility industry after LWR
events. Clearly, a particular organization or group may be
interested in specific costs and not interested in other
costs based on liability for losses incurred. For specific
-23-
interest groups it is important to carefully investigate
the distributions of losses in addition to the societal
cost estimates contained in this report. These issues are
addressed in other economic studies, but are not included
in detail in this investigation.
Societal accident costs are calculated in this report
within a probabilistic risk framework. One of the most
important and difficult aspects of this effort has been in
estimating the uncertainties associated with the cost
distributions presented. Estimation of accident costs must
necessarily involve information regarding accident physical
processes, radionuclide release and behavior in the
environment, methods and costs for accident mitigation
measures, costs for losses incurred, and future policy
decisions which would be made after severe accident
occurrence. Uncertainties exist in both event frequency
and consequence estimates for LWR accidents. Both
subjective and analytical analysis techniques are used to
develop rough estimates of the uncertainties in the LWR
economic risk values preserted in this report. Clearly,
further research is required to accurately estimate the
uncertainties in LWR accident frequencies and consequences.
As new information regarding LWR accident risks becomes
-24-
available, updated uncertainty estimates should be
incorporated.
1.2 LWR EVENTS AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
A wide range of possible events can occur during LWR
operation which can have societal economic impacts ranging
from benign to severe. Because of the range of economic
consequences of LWR events, it is useful to discuss a
spectrum of LWR economic risk. The spectrum can be
represented by a distribution of event frequency versus
cost (or event frequency versus severity). An example of
the LWR risk spectrum which is discussed in this report is
shown in Figure 1.1. This distribution is a complementary
cumulative frequency distribution of LWR event costs which
shows the frequency of events resulting in costs greater
than a specified magnitude.
1.2.1 CATEGORIZATION OF LWR OPERATIONAL EVENTS
The events which comprise the LWR economic risk
spectrum are divided for discussion in this study. Three
event categories are defined based on the severity of LWR
operational events which result in societal costs. This
-25-
Figure 1.1 - Example of LWR economic risk distribution.
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division of the economic risk spectrum and category
definitions used in this report are shown in Figure 1.2.
The discussion of LWR economic risk includes only those
events which occur during the operational life of an LWR
and not those events which might occur during plant
construction or decommissioning.
Event category I is defined to include all forced
outage events at LWR facilities which do not result in
core-damage or significant plant contamination (small
consequence events). These events, some of which occur
routinely during the life of a nuclear power plant, are not
scheduled or planned in advance (in contrast to refueling
or scheduled maintenance outages). The events result in
unplanned plant forced outage time (outage time refers to a
time period of zero power production from the plant), and
the maximum outage duration included in this category is on
the order of a few years. The events in this category may
result from spurious plant trips, operator errors,
unscheduled maintenance requirements, external events, or a
variety of plant system failures. There are no offsite
radiation-induced public health impacts or property damage
costs resulting from these events. Plant outages caused
explicitly by regulatory orders (i.e., plant shutdowns
-27-
Figure 1.2 - Event severity categories defined
of economic risks.
for estimation
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mandated by the NRC for regulatory reasons) are not
included in this category but are discussed separately in
Appendix B.
Event category II is defined to nclude LWR accidents
resulting in core-damage and possible fuel melting but
which do not result in breach of the reactor vessel or any
significant release of radioactive material to the
environment (medium consequence events). These accidents
result in the need for a plant decontamination effort
followed by either repair or decommissioning of the plant
after cleanup. LWR events resulting in fuel damage or
core-melt are included in this category only if the reactor
vessel is not breached by molten material (i.e., vessel
melt-through). There are no significant offsite health and
property damage impacts resulting from category II events.
Plant forced outages resulting from events in this category
are likely to last many years if the plant is repaired, or
may be permanent if decommissioning is begun immediately
after plant cleanup.
Event category III is defined to include all LWR
accidents which result in severe core-damage and either
reactor vessel breach (i.e., vessel melt-through) or a
-29-
significant release of radioactive material to the
environment (large consequence events). This category
includes severe core-melt accidents which have been
predicted to dominate the public health risks from nuclear
plant operation in the U.S. [Nu75a]. Severe accidents
which do not result in releases of radioactive material to
the environment but do result in reactor vessel
melt-through are included in this category. The accidents
in this category may result in offsite public health
impacts and property damage costs. There is a need for a
plant decontamination and cleanup program before plant
repair or decommissioning. These events have not been
experienced in U.S. commercial nuclear power plant
operation to date and are predicted to be extremely rare.
Each of these accident groups is di-cussed in
estimating LWR economic risks in Chapters 5 and 6. The
contribution of events of different severities to the
overall economic risk from LWR operation is discussed.
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1.2.2 DEFINITION OF "OFFSITE" AND "ONSITE" ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES
The discussion of LWR accident economic consequences
in this report is divided based on the location of
occurrence of resulting losses and the organizations
directly impacted by losses. Two groups of accident costs
are discussed, one which encompasses mainly those costs
which occur at offsite locations, and another which
includes losses which directly affect the plant licensee,
the nuclear power industry, the electric utility industry,
or occur at onsite locations. This division of accident
consequences is not strict in the sense that some costs may
first affect the plant licensee, and ultimately be
transferred to consumers at offsite locations.
"Offsite costs" include those costs which directly
affect the public or occur at offsite locations. The
offsite economic consequences of reactor accidents which
are discussed in this report include costs associated with
the countermeasures taken to reduce population radIiation
exposure after a contaminating event, the offsite property
damage or losses which occur as a result of an event, the
costs of radiation-induced health effects and health care
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costs incurred by the population living at offsite
locations, and indirect or secondary costs which may occur
outside of contaminated areas at offsite locations.
Specific offsite cost components include population
evacuation and temporary relocation costs, agricultural
product disposal costs, property decontamination costs,
land area interdiction and permanent relocation costs,
population health effect and health care costs, secondary
economic effect costs, and offsite litigation costs. These
costs are discussed in the development of LWR accident
offsite economic risk models.
"Onsite" ccident economic consequences include those
cost components which most directly affect the plant
licensee, electric utilities, the nuclear power industry,
or occur at onsite locations. The onsite economic
consequences of reactor accidents which are discussed in
this report include replacement electric power costs, plant
decontamination and repair costs, plant capital costs,
early decommissioning costs, electric utility "business
costs", nuclear industry impacts, plant worker health
effect costs, and litigation costs which directly affect
the plant licensees as a result of an accident. These cost
components are discussed in the development of LWR accident
-32-
onsite economic risk models.
The methods chosen for estimating LWR accident
economic consequences in this study are based on three
anticipated applications of the newly developed models:
1. Estimation of the absolute onsite and offsite
economic risks posed by LWR operation in the U.S.,
2. Site-specific analysis of onsite and offsite
economic risks for use in regulatory siting,
cost/benefit, or risk reduction decisions,
3. Generic and site-specific analyses of offsite
emergency response costs and consequence reduction
benefits for use in decisions regarding emergency
planning and post-accident population protective
action implementation.
The projected model applications significantly influence
the choice of economic consequence models and accident
impacts which are examined in this study.
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1.3 OUTLINE OF REPORT
Studies have been performed to estimate the economic
risks resulting from events in specific portions of the LWR
event spectrum. Chapter 2 of this report reviews results
and conclusions from previous studies concerning the
economic risks of LWR accidents. Previous and coincident
studies of specific topics regarding LWR accident economic
risk are discussed. Models previously developed to
estimate the economic consequences of LWR events are also
reviewed.
Onsite costs of LWR accidents are discussed in Chapter
3 of this report (see Table 1.1). Onsite cost component
models and estimates are developed for all unanticipated
LWR events. Available models are combined with historical
data, insurance claim data, and engineering-based cost
projections to form estimates of onsite accident costs.
Impacts which are not easily quantified in economic terms
are discussed, and uncertainties in event costs are also
addressed.
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Table 1.1 - LWR Event Costs Discussed in this Study
Chapter 3
Onsite Costs for Small, Medium, and Large Consequence Events
Replacement Power Costs
Plant Capital Costs
Plant Decontamination/Cleanup Costs
Plant Repair Costs
Early Decommissioning Costs
Onsite Litigation Costs
Worker Health Effect Costs
Worker Medical Care Costs
Electric Utility "Business
Costs"
Nuclear Power Industry Costs
Chapter 4
Offsite Costs for Medium and Large Consequence Events
Evacuation Costs Decontamination Program Costs
Temporary Relocation Costs Land Area Interdiction Costs
Agricultural Product Disposal Costs Permanent Relocation Costs
Secondary Impact Costs Offsite Litigation Costs
Public Medical Care Costs Public Health Effect Costs
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The offsite economic consequences of severe LWR
accidents are discussed in Chapter 4 of this report (see
Table 1.1). A new offsite economic consequence model is
developed for use in LWR economic risk calculations. The
new offsite economic consequence model is compared to
previous models, and data availability and limitations are
discussed.
The economic risk of small consequence LWR events is
discussed in Chapter 5 of this report. Historical
U.S. nuclear plant operating experience from he years
1974-1980 is used to estimate the frequency of LWR events
in this category. The data are used to estimate
distributions of event -frequencies and severities for
U.S. LWRs. The frequency estimates are combined with
onsite cost models to estimate the expected losses from
small consequence LWR events. Potential risk reduction
measures for small consequence LWR events are also
discussed.
The economic risks of medium and large consequence LWR
accidents are discussed in Chapter 6. The newly developed
onsite and offsite economic impact models are applied to
estimate societal risks from the operation of the Surry
-36-
reactor plant which was studied in the RSS Nu75a]. Model
predictions are compared with the results of previous
studies which employed the CRAC2 economic model to estimate
economic risks. The sensitivities of predicted offsite
costs to source term definition and post-accident
protective action implementation criteria are examined.
The new offsite cost models are used in an example
cost/benefit analysis of offsite protective action
implementation for severe accidents. The expected losses
from core-melt accidents are compared with losses from less
severe events to estimate the relative importance of low
versus high frequency events. The large uncertainties in
the probabilities of severe LWR accidents are also
discussed.
Finally, conclusions and recommendations concerning
the predicted accident economic risks and the use of models
to estimate LWR accident economic risks are outlined in
Chapter 7. Recommendations for further model development
and applications of the newly developed models are also
discussed.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF STUDIES OF LWR ACCIDENT ECONOMIC RISKS
The results of previous studies of LWR accident
economic risks are reviewed in this section. The
discussion is divided into two sections which review
studies which focus on "onsite" and "offsite" economic
consequences of LWR accidents.
2.1 PREVIOUS STUDIES OF LWR ACCIDENT OFFSITE ECONOMIC
RISKS
2.1.1 THE REACTOR SAFETY STUDY [NU75A,NU75B]
Estimates of the offsite economic risks of LWR
accidents are contained in The Reactor Safety Study (RSS)
[Nu75a,Nu75b] which was sponsored by the Atomic Energy
Commission. The objective of the RSS was to estimate the
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public risks which result from the operation of commercial
nuclear power plants in the U.S. The study formed realistic
estimates of public risks from nuclear power plants and
compared these risks with non-nuclear risks in society.
The property damage estimates in the RSS are based on
cost estimates for public protective measures which may be
taken after severe LWR accidents. No estimates of onsite
damage or possible secondary+ offsite costs from reactor
accidents were included in the RSS. The economic risk
estimates contained in the RSS are based on results
calculated with the CRAC consequence model [Nu75b].
The offsite loss estimates presented in the Reactor
Safety Study include the costs of population evacuation,
milk and crop disposal, decontamination of contaminated
areas, and interdiction (or the prohibition of the use of)
land areas and tangible wealth and resultant population
relocation from interdicted areas. The need for
decontamination or interdiction of land areas was
determined primarily by concentrations of surface-deposited
-39-
+ Secondary costs refer to potential accident offsite
impacts outside of directly contaminated areas.
long-lived isotopes (Cs-134, Cs-137) in the CRAC model.
For a very large release of radioactive material,
evacuation and milk and crop disposal costs each
contributed approximately 10%, decontamination costs
contributed about 20%, and land area interdiction costs
contributed about 60% to the total offsite costs of a
typical severe accident calculated with the CRAC model
[Nu77a].
The offsite property damage risk profile estimated for
a typical U.S. LWR in the RSS is shown in Figure 2.1. The
damage estimates shown are in 1974 dollars. A comparison
of property damage risk estimates for an industry of one
hundred similar nuclear power plants and for man-caused and
natural events in the U.S. is shown in Figure 2.2. The
majority of man-caused property damage resulted from fires.
Natural events causing significant property damage included
forest fires, hurricanes, and earthquakes. Nuclear plants
were estimated to be about one hundred to one thousand
times less likely to cause comparable large dollar value
accidents than other sources. All of the property damage
estimates for LWR accidents contained in the RSS were based
on the accident economic consequence model contained in the
CRAC code (Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences),
-40-
Figure 2.1 - RSS estimate of offsite economic risks from
a typical U.S. nuclear power plant [Nu75b].
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Figure 2.2 - RSS comparison of economic risks from 100 nuclear
power plants and other sources [Nu75a].
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which is discussed and compared to the newly developed
economic consequence model in Chapters 4 and 6 of this
report.
The property damage estimates included in the Reactor
Safety Study provide important information concerning the
offsite economic risks of LWR core-melt accidents.
Core-melt accident atmospheric radioactivity releases with
an estimated probability of 1X10 lper reactor-year were
predicted to result in $15 billion (1974 dollars) in
offsite costs. Core-melt accident releases with
probabilities larger than lX10-6 per reactor year were
predicted to result in less than $1 billion dollars in
offsite costs.
Studies have been performed since the RSS to provide
improved estimates of the frequencies of core-melt
accidents for specific LWR plants in the U.S. Because
current nuclear plant risk analyses focus on potential
public health effects of accidents, no substantial effort
has been made to improve offsite cost estimates for severe
LWR accidents. An improved model for estimating the
offsite economic consequences of degraded-core and
core-melt accidents at specific reactor sites is developed
-43-
in Chapter 4 of this report.
2.1.2 ECONO MARC: A METHOD FOR ASSESSING THE COST OF
EMERGENCY COUNTERMEASURES AFTER AN ACCIDENT [CL82]
A model has been developed for the purpose of
assessing the cost of emergency countermeasures taken after
an accidental release of radionuclides into the environment
in the United Kingdom [C181,C182]. The model estimates the
lost contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) caused by
population protective countermeasures implemented after an
accidental release. Cost estimates for the lost GDP
contribution from food bans, temporary evacuation, and
long-term interdiction of areas are included in the
economic consequence model.
The basic assumption underlying the ECONO-MARC model
is that the costs of countermeasures like land area
interdiction will be a function of the area's contribution
to Gross Domestic Product prior to the event. Gross
Domestic Product is a measure of economic output which is
used in National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) and
reflects the level of activity in an economy [Sa79]. GDP
is a broad macroeconomic measure which can be used to
-44-
estimate the contribution of a specific region to national
output. The ECONO-MARC model assesses the impact of
countermeasure implementation on regional contribution to
GDP.
The lost contributions to GDP due to population
evacuation, agricultural product bans, and permanent
population relocation which might result from a
contaminating event were included in the ECONO-MARC model.
Two approaches to the estimation of lost GDP were
accommodated in the model; one based on detailed land
usage and industrial output analysis, and another based on
average GDP per-capita figures. The results of both
methods of analysis using ECONO-MARC are very similar for a
rural site. Results calculated using the two methods
differ substantially for a semi-urban site. The difference
in estimates is generally large for very small areas and
gets smaller as the size of the area increases. The
estimation of GDP losses based on per-capita information is
advantageous because of its computational simplicity
relative to the land usage approach which requires tedious
manual sampling of data points from detailed land usage
maps.
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There are two significant problems in the estimation
of accident impacts using the ECONO-MARC modeling approach.
Because GDP measures the rate of output in an economy, it
is necessary to integrate GDP losses over time to estimate
the total costs of post-accident countermeasures.
Projected GDP losses are likely to be temporary since the
loss of production from a specific region may be
substituted by increased output from a different region, or
from new investment in the economy. This adjustment of the
economy, demonstrated in Figure 2.3, is frequently observed
after natural disasters and wars. The resilience of the
U.S. economy to disasters has been demonstrated many times
after earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods [ED74,Pe77].
After severe disasters, economies of impacted regions
resume previous or even higher rates of growth in
relatively short periods of time. Predictions of GDP loss
due to accidents are sensitive to the time history of
economic recovery assumed, which is difficult to specify
without very detailed analysis. Another problem with the
GDP approach is that the loss of regional tangible wealth
(or assets accumulated prior to the accident) is not
properly accounted for, particularly those assets which
produce output which is not directly measured in market
-46-
Figure 2.3 - Temporary nature of GDP loss due to population
protective measure implementation [C182].
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transactions. This is a very significant problem since
results from the CRAC2 model predict tangible asset losses
are very important.
The ECONO-MARC model provides a broad macroeconomic
measure of the offsite impacts of reactor accident
countermeasures for Britain. Model predictions are not
directly comparable to CRAC2 economic impact predictions
which are based on microeconomic models and assumptions
which may be specific to the U.S. Also, the CRAC2 model
estimates the direct costs of countermeasures such as
decontamination which are not considered in the ECONO-MARC
model. Because of the limitations and accounting problems
in estimating the GDP loss resulting from LWR accidents,
this approach is not employed in this study.
2.1.3 ESTIMATING THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF A NUCLEAR
REACTOR ACCIDENT [CA82]
A study has been performed to deveLop an industrial
impact model that can be used to estimate the regional
industry-specific economic impacts of severe nuclear
reactor accidents [Ca82]. The impact estimates are based
on reactor-specific information for core-melt accidents and
regional economic models derived from the Regional
Input-Output Modeling System (RIMS-II) developed at the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Ca81]. The ultimate
goal of the investigation was to develop models which could
be used to evaluate the potential impacts of Class 9 (the
most severe) reactor accidents for Environmental Impact
Statements.
Estimates of reactor accident impacts were based on
the results of interregional, interindustry analyses in the
BEA studies. These analyses require large amounts of
economic input data in the form of interindustry
transaction tables for each specific region under
consideration [Le66]. These transaction tables were
defined in the BEA analyses based on county or SMSA+ level
data. The RIMS II economic model was used to predict
changes in regional output resulting from changes in final
demand or final payments caused by a reactor accident. The
basic input-output methodology used and the results of BEA
studies are analyzed in detail in Appendix C.
Results of the BEA analyses for the St. Lucie nuclear
+ Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
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reactor site are shown in Table 2.1. This table shows
predicted private sector employment losses due to emergency
countermeasures taken after an SST1 accident at the
St. Lucie site with a WNW wind direction+. The "physically
affected" area is defined to include all areas contaminated
by the release of radioactive material from the reactor
plant. The physically unaffected area ncludes all other
areas around the reactor plant. Table 2.1 shows that the
SST1 accident with the WNW wind direction is predicted to
result in -80,000 annual job losses due to the reactor
accident. The effects in the physically unaffected area
are predicted to be relatively small compared to annual job
losses in the physically affected area.
The BEA estimates of reactor accident industrial
impacts were presented in terms of annual jobs lost. The
+ The SST1 accident category was defined for the Sandia
Siting Study to represent a severe core-melt accident
which results in a rapid, large release of radioactive
material to the environment [A182]. Accidents in this
category result in release of approximately 100% of the
reactor core inventory of noble gases and 50% of the
volatile radionuclides in a very short time period.
-50-
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impact estimates were intended to account only for the
first year after core-melt accident occurrence. Also, many
assumptions were required to adapt the LWR accident problem
so that impact estimates can be calculated using the
RIMS-II models. In particular, the BEA impact estimates
were based on areas defined at the county level. The
definitions of areas impacted by post-accident
countermeasures either include or exclude entire counties
for estimation of economic impacts. Because this can lead
to significant changes in the definition of areas affected
by accidents, the BEA accident impact estimates cannot be
directly compared to other accident cost estimates,
particularly those from the CRAC or CRAC2 economic models.
Also, the usefulness of input-output analysis techniques
for modeling non-equilibrium post-accident situations is
questionable. The input-output technique is far too costly
and data-intensive for consideration in LWR risk analysis
applications which require sampling of hundreds of
meteorological conditions for each accident category. A
discussion of problems with the BEA post-accident modeling
approach and an analysis of the BEA results is contained in
Appendix C of this report.
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2.2 STUDIES WHICH ESTIMATE ONSITE ECONOMIC RISKS
2.2.1 ESTIMATES OF THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR
POWER REACTOR ACCIDENTS ST821
Preliminary estimates of the financial consequences of
potential nuclear reactor accidents were developed as part
of the current NRC program to develop methods for
estimating reactor accident financial risks. The onsite
and offsite financial consequences of LWR core-melt
accidents were estimated based on results of calculations
performed with the CRAC2 economic consequence model and
estimates of onsite costs for worker health effects,
replacement power, and accident cleanup costs. Dollar
values were assigned to radiation induced health effects
based on a review of societal expenditures for life-saving
safety measures. Health effect values of $1,000,000 per
early fatality, $100,000 per early injury, and $100,000 per
latent cancer fatality were used in the analysis.
Site-specific, life-cycle core-melt accident financial risk
estimates were developed for reactor-site combinations in
the U.S.
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The study outlined discounting methods to calculate
life-cycle core-melt accident economic risks. These
methods were used to calculate isks from core-melt
accidents based on the remaining years in the LWR plant
life, which is assumed to be forty years from the plant
start-up date. This type of analysis is valuable for
estimating the expected cost avoided by installation of a
specific accident prevention system in an operating LWR.
Equations were presented for calculating the life-cycle
risk at a particular LWR based on probability estimates for
various classifications of LWR accidents. The assessment
or tabulation of site-specific accident probabilities was
not addressed in the report.
The mean total predicted risks from this study for the
SST1, SST2, and SST3 core-melt accident release categories
at the Surry plant are shown in Table 2.2+. Discounted
economic risks for the remaining productive lifetime of the
Surry plant are presented in the table. To calculate the
discounted present value core-melt accident risks over the
remaining plant lifetime, estimates of accident frequencies
fl, f2, and f3 (per reactor year) must be multiplied out in
Table 2.2. These multiplications yield the total
discounted risks in 1981 dollars. Onsite cost components
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were predicted to dominate all other cost components for
the smaller releases, and to be comparable to other costs
for the SST1 release. The onsite costs were large because
it was assumed that the plant would be decommissioned after
any core-melt accident. Replacement power costs were
integrated over the remaining life of the reactor plant to
estimate the loss of benefit to society provided by plant
operation. Assuming a core-melt accident frequency of
approximately 10- 4 per reactor-year, the life-cycle
core-melt financial risk at this plant is estimated to be
on the order of 106 to 107 dollars. The estimated risks
+ The SST1-SST3 accident source terms were defined in the
Sandia Siting Study [A182] to represent the range of
potential releases of radioactive material resulting from
core-melt accidents with containment failure. The SST1
release category includes accidents which result in
containment failure due to rapid overpressurization and
release of a large fraction of the core inventory to the
environment. The SST3 accident category includes
core-melt accidents with slight containment leakage which
result in small releases of radioactive material and
minimal offsite consequences.
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did not include costs for any accidents less severe than
core-melt accidents.
The results of this study are useful for estimating
the financial risks of core-melt accidents at specific
sites given a core-melt accident severity versus
probability spectrum. The onsite cost estimates were based
on rough estimates of onsite societal costs for core-melt
accidents (large consequence events). The report
incorporated the replacement power cost model which is
discussed and utilized later in this study. Also, the use
of present value discounting in calculating life-cycle risk
discussed in the study is useful for the utilization of
risk estimates in regulatory decision-making.
2.2.2 "COPING WITH NUCLEAR POWER RISKS: THE ELECTRIC
UTILITY INCENTIVES" [ST81]
As a result of the accident at TMI-2 in March 1979,
much interest has shifted to the potential onsite economic
consequences of LWR accidents. A 1981 study by C. Starr
and C. Whipple of EPRI [St81] estimated the financial risks
from nuclear plant events by interpolating between
frequency-severity data from routine outages and the
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results of the Reactor Safety Study. The study included
rough estimates of both the onsite and offsite consequences
of reactor accidents in estimating LWR financial risk. The
results of the analysis are used to suggest that utility
self-interest and the public interest in nuclear reactor
accident prevention are coincident.
An estimated event frequency versus forced outage
duration (or time to repair) curve was combined with a cost
versus outage duration curve to form the frequency versus
cost curve (shown as cost to the utility before insurance
recovery) in Figure 2.4. Curves were also estimated for
utility risks with insurance coverage. The curves for
public risk shown in Figure 2.4 are taken from the Reactor
Safety Study [Nu75a] and modified by multiplying public
health effects by constant dollar values. The values
assumed for health effects and the expected values of
public risks are compared to the expected utility risks in
Table 2.3. Based on the analysis, it was argued that
utility financial risks dominate public risks.
The need for consideration of both onsite and offsite
risks over a broad range of possible events was emphasized
in the results of this study. Although the study was
-58-
Figure 2.4 - Estimated utility and public economic risks for
reactor outages and accidents St8l].
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Table 2.3 - Expected values of public and utility risks from
LWR outages and accidents St81].
PUBULIC RISKS-EXPECTED VALUE PER REACTOR-YEAR
Effect
Early fatalities
Early Illness
Latent fatalities
Thyroid nodules
Genetic effects
Poperty damage
Expectation'
3X 104
2x 14
7X 104
7 X 10
1 X 104
$20,000
Value (5)
106
Twice WAS1400
Twice WASH-1400
Expected Cost (S)
150
20
700
20
10
40,000
*SWc: WASH1400. Table 4.
UTIUTY RISKS-EXPECTED VALUE PER REACTOR-YEAR
Dollars
With $450 million insurance 2.1 X 10
With $300 million insurance 29 X 106
No insurance (includes accidents
causing 10 days outage or longer) 24 X 106
-60-
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performed using coping-type estimates of event frequencies
and costs, the conclusion that utility risk dominates
public risk was determined to be insensitive to
uncertainties in parameters.
2.3 SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF PREVIOUS STUDIES
Previous studies have estimated the risks from the
offsite economic consequences of severe LWR accidents.
Three separate models have been developed to estimate the
offsite economic impacts of severe accidents, each of which
employs a fundamentally different economic methodology for
estimation of accident costs. The three models, CRAC (or
CRAC2), ECONO-MARC, and 'RIMS-II, estimate different
attributes of the impacts of severe LWR accidents, and
therefore their results cannot be directly compared. The
results of previous studies of offsite economic
consequences and risks indicate a potential for significant
offsite economic impacts for very low probability accident
sequences.
In light of the accident at TMI-2, interest has
focused in large part on the potential onsite losses
resulting from LWR accidents. Recent studies performed at
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EPRI and Sandia National Laboratories have attempted to
include onsite costs in examinations of LWR economic risks.
Both studies concluded that onsite accident costs are
likely to dominate offsite accident costs except in the
case of very low probability core-melt accidents
accompanied by large atmospheric radionuclide releases.
This conclusion is supported by the TMI-2 accident
experience, where offsite costs (of evacuation only) were
very small compared to the costs of onsite property damage
and replacement power. To maintain proper perspective it
is important to examine both onsite and offsite costs of
LWR accidents, particularly in performing cost-benefit or
risk-reduction calculations.
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CHAPTER 3
ONSITE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF LWR EVENTS
LWR event economic consequences which most directly
affect the plant licensee or occur at onsite locations are
discussed in this section. Models used in estimating the
onsite economic consequences of LWR events are developed.
Onsite cost components are estimated for each category of
LWR operational events.
3.1 ONSITE COST COMPONENTS DISCUSSED
The onsite economic consequences which are important
in estimating the societal benefits foregone or costs
caused by an LWR outage or accident depend on the severity
of the event which causes the loss. The cost components
discussed in this section include power production cost
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increases, reactor plant capital investments lost, plant
decontamination costs, plant repair costs, costs due to
early decommissioning, worker health effect and health care
costs, electric utility "business costs," nuclear power
industry costs, and onsite litigation costs which may
result from an LWR event. These costs either directly
affect LWR plant licensees, electric utilities, the nuclear
power industry, or occur at onsite locations and are
therefore considered to be onsite costs. Each onsite cost
component is discussed in detail. The discount rate used
in the analysis of post-accident cash flows is also
discussed.
3.2 DISCOUNT RATE USED IN ESTIMATING SOCIETAL COSTS
Present-value discounting is a method of representing
the time-value of money in financial analyses. Discounting
is used to convert all cash flows which occur at different
points in time to a common time basis. Standard textbooks
on economics or finance review the basis and formulas used
in present value-discounting [Br81,Sa79,Ar76].
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The discount rate used in financial analyses is
normally chosen to represent the "opportunity cost of
capital" based on the level of risk associated with a
particular investment strategy [Br81l. This rate is
estimated by adding a risk premium for a given investment
to the risk-free discount rate. The rate of return which
can be earned on investments with zero risk is defined to
be the risk-free rate (normally taken to be the available
real rate of return on short-term U.S. Treasury bills).
Risk premiums are estimated based on the risk associated
with specific investments. Higher levels of risk imply
higher risk premiums. The risk free rate plus the risk
premium for an investment corresponds to the rate of return
which can be earned by investing the same amount of capital
in a different project with equal risk.
Discount rates are commonly estimated from interest
rates charged in capital markets. Market interest rates
include allowances for general inflation in the economy. A
real interest rate can be estimated from the nominal (or
observed) market rate using:
(I + i) J- 1 (3.1)
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where
re - the apparent interest rate observed in the
economy,
i - the inflation rate in the economy,
r the real interest rate.
It is appropriate to use real discount rates in performing
analyses of future cash flows to avoid projecting future
inflation rates, and because real cash flows and discount
rates show less variation than nominal flows and rates.
A societal discount rate is chosen in this study to
represent the value judgement of society for consumption of
capital today versus consumption at some point in the
future. The rate can also be interpreted as the
opportunity cost of capital to society for low-risk
investments. To estimate the societal discount rate, the
prime rate, which is the interest rate charged by large
U.S. money centers to their best business borrowers, is
corrected for inflation to arrive at a real discount rate.
This real discount rate has averaged approximately 4% per
year in recent years. This estimate of the societal
discount rate is used in performing all present value
analyses in this study.
The appropriate discount rate for present-value
analyses must be chosen based on the characteristics of the
case under consideration. The rate used in this study may
not be appropriate for analysts in the electric utility
industry performing financial risk analyses for nuclear
power plant accidents. In general, the opporzunity cost of
capital to industry is higher than the societal discount
rate [CR82]. Also, the Office of Management and Budget of
the U.S. Government recommends the use of a 10% discount
rate for government decision-making. Therefore, the
sensitivity of projected costs to discount rate is studied
using 0% (i.e., no discounting) and 10% rates along with
the recommended 4% societal discount rate.
3.3 REPLACEMENT POWER COSTS
One of the most important cost components over much of
the spectrum of LWR events is the incremental cost of
replacement power, or the production cost increase for
supplying power to the associated electric utility system
during a nuclear plant outage. The net societal costs
resulting from the need to replace power which had been
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produced by a previously operating reactor can be very
substantial. The net cost is incurred because power
produced by operating nuclear plants is cheaper than that
available from sources used for replacement power.
The methods available for compensating for the
generating capacity lost due to a nuclear reactor forced
outage depend on the duration and timing of the forced
outage event [Bu82]. For shorter duration outages it is
possible that a utility would not have to purchase
replacement power but through short-term generation
increases and load management methods could meet the needs
of its service area. This has been identified in a recent
study of the loss of benefits from nuclear plant outages
[Bu82]. Typical utility emergency operating procedures for
short-term outages (1 month to 1 year) are shown in Table
3.1. The fourth item in Table 3.1 is the purchase of
emergency power from other utilities.
For longer-term nuclear plant outages or permanent
plant shutdowns, there exists an alternate set of options
to offset the need for generating capacity lost due to the
plant outage. These options include long-term purchase
agreements with neighboring utilities, load management and
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Table 3.1 - Typical utility operating procedures for
short duration outages Bu82].
Utility Actiof 
Bypaso plint pollution control
equip ent
Switch from ecosomic dispatch to
critical fuel coeservation dispatch
Purchase excess industrial generation
Purchase mergency power from other
utilities
Reduce standby reserves
Direct load control (customer load
management)
Reduce voltage by 5S
Appeal to industry
Appeal to public
Interrupt interruptibles ervice
Run generating units at extreme outputs
Rduce spinning reserve to ero
Reduce voltage 82 ( additional 32)
Shed load (rotating blackouts)
Typical tffect
Increae available generating
capacity by mall amount
Prolong tim before ore serious
emergency actions are necessary
Add generating capacity
Often make substantial power
available, but at high cost
Increase generating capacity by
50-1002 of the capacity of 
large unit
Reduce load
Reduce load by 32
Reduce load by 1-22
Reduce load by 1-22
Reduce load
Increase generating capacity by
1-32
ncreaase generating capacity by
the capacity of a large unit
laduce load by 12
Reduce load by amount necessary
to balance with supply
SActlons are listed In the approximate order in which they would be
lmplesented.
__
conservation programs, deferment of planned power plant
retirements, acceleration of existing construction
schedules, addition of new capacity to the utility
construction schedule, additional interconnections in the
power grid, and the imposition of restructured electricity
usage rates.
All of the available options for compensating for
nuclear plant forced outage time have associated societal
costs. This cost is incurred because nuclear power plants
in operation have very low operating and fuel-cycle costs
relative to fossil-fueled units. Because large operating
nuclear generating units produce low marginal cost power,
they are normally employed in base-load generation of
electricity and higher marginal cost non-nuclear generating
units are used to handle variations in power requirements
on a daily or seasonal basis. The loss of power generation
from a nuclear generating unit normally results in the need
to employ higher cost generating units, and a net cost
results from the use of a more expensive energy source.
Therefore, because of the low marginal power production
costs of operating nuclear units, and their use in meeting
base load requirements, any forced outage is likely to
result in some net power production cost increase.
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Because of the variation in methods and fuels used for
generating replacement power in different parts of the
U.S., the costs of replacement power for nuclear plant
outages will vary depending on plant location. In
estimating the losses from a nuclear plant forced outage
event, the plant location and likely mix of units to be
used for generation of replacement power must be accounted
for. Also, the availability of interconnections and power
transfer must be considered along with the availability of
excess capacity to be used for replacement power
generation.
In this study it is assumed that excess capacity
exists for generation of replacement power for a given
reactor plant or site forced outage. This assumption is
justified given the current state of power productive
capacity in the U.S. [Bu82]. However, if in some specific
case replacement power for a nuclear unit outage was not
available, then the societal costs of decreased power
system reliability and supply shortages must be considered.
This is discussed in the study of the loss of benefits from
nuclear plant outages [Bu82].
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There are other potential costs resulting from the
production of replacement power for nuclear plant outages
which are not estimated in this report. Increased mining,
shipment, and burning of replacement fuels may result in
impacts on human health and safety. Also, the increased
use of fossil fuels could result in environmental effects
such as acid rain or CO2 global climate effects. These
potential losses are treated as externalities and are not
included in the estimation of replacement power costs from
nuclear plant outages in this study.
3.3.1 SIMPLIFIED MODEL FOR NUCLEAR PLANT OUTAGE POWER
PRODUCTION COST INCREASES
A simplified method for estimating the societal costs
resulting from nuclear power plant outages has been
developed in a previous study [Bu82]. A detailed loss of
benefits analysis requires data-intensive models that
simulate the characteristics of a particular utility
affected by a plant outage. These detailed models include
regional load growth, expansion plans, mix of generating
units, and emergency options which might be available for a
particular utility. The simplified method for estimating
reactor outage costs is intended to provide rough estimates
of the production cost increases for a specific plant
outage.
The simplified model relates first year power
production cost increases to the fraction of replacement
power from oil-fired power plants and non-economy+ power
purchases. The simple model relationship between oil-fired
and non-economy replacement power fraction and the power
production cost increase due to a full year of reactor
outage time is shown in Figure 3.1. Also shown is the
range of results from detailed loss of benefits case
studies from which the simple model is derived. The data
from the analyses are not sufficient to develop a detailed
relationship, but the data do provide an estimate of the
importance of the fraction of replacement power from
non-economy sources in determining production cost
increases. Beyond the first year of forced outage
duration, the yearly power production cost increase can be
modified for real cost escalation to estimate the total
power production cost increase for long-duration plant
outages.
+ Non-economy power purchases refer to power generated by
higher marginal fuel sources (e.g., gas turbines).
_
Figure 3.1 - Relationship between power production cost
increase and non-economy power fraction [Bu821.
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In order to use the relationship in Figure 3.1, it is
necessary to estimate the fraction of non-economy purchases
for a specific plant outage. For the purpose of this study
the average fraction of replacement power from non-economy
purchases within each of the National Electric Reliability
Council (NERC) regions is employed. The NERC regions in
the U.S. are shown in Figure 3.2, along with the average
fraction of non-economy replacement power purchases for
each region in Table 3.2 [Bu82]. The average fraction of
non-economy purchases varies widely across the NERC
regions.
Given an estimate of the fraction of oil-fired and
non-economy replacement power purchases for an outage, the
present discounted value of the production cost increase
for a given forced outage can be calculated by integrating
over the outage duration:
D MC F(t)e-'tdt (3.2)
where
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u;
Average Fraction of ol-8Fired and Non-Economy
Replacement Energy by NERC Region** Bu82]
National Electric Percent of Replacement Energy
Reliablllty Council from Oll-Flred Power Plants and
Re a Non-Economy Power Purehses
MARCA . . 20
NPCC _ 95'_..
MAAC ...... 60
MAIN l&
ERCOT 60
SPP 40
WSSS California) 95
WSSS (non-California) 25
SERC 15"
ECAR 5
Based on ANL loss-of-benefit studies [Bu82]. Data from other regions derived
from [NA81,DE81].
Over a ten year outage period, the replacement fuel for a known outage would
change as utilities make firm arrangements for power transfers. The regions having
the highest dependence on high-priced fuels would be the most likely to change
over time. In general, replacement capacity would not be available in less than 10
years.
Dv a present discounted value of production cost
increases over the outage period (1982 $),
F(t)- unit production cost increases of outage versus
time ($/MWe-year),
M - electrical generation rating of reactor involved
in outage (MWe),
C - assumed capacity factor of plant had outage not
occurred (%),
r = real discount rate,
tl,t2 = start, end time of reactor plant outage.
The simple model was derived in the loss of benefits study
on the assumption that the plant would have operated at an
average capacity factor of 65% had the outage not occurred.
The real power production cost increase as a function
of time can be specified. Two cases of importance include
the assumption of zero growth in real power production
costs (F(t) = constant in equation 3.2), and a constant
real escalation rate of power production cost. For the
latter case the production cost model becomes:
Dp I65 Foe('r #dt (3.3)
ArC/5 ,PPJ'
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or,
MCPo -(r-)s- ,C(--1 (3.4)
DP (rg) j (3.4)
where
F.- power production cost increase at time zero
($/MWe-year),
g - real escalation rate of replacement power costs
(per year).
This is the form of the model which is used in this study,
with Festimated from the average fraction of replacement
power supplied from non-economy purchases (Table 3.2).
It is important to recognize the limitations and
assumptions which underlie the simple model for estimating
power production cost increases due to reactor outages:
1. The model is intended to provide estimates of the
power production cost increases for long-duration
outages at nuclear power plants.
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2. The model does not account for utility-specific
characteristics such as fuel mix, excess capacity,
load curves, and alternative options which could
be employed during plant outages.
3. The correlation between replacement energy from
non-economy purchases and the production cost
increase due to the first year of outage time is
based only on a range of values observed in
detailed case studies.
4. The average (non utility-specific) fraction of
non-economy replacement power purchases for an
NERC region is used in this study.
5. The cost estimates are based on studies performed
at a time when fossil fuel prices were high
relative to nuclear generation costs. Drastic
changes in world oil prices or other fossil fuel
prices relative to nuclear generation prices could
change the basis for the model.
6. External replacement power costs such as
environmental effects are not included in the
model.
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The simple replacement power cost model is used for
outages of less than 10 years duration in this study. The
model is also used to estimate the costs of short duration
outage events (<1 year). This is an extension of the
intended use of the model since it was developed for use in
modeling production cost increases for long duration
outages. The model does not account for daily or seasonal
effects which might have important impacts on the costs of
short outages, or alternative measures to alleviate the
need for replacement power purchases [Bu82]. Therefore,
the simple model could significantly overestimate the costs
for very short duration outages. However, the model is
appropriate based on other uncertainties in the event cost
analysis performed in this study. For plant outages
lasting more than 10 years or permanent plant shutdowns,
the power production cost increase for the first 10 years
is combined with the capital cost model discussed in the
following section. The replacement power cost model is
also used to estimate power purchase costs for multiple
unit plant shutdowns at a single site.
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3.4 REACTOR PLANT CAPITAL INVESTMENT LOSS AFTER SEVERE
ACCI DENTS
For some LWR events, plant damage may be so severe
that the reactor would be permanently shut down sooner than
originally planned, thus shortening the productive lifetime
of the reactor plant. In these cases, the entire capital
investment in the plant may not have been recovered, so
some part of the capital cost of the plant re: ;sents
investment lost. The normal method for accounting for this
loss would be to calculate the depreciated value of the
reactor plant at the time of the event. The remaining book
value of the plant is a loss after an event which results
in early permanent shutdown.
For example, if a nuclear plant is 18 years old when
an event causing permanent plant shutdown occurs, and the
anticipated plant service lifetime is 40 years, 22 years of
societal benefits from plant operation are lost due to the
event. To account for this physical plant loss using
traditional methods, the initial capital investment in the
plant would be depreciated over 18 years using a specified
depreciation schedule (e.g., straight line,
sum-of-the-years digits, double declining balance). This
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depreciated value should represent the remaining value of
the initial capital investment. Unfortunately, standard
accounting depreciation and plant lifetime schedules are
accelerated and shortened to allow for earlier capital
depreciation tax deductions. Therefore, the depreciated
capital value estimated using this method may be zero.
Also, the possibility of investment appreciation is not
accounted for in estimates of book value using depreciation
schedules. Therefore, the standard accounting book value
does not truly represent the potential future societal
benefits of plant operation which are lost due to the
accident.
The net societal cost of permanent plant shutdown is
estimated in this study by including replacement power cost
increases and capital costs necessary to replace the lost
productive capacity of the plant. Power production cost
increases are integrated for a period of 10 years in which
new productive capacity could be built to replace the
shutdown plant. After the new replacement plant is
constructed and brought on line, the capital costs of the
new plant are integrated for the remaining lifetime of the
original plant at which the accident occurred. In the
example, the annualized capital costs of the new plant are
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integrated for 12 years after completion of the new plant.
This cost is added to the 10-year integrated cost of
replacement power purchases necessary while the new plant
was under construction and non-productive (Figure 3.3). In
the example, the net societal cost of the plant shutdown
includes 10 years of replacement power purchases, and 12
years of new plant capital amortization. Costs beyond the
projected productive lifetime of the damaged plant are
assumed to be similar to those incurred had the accident
not taken place. Therefore, the time horizon of concern
with this approach is limited to the remaining productive
lifetime of the original plant. It is assumed that a
nuclear plant would be built to replace the damaged plant
for ease of cost estimation.
The present value of the capital costs of a new
1000MWe nuclear power plant at the time of plant startup is
assumed to be 3 billion 1982 dollars in this study. This
cost estimate is used to estimate an annualized capital
charge over the 40-year plant life using standard present
value discounting. It is assumed that plant capital costs
are linearly dependent on plant electrical output rating in
the analysis. No capital costs are included for accidents
which result in replacement power purchase periods of less
Figure 3.3 - Replacement power cost increases and newreplacement plant capital costs in example problem.
¢
4
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than 10 years. Capital costs are only estimated for severe
reactor accidents (category II and III events) which might
result in early permanent plant shutdown.
The present discounted cost calculated using the above
method includes the value of the physical plant loss and
power production cost increases assuming that excess
capacity exists which can be used for replacement electric
power generation during new plant construction. The cost
reflects the use of a non-optimal fuel for electric power
generation for the 10 year period in which new capacity is
not available to replace the damaged plant. However, if
for some reason sufficient excess capacity does not exist
for replacement of the lost generation capacity, then the
above method must be modified to account for the costs of
potential electric power supply shortages (i.e., brownouts,
blackouts) which are not included in the simple replacement
power cost model.
3.5 PLANT DECONTAMINATION COSTS
After a serious accident at an LWR facility (medium or
large consequence event) it may be necessary to
decontaminate areas within the power plant which have
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become contaminated with radioactive material released from
the reactor core. Cost estimates for the decontamination
of areas within the reactor plant after serious accidents
are reviewed in this section. These costs are negligible
for routine forced outage events.
3.5.1 PLANT DECONTAMINATION COSTS FOR CATEGORY II EVENTS
(MEDIUM CONSEQUENCES)
A flowchart for post-accident actions following LWR
events of different severities is presented in Figure 3.4.
After any severe LWR accident the facility must be brought
to a stable condition. The stabilization of plant systems
would result in small incremental costs relative to the
costs of cleanup and repair or decommissioning. The costs
of post-accident plant decontamination are discussed in
this section.
3.5.1.1 TMI-2 Accident Experience
The experience gained to date with the cleanup of the
accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 provides a source of
information regarding medium consequence reactor accident
cleanup/decontamination costs. The accident on March 28,
-87-
Figure 3.4 - Flowchart of post-accident actions forLWR event categories.
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1979, resulted in significant fuel cladding failure and
perhaps some fuel melting in the reactor core region. The
auxiliary and containment buildings for Unit 2 were
contaminated with radioactive material released from the
reactor core during the accident.
Several time and cost estimates for the TMI-2 recovery
program have been developed as the cleanup process
continues. Because the process is a learning experience,
cost estimates and program plans must be continually
updated to reflect new information. The cost estimates
presented in this section are based on Revision 1 of the
TMI-2 Recovery Program Estimate dated July, 1981 [GP81].
Updated recovery program plans and cost estimates have been
prepared but the cost estimates are not significantly
different from Revision 1 estimates.
The estimates of the cleanup costs for the TMI-2 unit
contain allowances for delays resulting from problems in
financing plant cleanup and regulatory concerns. Revision
1 of the recovery program plan includes a longer time for
plant cleanup due to the lack of available funding for the
recovery program. The extended cleanup program plan
incorporates higher cost estimates for base plant
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operations and maintenance which must be performed
throughout the entire cleanup process regardless of the
total program duration. There are distinct cost advantages
to completion of the cleanup program in the shortest
possible time period.
The cash flow diagram for the estimated costs of the
TMI-2 decontamination and cleanup program is shown in
Figure 3.5. The cash flows represent total undiscounted
costs in 1980 dollars for each year measured from the time
of accident occurrence+. The estimates include costs for
disposal of radioactive waste, except for the reactor core
which is to be stored in the Spent Fuel Storage Pool. The
estimates do not include allowances for reconstruction or
decommissioning of the reactor after cleanup. The costs
for man-rem incurred during the cleanup process are also
not included in the total cost estimates. However, the
projected cleanup effort is predicted to result in =30,000
+ Cost estimates for the 1979-1980 period are combined in
Revision 1 of the TMI-2 Recovery Program Plan. The total
cost for 1979-1980 has been scaled by the actual duration
of the recovery program in 1979 and 1980 to estimate
expenditures in these years.
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Figure 3.5 - Projected expenditures on TMI-2 decontaminationprogram versus time GP81].
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man-remin to workers, which has a negligible contribution to
the total estimated cleanup cost.
The net present value of the TMI-2 decontamination and
cleanup costs per Revision 1 of the program plan is
estimated using discrete escalation and discounting:
nO L[(+ )]I
where
DC = the net present value of decontamination costs
at the time of accident occurrence,
= the year measured from the year of accident
occurrence,
mz = the year of the completion of the cleanup
program,
C.= unescalated, undiscounted program cost estimate
for year n after accident occurrence,
g = real escalation rate for program costs (assumed
constant and uniform for all costs),
-92-
r - real discount rate for program costs.
General Public Utilities (GPU) estimates of total program
costs are computed using then-current dollars. The GPU
estimates of the costs include cost escalation on Bechtel
work of 9% per year, and cost escalation on GPU work of 8%
per year. This leads to the GPU estimate of total
undiscounted decontamination program costs of approximately
$1.0X109 then-current dollars.
The cost projections used in this study are based on
constant dollars. The net discounted cost of the
decontamination and cleanup program for the TMI-2 accident
versus the real discount rate is shown in Figure 3.6. The
discounted cost is sensitive to the discount rate chosen
because the program is planned to cover an 8 year time
period.
The constant-dollar discounted and escalated cost of
the TMI-2 decontamination and cleanup program is shown
versus the parameter (l+g)/(l+r) in Figure 3.7. If the
discount rate chosen is equivalent to the escalation rate -;
chosen, the discounted cost is the same as the total
unescalated, undiscounted constant-dollar cost estimate.
For a 4% real discount rate, and a 0% (i.e., no real growth
-93-
Figure 3.6 - Total projected cost of TMI-2decontamination program versus discount rate.
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Figure 3.7 - Total projected cost of TMI-2 decontamination
program including escalation and discounting.
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2
in costs) real escalation rate, the net present cost of the
program as planned is 750 million 1980 dollars (850
million 1982 dollars).
Finally, the sensitivity of the total cleanup cost
estimate for the TMI-2 accident to the time period of the
cleanup rocess is shown in Figure 3.8. The "cold iron"
cost of maintaining the plant in a stable condition without
any decontamination activities was assumed to be =40
million dollars per year [Ra83]. The amount estimated to
be spent above this amount was scaled to estimate costs for
a 4 year and a 12 year program duration. Discounted cost
estimates for the 4, 8, and 12 year decontamination program
durations are shown in Figure 3.8. This figure shows that
a rapid, efficient program could reduce the decontamination
costs substantially. However, given the regulatory and
financial constraints which would exist after any severe
accident it is unlikely that a rapid cleanup program could
ever be carried out.
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Figure 3.8 - Estimated TMI-2 decontamination program costsfor various program durations.
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3.5.1.2 PNL Post-Accident Cleanup Study
A study performed to estimate the post-accident
cleanup and decommissioning costs for a reference PWR
provides a source of information regarding severe accident
cleanup costs [Mu82a, Mu82b]. The reference accidents,
estimated manpower requirements for cleanup, and estimated
costs for cleanup from the study are shown in Table 3.3.
The reactor core is assumed to stay within the reactor
vessel in all of the reference accidents. Core-melt
accidents with reactor vessel melt-through are not
considered. The cost estimates for cleanup of the
accidents are based on the assumption that a rapid,
efficient cleanup program is possible using available
technology without financial or regulatory constraints.
The cleanup cost estimates for the severe accidents
considered range from $78-378 million 1981 dollars and
total preparation and cleanup periods of 3-8 years. The
cost estimates do not include estimates for research and
development program expenditures which have added to the
costs of the TMI-2 recovery program. The TMI-2 accident is
similar to a scenario 2 or 3 accident as defined in the
study. The study predicts that the cost of cleanup of the
TMI-2 accident could be less than half of current GPU
-98-
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program estimates. However, it is unlikely that these
optimistic cost estimates could be achieved based on
regulatory and financial considerations.
3.5.2 PLANT DECONTAMINATION COSTS FOR CATEGORY III (LARGE
CONSEQUENCE) EVENTS
It is necessary to estimate accident cleanup and
decontamination costs for an accident which results in
full-scale core melting and subsequent breach of the
reactor vessel. No historical data or projected cost
estimates for onsite decontamination exist for such events.
The dominant cost contributor for cleanup of these events
is likely to be the cost of working in high radiation
environments. Experience at TMI has shown that each
man-hour spent in high radiation environments requires an
additional 10-100 man hours in preparation, regulatory, and
related activities. After a core-melt accident with
reactor vessel melt-through, the radiation fields within
the plant containment could be much higher than those
observed within the TMI plant.
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Based on these considerations and experience with
severe accident cleanup costs, it is almost certain that
cleanup costs would be greater after a core-melt event than
after a degraded core accident confined to the reactor
vessel. This is based on the assumption that permanent
entombment of the plant in place after the accident would
be an unacceptable cleanup alternative. As a lower bound,
twice the optimistic estimate of 400 million dollars for
cleanup of a degraded core accident is used for cleanup of
a core-melt accident with subsequent vessel breach. As an
upper bound, it is assumed that the core-melt accident
could result in a factor of 3 greater cleanup costs than
the accident at TMI-2. Thus, an upper bound of -2500
million dollars will be assumed. A best-estimate of 2
times the TMI-2 accident cleanup costs, or 1700 million
dollars, is used for core-melt accidents with reactor
vessel breach. As with the TMI-2 accident, the total
man-rem incurred in the cleanup process is likely to be a
negligible contributor to overall cleanup program costs.
These estimates of core-melt accident onsite
decontamination costs contain large uncertainties due to
the lack of understanding of severe accident physical
processes and post-accident cleanup methods and
-101-
effectiveness. Estimates of the costs of the cleanup
program for the TMI-2 accident are uncertain due to a lack
of perfect information concerning the state of the reactor
plant. Future information gained from experience should be
incorporated into updated cleanup cost estimates.
3.6 PLANT REPAIR COSTS
Some events at LWR facilities which occur during
operation may result in damage to plant components which
would require repair before the continuation of plant
operation. The magnitude of plant repair costs for various
ranges of accidents are discussed in this section. Only
marginal repair costs are included in the analysis, not
those costs which would have been borne if an accident did
not occur.
The magnitude of plant repair costs is difficult to
quantify for the majority of LWR forced outages or
accidents. The major reason for this is the difficulty in
distinguishing between normal maintenance of plant
equipment and repairs which are forced by an event. In
many cases repairs after an event can be performed by the
normal plant operations crew, and outside contractors are
-102-
not employed. Also, for most routine operating events,
replacement parts for repairs have relatively small costs.
Moreover, the costs of repairs after routine forced outages
are normally not distinguished on financial records. Thus,
it is difficult to obtain any data on the repair cost (if
any cost was incurred) for routine outages.
More severe LWR operational events obviously might
involve significant plant repair costs. For the purpose of
this report, repair costs are distinguished from the costs
of decontamination of plant equipment after a severe
accident at an LWR facility. Repair costs for events which
cause severe plant contamination are defined to include
only the work necessary to restore the plant to operational
status after decontamination has been completed (see Figure
3.4).
3.6.1 REPAIR COSTS FOR CATEGORY I EVENTS
To estimate the cost of plant repair after forced
outage events, historical plant operational data was
combined with insurance company onsite property damage data
from [Ho82]. Plant repair costs are compared with the
magnitude of other costs for routine LWR events. The data
-103-
for plant repair cost versus the duration of the resulting
forced outage event are shown in Figure 3.9. This graph
shows the plant repair cost per hour of plant outage as a
function of outage duration for the available data.
Replacement power costs are shown for a 1000 Mwe plant in
two NERC regions based on the replacement power cost model
discussed in Section 3.3.1. Lines corresponding to
$250,000, $750,000, and $1,000,000 total repair costs are
also shown in Figure 3.9. These lines correspond to
commonly chosen deductible limits in onsite property damage
insurance policies [Lo82].
If the total repair cost for an outage event is less
than the deductible limit for the plant under
consideration, then data for the total repair costs
resulting from the outage are unavailable. This is the
reason for the general lack of data within the deductible
limits. Many LWR outages result in total repair costs
within the deductible limits. Of the 70 LWR long-duration
forced outage events analyzed, only 9 events resulted in
repair costs which were above the deductible limits. These
data points are shown in Figure 3.9.
-104-
Figure 3.9 - Plant
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The repair cost data in Figure 3.9 show that for all
LWR events which do not result in significant plant
contamination, repair cost (per hour) is predicted to be
less than 20% of the replacement power cost (per hour) for
a 1000 MWe plant. This data includes repair cost estimates
for the Brown's Ferry fire and the steam generator
re-tubing outage at TMI-1. The data represent the upper
limits of plant repair costs for routine outages, since
many events resulted in repair costs lower than the
deductible limits. The data indicate that typical plant
repair costs are in the range of =S1000 per hour of outage
duration.
Based on the analyses of repair costs for LWR plant
outages, it is likely that plant repair costs would be
small compared to replacement power costs incurred after a
routine forced outage event. As a lower bound, plant
damage repair costs are assumed to be negligible compared
to replacement power costs for routine forced outage
events. A best estimate of plant repair costs of $1000 per
hour of outage duration is used in the analysis of small
consequence event costs. Finally, as an upper bound plant
repair costs for routine LWR outages are estimated to be
20% of replacement power costs.
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3.6.2 REPAIR COSTS FOR CATEGORY II EVENTS
Estimates of the repair and the sum of repair and
decontamination costs for the accident at TMI-2 are shown
in Figure 3.9. The estimates for repair costs per hour are
higher than those for routine forced outage events. The
repair costs represent about 20% of the total
decontamination and repair costs. Also, the estimates of
the total recovery costs for TMI-2 are comparable to the
estimates of replacement power costs for the accident.
Thus, for events which result in significant plant
contamination, it is likely that repair and decontamination
costs will be significant in relation to replacement power
costs. However, in the case of the accident at TMI-2,
repair costs alone would only represent about 10% of the
total estimated accident cost (including replacement power
costs).
The accident at TMI-2 is used to estimate the cost of
plant repair for medium consequence (category II) events
after plant decontamination has been carried out. The
estimates are based on the assumption that repair of the
reactor plant is chosen over decommissioning after cleanup.
Reconstruction and restoration of the TMI-2 unit to
-107-
pre-accident status is estimated to cost between $190 and
$260 million 1982 dollars, depending on the costs included
in reconstruction. These estimates are preliminary, and
the final costs will not be known until the plant has been
decontaminated and repair is undertaken.
A minimum repair cost is estimated for category II
events assuming that only the core must be replaced (80
million 1982 dollars) and refueling and startup tests must
be conducted (=22 million 1982 dollars). This results in a
lower bound repair cost estimate of $100 million 1982
dollars for these events. As an upper bound on repair cost
estimates for category II events, it is assumed that the
core must be replaced (80 million 1982 dollars) and plant
reconstruction and associated site support, operations, and
refueling services would require 3 times the effort
currently projected for TMI-2 (520 million dollars). This
leads to an upper bound estimate of 600 million 1982
dollars for plant repair costs. A best-estimate of -275
million 1982 dollars as projected for the repair of TMI-2
after cleanup is used in the analysis [GP81].
-108-
3.6.3 REPAIR COSTS FOR CATEGORY III EVENTS
Repair costs after severe LWR accidents involving
core-melt and reactor vessel breach would be substantially
higher than those for an event like the TMI-2 accident in
the event that plant repair is chosen over immediate
decommissioning. A large contributor to the difference in
repair costs for a core-melt accident would be the
replacement of the reactor vessel after such an event.
Also, very significant containment system damage might
exist after core-melt accidents. The repair and
requalification of the plant is expected to be very costly
because current LWR designs do not include plans for
reactor vessel replacement. Because of the large
decontamination costs and the potential severity of plant
damage after core-melt accidents with reactor vessel
breach, it is likely that immediate decommissioning will be
the most cost-effective action. Even if repair is
undertaken and the plant is returned to operation, it is
estimated that costs will be close to those for immediate
decommissioning. Thus, all large consequence (Category
III) events are treated as though repair is not performed
and early decommissioning is begun immediately after plant
cleanup. This should lead to small errors in cost
-109-
estimation for these events.
3.7 EARLY DECOMMISSIONING COSTS FOR CATEGORY II AND III
EVENTS
After accidents at LWR facilities resulting in plant
contamination, an alternative to plant repair and
restoration to pre-accident condition is immediate
decommissioning. This results not only in the need to
replace the power which would have been generated over the
remaining plant life, but also incurring costs for
decommissioning earlier than anticipated. Because of
present value discounting, incurring decommissioning costs
sooner results in real costs. It is assumed that the
decommissioning cost incurred after plant decontamination
would be roughly the same as that which is anticipated at
the normal end of plant life. This assumption is validated
in studies of post-accident cleanup and decommissioning
[Mu82a,Mu82b].
Much study has been done on the costs of
decommissioning LWRs. Most studies examine alternatives of
mothballing, dismantling, or entombing reactors and
estimate costs for each alternative. Table 3.4 shows a
-110-
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comparison of decommissioning cost estimates of different
organizations over a range of studies. The costs represent
the total undiscounted summation of all decommissioning
costs at the time of plant shutdown. Most studies include
a contingency in the cost estimate of 25% [Sm78, Mu76].
All cost estimates have been updated to 1981 dollars using
simple price indexes [Pr83]. An undiscounted
decommissioning cost estimate of $100 million 1982 dollars
is used in this study, based on immediate dismantlement of
the reactor plant.
The real cost incurred due to accelerated
decommissioning of a reactor facility is dependent upon the
time during the life of the reactor at which
decommissioning occurs. The real cost due to accelerated
decommissioning is calculated using:
Dd= -[1 (3-.)
where
Dd = real cost incurred due to acceleration of
decommissioning activities,
-112-
S - cost of decommissioning at end of plant life
(_-$100 million 1981 dollars),
r real discount rate,
I = plant service life (40 years),
td = time at which decommissioning starts, measured
from the start of plant commercial operation.
For severe reactor accidents involving plant contamination,
a long time period may be necessary for plant cleanup
before decommissioning activities begin. This is accounted
for in the cost analyses.
Sensitivity studies were performed to determine the
importance of early decommissioning costs to total costs
for medium and large consequence accidents. For accidents
which occur very early during plant life, the cost due to
accelerated decommissioning can be a substantial fraction
of the $100 million dollar end-of-life decommissioning
cost. However, accelerated decommissioning costs are
generally small compared to total costs for medium and
large consequence events.
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3.8 WORKER HEALTH EFFECT AND MEDICAL CARE COSTS
Any event at an LWR facility has the potential for
causing plant worker health impacts. These impacts may
have costs ranging from minimal health care costs to costs
for worker fatalities caused by an event. A review of
standard methods for accounting for health care and health
effects costs is included in section 4.4.6 on offsite
health effects and medical care costs.
3.8.1 HEALTH COSTS FOR CATEGORY I EVENTS
Plant worker health effects resulting from routine LWR
forced outage events are extremely rare. These health
effects are incurred as part of the risk of operating an
LWR facility and are not included in the cost estimates for
routine forced outage events. Because of the low
probability of worker health effects, and the small costs
of such effects, other costs associated with routine forced
outage events will dominate expected worker health effect
costs.
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3.8.2 HEALTH COSTS FOR CATEGORY II EVENTS
Accidents involving significant contamination of the
LWR facility result in an increased potential for worker
health effects because of the radioactive materia. released
within the plant. Plant workers in areas of the plant
where serious system failures occur may also sustain
injuries induced by causes other than radiation.
Because very little data exists for category II
accidents, any estimation of the likelihood of resulting
worker health effects is highly uncertain. Because the
accidents in this category do not result in reactor vessel
failure or large releases of radioactive material to the
environment around the plant, it is likely that any
resulting injuries in the plant area will be highly
localized. Therefore, the accidents are not expected to be
significantly different from normal plant operation for the
possibility of worker injuries, and no significant worker
health effect costs are assumed to result from accidents in
this category. This is consistent with the historical
experience of TMI-2. Even if some of the plant work crew
were injured during an accident of this type, cost
estimates for this impact would be small compared to other
-115-
accident costs (if reasonable dollar values are used for
health effect costs).
3.8.3 HEALTH COSTS FOR CATEGORY III EVENTS
The most serious core-melt accidents at LWR facilities
may result in significant injuries or fatalities among
workers at the facility. Failure of the reactor vessel and
possible release of radioactive material to the environment
could lead to contamination of equipment and exposure of
workers in many areas of the plant.
An upper-bound estimate of the costs of worker health
effects after a category III accident has been evaluated
and included in the financial risk estimates of Strip
[St82]. Estimated dollar values for worker injuries
($100,000/injury) and fatalities ($1,000,000/fatality) were
used in the analysis. A typical work shift for a single
plant includes approximately 40 workers, and it was
conservatively assumed that a core-melt accident would
result in 10 early fatalities and 30 early injuries. This
results in an upper bound estimate of worker health effects
cost of =13 million dollars. This cost is very small
compared to other cost components for core-melt accidents.
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3.8.4 CONCLUSION-WORKER HEALTH EFFECTS AND HEALTH CARE
COSTS
For routine outage events or severe accidents which do
not breach the reactor vessel, it is assumed that no
significant onsite worker health impacts are incurred.
Even if a large fraction of the onsite workers incurred
health effects after a severe accident, the contribution to
total accident costs is small if reasonable values for
personnel injuries and fatalities are used. For core-melt
accidents with reactor vessel failure, an upper-bound of 10
early fatalities and 30 injuries is used to estimate the
costs of onsite worker health effects. Even this
worst-case assumption of worker health effects contributes
negligibly to total accident losses. Onsite costs for
these accidents are dominated by other cost components.
Methods used for estimating the costs of offsite health
effects from severe accidents are discussed in section
4.4.6.
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3.9 ELECTRIC UTILITY "BUSINESS COSTS" AND NUCLEAR POWER
INDUSTRY IMPACTS
It is possible that a plant licensee or electric
utilities in general might incur higher costs for borrowing
capital and continuing to provide adequate electricity to
service areas after severe accidents at LWR facilities.
These costs are incremental "business costs" which are
discussed in this section. Another possible impact of
severe LWR accidents may be future policy decisions which
lead to the rapid shutdown, phasing out, or slowed growth
of the nuclear electricity generating industry in the U.S.
These potential nuclear power industry impacts are also
discussed in this section.
3.9.1 ELECTRIC UTILITY "BUSINESS COSTS"
"Business costs" have been addressed in studies which
estimate the costs of closing currently operating nuclear
generating facilities [St81b]. These costs might result
from altered risk perceptions in financial markets combined
with the need for the plant licensee to replace the income
once generated by the operating plant. These costs mainly
would affect the licensee of a damaged plant, but could
-118-
also affect the electric utility industry in general
through the financial markets.
Business costs originate in the increased cost of
capital to an electric utility caused by increased
borrowing costs in financial markets or limitations on
access to financial markets. Increased borrowing costs
result from altered perceptions of risk in investment in a
specific utility which results in a higher demanded return
on capital. Limitations on access to financial markets can
result from the plant licensee's loss of income which
results in insufficient coverage on existing financial
security commitments. This occurred after the TMI-2
accident, as Metropolitan Edison's interest coverage ratio
fell below 2.0, which prohibited the issuance of new bonds.
Capital borrowing costs and/or market access limitations
can have serious impacts on construction programs,
financing options, and dividend policies, all of which did
occur after the TMI-2 accident [GA80].
In discussing business costs it is important to
distinguish between increased capital borrowing costs due
to improved information provided by an accident, and
possible increases in borrowing costs due to
-119-
mis-information or falsely perceived risks. The portion of
increased capital costs due to improved information
provided by an accident represents only a redistribution of
benefits within society through financial markets which
efficiently value the benefits of nuclear power utilities
as an investment. An accident which results in an
incorrect perception of nuclear power risks can result in
increased electric utility capital borrowing costs which
are true societal costs. To the extent that increased risk
perceptions are not supported by new accident information,
business costs do result in a net societal loss due to
impacts on construction and maintenance programs which may
be significantly altered due to cash flow limitations. It
is likely that market access limitations result in an
increased cost for a societal necessity, electricity, in
future years.
Previous estimates of the business costs which may be
incurred due to the loss or shutdown of a nuclear
generating facility have been large. Studies of the costs
of closing the Indian Point nuclear power plant have
estimated business costs to be between $1 and $6 billion
1981 dollars, or -15-30% of the total estimated costs
[St8lb]. The range of estimates shows the large
-120-
uncertainties in these estimates.
Unfortunately, estimation of business costs due to an
accident requires separation of impacts due to improved
information and those due to false risk perceptions.
Limitations on access to capital markets which result after
an accident are likely to result in significant business
costs which represent net societal losses. Obviously, the
electric utility industry and nuclear plant licensees
should be very concerned with the potential business costs
caused by an accident because they can influence the
stature of companies within financial markets. Because of
the difficulties in estimation and the specific nature of
business costs after a serious accident, these costs are
not explicitly estimated in this study. However,
particularly in electric utility financial risk analyses,
these costs can be important in estimating the impacts of
serious accident events (Categories II and III) and should
be considered in some way in making decisions. This area
requires more investigation regarding the ultimate
distribution, magnitude, and specific characteristics which
can influence net societal costs.
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3.9.2 NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY COSTS
Another potential impact of severe LWR accidents is
that policy decisions or risk perceptions could cause the
elimination of or slowed growth in the U.S. nuclear power
industry. It has been argued that the accident at TMI-2
has caused losses in the U.S. nuclear power industry since
no new plant orders have been placed and many plant
cancellations have occurred since the accident. It is also
argued that severe accidents with offsite consequences
could result in societal overreaction and a forced shutdown
of all or many operating nuclear power reactors effectively
eliminating nuclear power as an alternative for electricity
generation.
Several studies have investigated the consequences of
closing commercial nuclear power reactors in the
U.S. [St81b,Bu82]. Table 3.5 shows the electrical
generating capacities and actual loads for each NERC region
in 1980 and projections for 1990 [Bu82]. The reserve
margin with and without nuclear power plant operation is
shown for each NERC region. The reserve margin is the
total installed capacity minus the peak load for each
region. A typical reserve margin used for electric utility
-122-
Table 3.5 - Loads
regions in 1980 and generating capacities of NERCand projections for 1990 [Bu82].
Actual Loads and Generating Capacities for National
Electric Reliability Council Regions in 1980
Regional
Reserve
Regional Installed Nuclear Margin
Peak Installed Reserve Nuclear X of Without
NERC Load Capacity Margin Capacity Total Nuclear
Region (GWe) (GWe) (2) (GWe) Capacity (2)
ECAR 63.0 88.2 40 4.5 5.1 33
ERCOT 31.7 42.5 34 0.0 0.0 34
MAAC 34.5 45.0 30 7.1 15.8 10
MAIN 33.9 41.7 23 6.3 15.1 4
MARCA-U.S. 19.4 25.6 32 3.7 14.5 13
NPCC-U.S. 36.8 51.1 39 7.8 15.3 18
SERC 9 0 .4a 1 1 5 .9a 28 15.5 13.' 11
SPP 45.0 50.6 12 1.7 3.4 9
WSCC-U.S. 72.9 102.3 40 2.6 2.5 37
NERC-U.S. 4 2 7 .6b 562.9 3 2 b 49.2 8.7 20
Projected Loads and Capacities for National Electric
Reliability Council Regions in 1990
Regional
Reserve
Regional Installed Nuclear Margin
Peak Installed Reserve Nuclear X of Without
NERC Load Capacity Margin Capacity Total Nuclear
Region (GWe) (GWe) (2) (GWe) Capacity (1)
ECAR 89.4a 119.2 33 14.1 11.8 18
ERCOT 48.9 59.1 21 5.9 10.0 9
HAAC 41.8 54.2 30 14.5 26.8 -5
MAIN 45.3 54.1 19 16.2 29.9 -16
MARCA-U.S. 27.8 32.5 17 3.7 11.4 4
NPCC-U.S. 43.2 a 62.5 45 14.6 23.4 11
SERC 122.7 158.1 29 41.1 26.0 -5
SPP 62.5 74.9 20 6.9 9.2 9
WSCC-U.S. 104.4 140.2 34 16.9 12.1 18
NERC-U.S. 5 8 6 .0b 754.8 2 9b 133.9 17.7 6 b
aWinter loads and capacities - all unmarked loads and capacities are sumer.
bBased on noncoincident peak loads.
-123-
planning purposes is in the range 15-30% to allow for
scheduled and unscheduled refueling and maintenance
shutdowns for each generating unit. The table shows that
reserve margins without nuclear power plants were under 15%
in many regions in 1980. By 1990, almost all regions are
predicted to have reserve margins without nuclear units
less than 15%, and some areas would not have sufficient
capacity to meet the predicted peak load requirements. A
forced shutdown of all nuclear units would result in a
marked decrease in the reliability of electric power supply
in some NERC regions along with very large power production
cost increases.
Currently, five NERC regions depend on nuclear units
for =20% of total power generation (kWhre) (where nuclear
represents =15% of total generation capacity), and by 1990
four regions are predicted to depend on nuclear power units
for 40% of electricity generation (where nuclear is
predicted to represent 30% of total generation capacity)
[Bu82]. A shutdown of all nuclear units would result in
the need to replace a large fraction of the electricity
generated in the U.S. with higher-cost power from
alternative sources. A forced shutdown of all nuclear
units in 1990 is predicted to result in the need to replace
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813X109 kWhre with electricity generated from other sources
during the first year of the shutdown.
The large magnitude of the cost of replacing this
power can be estimated using the simplified power
production cost increase model. Assuming an average 65%
nuclear generating unit capacity factor, and an average
non-economy replacement power fraction of 0.5, the
estimated cost of the first-year power production cost
increase for closing all nuclear units in 1990 (assuming no
escalation of replacement power costs relative to nuclear
generation costs through 1990) is $33 billion 1982
dollars. This calculation is based on the assumption that
sufficient capacity and interconnections are available to
replace all of the power generated by the closed nuclear
units (a very optimistic assumption). The replacement of
power over the remaining nuclear plant service lives would
result in estimated societal direct costs between z$500
billion and -$2 trillion 1982 dollars due to plant
closings. This is an estimate of the cost society would be
forced to pay assuming the decision is made to close all
operating nuclear units after an event which occurs in
1990.
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Any severe accident at an LWR facility will result in
new information concerning the risks of nuclear power
reactor accidents which should be incorporated rationally
into the societal decision-making process. It is difficult
to determine what societal reaction to new information
would be. There is no evidence to prove that societal
overreaction would take place after a serious nuclear
reactor accident. Other industries such as commercial
airlines, chemical manufacturing, and coal mining have
experienced devastating accidents and continue operations
with only minor safety modifications. Even the
U.S. nuclear industry has survived a serious accident
without immediate and complete shutdown. The loss of
benefits to society from an immediate, complete shutdown of
any large industry after a severe accident would be too
large to allow societal overreaction to force this action.
For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that
society would make rational policy decisions based on new
information which is obtained after reactor accidents.
These decisions may have serious impacts on the U.S. and
world nuclear power industries. Therefore, from the
nuclear power industry and electric utility perspectives
these decisions could result in significant direct costs.
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However, from the societal perspective it is anticipated
that these costs would be balanced by benefits considered
in the societal decision-making process.
Other potential nuclear power industry costs of severe
reactor accidents have been investigated since the accident
at TMI-2. A study has used the observed drop in the
performance of PWRs in the western world to estimate a
total cost of replacement power due to increased plant
outage time as a result of the TMI-2 accident [Ev82]. The
lower bound estimate of the total cost due to increased PWR
outage time resulting from the accident is $700 million
dollars. However, the study does not estimate the
potential benefits of increased plant safety and confidence
which have resulted from the increased forced outage time.
The increased forced outage time after TMI-2 has largely
resulted from decisions to improve the safety of some PWRs
in light of information gained from the accident.
Therefore, no significant societal cost is assumed to
result from the increased plant outage time resulting from
regulatory concerns after severe accidents.
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Finally, studies have been performed to estimate the
decrease in the valuation of nuclear power in the period
following the TMI-2 accident [Zi82a,Zi82b,Ne82]. Studies
of stock prices of utilities owning nuclear power plants
showed no significant decrease in the valuation of the
investment one year after the accident occurred. The only
exception to this is for plants under construction in
states where CWIP (Construction Work in Progress) funding
is not allowed. The stock of these utilities showed some
drop in valuation, probably due to increased uncertainty in
the time required to obtain an operating license for plants
under construction. Studies of nuclear utility bond prices
showed some decrease in valuation occurred after the
accident at TMI-2, but this may have been due to a general
trend in the valuation of the electric utility industry as
an investment. The results of these studies indicate that
the nuclear utility industry was beginning to slow before
the accident at TMI-2. Much of the industry depression
attributed to the TMI-2 accident can actually be explained
by economic and regulatory forces which began before the
accident occurred.
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Serious accidents at LWR facilities could result in
large impacts on the nuclear power industry and electric
utilities in the U.S. because of societal decisions based
on new information and risk perceptions. Therefore, from
the perspective of particular interest groups it is
important to consider the potential direct losses resulting
from these impacts. From the societal perspective, any
direct losses to nuclear power industries should be
balanced by benefits considered in the societal
decision-making process. If societal overreaction does not
occur and decisions are made on a rational basis, then
significant societal costs should not be incurred for
nuclear power and electric utility industry impacts.
3.10 ONSITE LITIGATION COSTS
After very severe accidents at nuclear power reactors,
issues of liability and compensation for losses incurred
can be settled through litigation. The U.S. legal system
has previously and would in the future play a major role in
assigning liability for the risk associated with nuclear
power reactor accidents to individual parties. The
transfer payments resulting from legal settlements and the
legal fees associated with the litigation process are
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discussed in this section.
The legal awards for damages incurred as a result of
an LWR accident are transfer payments which result in the
distribution of net costs. The societal costs of LWR
accidents are estimated directly within this study without
regard for the ultimate distribution resulting from
transfer payments. Most of the transfer payments resulting
from the litigation process do not result in additional net
societal costs. It is possible that compensation could be
awarded for costs which are not quantified directly in this
study. The dollar costs estimated in this study could be
augmented to reflect the additional costs of accidents
quantified through litigation awards, but the contribution
to total societal accident costs is likely to be small.
The legal fees for the time and efforts of those
individuals involved in the litigation process do represent
societal costs since efforts could have been expended on
other problems if an accident had not occurred. Studies
have shown that the costs of corporate lawyers are very
high, particularly in those cases where outside counsel is
required [IC78]. Legal fees can be substantial to an
individual group but are unlikely to be significant
-130-
accident costs from the societal perspective.
Most legal compensation awarded after a reactor
accident represents transfers of net societal costs which
are estimated in other sections of this study. Cost
estimates could be augmented to account for effects like
"pain and suffering" which have not been included in the
societal cost estimates presented. The legal fees incurred
by parties involved in the litigation process do result in
a net cost, but the contribution to total societal costs is
likely to be small. Therefore, no direct cost estimates
are included for onsite litigation resulting after severe
accidents.
3.11 SUMMARY-ONSITE CONSEQUENCES OF LWR EVENTS
A summary of the models and estimates to be used in
the analysis of the economic risk from onsite consequences
of LWR events is presented in Table 3.6. Lower-bound,
upper-bound, and best-estimates are shown for those cost
components where subjective judgments have been combined
with historical data and available studies of potential
costs. For some accident categories specific cost
components may be negligible or not quantified in this
-131-
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study.
3.11.1 CATEGORY I FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS (SMALL
CONSEQUENCES)
The LWR events in category I include routine forced
outage events of up to a few years duration which do not
result in significant plant contamination. The outage
duration for these events is estimated from historical
nuclear plant operating experience. Power production cost
increases for these outages are estimated using the
simplified replacement power cost model discussed in
Section 3.3.1. Upper and lower bound estimates for
replacement power costs are obtained from the range of
values upon which the simple model is based. Estimates of
repair costs after routine forced outages show that in some
cases these costs are negligible. A best-estimate for
repair costs of $1000 per hour of outage duration is used
in the analyses. As an upper bound on repair costs, 20% of
the replacement power costs are included for the entire
outage duration.
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The remaining onsite cost components are negligible
for all events in category I. It is assumed that the plant
is repaired and returned to operation after all category I
events. Therefore, it is not appropriate to estimate
capital value losses, decommissioning costs, and electric
utility and plant licensee "business costs" for these
events. Marginal worker health effects and health care
costs are negligible for these events. Because little or
no radioactive material is released from the core in these
events, any plant decontamination costs incurred would be
small. Also, nuclear power industry and onsite litigation
costs are not important for these events.
3.11.2 CATEGORY II EVENTS (MEDIUM CONSEQUENCES)
Category II LWR events include accidents which lead to
core-damage but do not result in reactor vessel breach or a
release of radioactive material to the environment. Some
radioactive material is released from the reactor core in
these accidents. The forced outage duration is estimated
for these events in cases where plant repair is chosen
rather than immediate decommissioning. Based on studies of
post-accident cleanup and decontamination, a lower bound
estimate of 4 years for cleanup is assumed. A
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best-estimate of 8 years for plant cleanup time is based on
the projected TMI-2 decontamination program and estimates
from post-accident cleanup studies. An upper bound
estimate of 12 years is used for plant cleanup following
the worst category II accidents. Plant repair, if elected,
is predicted to require much shorter time periods than the
cleanup operations. Lower, best, and upper bound estimates
of 1, 2, and 3 year repair periods after decontamination
are used. This results in total outage duration estimates
of 5, 10, and 15 years before the possible return to
operation after a category II event. The option of
immediate decommissioning after cleanup is also included in
the analyses.
The models and estimates used for replacement power
costs, plant capital costs, decontamination and cleanup
costs, and possible repair or decommissioning costs for
category II events are shown in Table 3.6. The only cost
component which is assumed to be negligible for these
events is worker health effect and health care costs.
Electric utility and plant licensee business costs, onsite
litigation costs, and nuclear power industry costs are
small from the societal perspective, but could be very
important to these specific groups after severe accidents.
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3.11.3 CATEGORY III EVENTS (LARGE CONSEQUENCES)
Category II accidents include full scale core-melt
accidents which breach the reactor vessel, and possibly
result in a significant release of radioactive material to
the environment around the reactor plant. These accidents
are very low probability events which are included in plant
specific probabilistic risk analyses. No historical data
exist for these events, and very little information is
available concerning recovery costs. Because of the likely
extent of plant damage after category III events, costs are
estimated based on the assumption that immediate plant
decommissioning would be chosen over repair for thes2
accidents. It is possible that the plant would be repaired
and returned to operation, but costs are estimated to be
close to those for immediate decommissioning after events
in this accident severity category.
The onsite cost components estimated for a category
III accident are outlined in Table 3.6. The cost of plant
repair is not explicitly estimated since immediate
decommissioning is assumed to occur. The onsite
decontamination and cleanup cost estimates for category III
events are based largely on extrapolation of the results'of
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studies and historical data for category II events. It is
assumed that plant cleanup would be mandated, and permanent
entombment of the contaminated plant at the site location
would not be an acceptable option (although possibly
technically feasible and less costly). The estimates of
plant cleanup costs are uncertain because of options which
would be available and the lack of information concerning
cleanup costs. Electric utility and plant licensee
business costs which could be important after events in
this severity category are explicitly excluded from
quantification in this study but should be considered in
decision-making. Nuclear power industry and onsite
litigation costs are assumed to be small from the societal
perspective but could be important to particular groups,
particularly if societal overreaction occurs after severe
accidents.
3.11.4 ESTIMATION OF LWR ECONOMIC RISKS
The cost estimates developed in this section are used
in the estimation of societal economic risk from the onsite
consequences of LWR events. Models are developed in
Chapter 4 to estimate the magnitude of offsite costs of LWR
accidents. Chapters 5 and 6 combine the onsite and offsite
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costs with frequency estimates for LWR events to estimate
the economic risks from small, medium, and large
consequence events. Conclusions concerning the
contribution of specific cost components to economic risks
from accidents of various severities are discussed in these
chapters.
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CHAPTER 4
OFFSITE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF LWR EVENTS
The offsite economic consequences of severe LWR
accidents are discussed in this section. Conclusions from
previous studies of post-accident population radiation
exposure pathways are reviewed for use in the offsite
economic consequence model. The offsite economic
consequence models developed for eventual incorporation
into the MELCOR series of risk assessment codes are
described. Potential offsite economic impacts of severe
LWR accidents not included in the new model are discussed.
The major differences between the new economic models and
those in the CRAC2 code are reviewed. Finally, assumptions
used to develop a prototype offsite economic consequence
model for use in the calculations in this study are
outlined.
-139-
4.1 LWR ACCIDENT OFFSITE COSTS DISCUSSED IN THIS SECTION
The LWR accident offsite population protective measure
costs discussed in this section include population
evacuation costs, temporary relocation costs, agricultural
product disposal costs, land and property decontamination
costs, land interdiction (or condemnation) costs, and
permanent relocation costs which may be incurred after
severe accidents involving releases of radioactive material
to the environment. These cost components are associated
with population protective measures to avoid radiation
exposure after contaminating events. The economic impacts
of radiation-induced human health effects which result from
population exposure after an event are also discussed.
Other impacts such as litigation costs (for offsite
damages) and secondary economic effects (outside of
directly contaminated areas) are discussed in this section.
Offsite impacts explicitly excluded from the estimation of
economic consequences in this study are outlined.
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4.1.1 DEFINITION OF TERMS USED IN DISCUSSION
Unfortunately, organizations involved with offsite
emergency response and public protection have used many
terms to describe various countermeasures which might be
implemented after reactor accidents. The terms used to
describe LWR accident offsite emergency response are
defined in this section to eliminate confusion which may
otherwise exist. The definitions used are in close
agreement with those used in the RSS Nu75b].
The term "evacuation" is used to refer to the
immediate movement of individuals out of an area at the
time of an accident. Evacuation may be implemented before
any release of radioactive material occurs as a
precautionary measure based on in-plant conditions which
could worsen. This is distinguished from "temporary
relocation" which is the movement of a population from an
area based on monitored levels of radioactive
contamination. "Agricultural product disposal" refers to
the disposal of milk or crops which are contaminated with
radioactive material until projected individual and
population doses from ingestion are acceptable.
"Decontamination" refers to the process of cleanup and
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restoration of land and property in an area through
measures which reduce dose rates by removing
surface-deposited radioactive material. "Land
interdiction" refers to the prohibition of inhabitation or
use of areas for a protracted period of time (years), and
is therefore a long-term exposure reduction measure.
"Permanent relocation costs" refer to lost income,
productivity, and moving costs incurred in the transition
period of population relocation from interdicted land
areas.
4.2 REVIEW OF POPULATION RADIATION EXPOSURE PATHWAYS
FOLLOWING LWR ACCIDENTS
Detailed studies on the importance of radiation
exposure pathways for LWR accidents were performed as part
of the RSS [Nu75b]. The studies included consideration of
both acute and chronic exposure pathways following severe
LWR accidents. The projected doses from important exposure
pathways are used in both the CRAC2 and new economic models
to determine the need for population protective measure
implementation.
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The acute exposure pathways include groundshine,
cloudshine, and inhalation of radionuclides which may be
deposited by or contained in a passing cloud of radioactive
material. Acute doses are incurred within a short time
period (-1 to a few days) after the release of radioactive
material to the environment. The population protective
measures which are effective in reducing acute exposures
include evacuation and sheltering followed by short-term
relocation.
The chronic exposure pathways of concern after serious
LWR accidents include the milk ingestion, food ingestion,
and the groundshine exposure pathways. Studies performed
in the RSS concluded that these are the most important
chronic exposure pathways for LWR accidents. This
conclusion is based on the radionuclide inventory of an LWR
reactor core, the estimated release fractions of each
element group, and the limiting body organs and health
effects of concern for each radionuclide. The CRAC2 code
projects chronic doses from these exposure pathways for the
maximum exposed individual to determine the need for
population protective measure implementation in each area
affected by a release of radioactive material. The RSS
concluded that milk ingestion dose criteria are the most
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limiting for LWR accidents. The criteria for individual
doses from crop ingestion are the next most limiting, and
the criterion for the groundshine exposure pathway is the
least limiting of these three pathways in terms of areas
that would be affected.
A simplified diagram of the CRAC2 population
protective measure model is shown in Figure 4.1. Milk
disposal is implemented in the largest area following most
accidents, with crop disposal necessary in a smaller area,
and decontamination of land and property to reduce
groundshine exposure in a still smaller area. Land area
interdiction is required in the smallest area where
decontamination efforts cannot reduce groundshine dose
rates to acceptable levels.
Protective action implementation criteria are defined
for the milk ingestion, food ingestion, and chronic
groundshine exposure pathways in the new offsite economic
models. This approach, which is the same as that used in
CRAC2, is based on detailed studies of the importance of
exposure pathways after LWR accidents which result in
releases of radioactive material to the environment. Other
chronic exposure pathways are predicted to be less
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important and therefore do not need to be considered in
determining the need for population protective measures in
an area.
4.3 MODELING OF STAGED OFFSITE PROTECTIVE MEASURE
IMPLEMENTATION
The new economic models are based on staged
implementation of offsite population protective measures in
post-accident situations. A time chart of protective
measure implementation after the start of a severe LWR
accident sequence is shown in Figure 4.2.
Individuals living in areas near the reactor plant may
begin evacuation after the start of an accident sequence
but prior to any release of radioactive material to the
environment. If a release of radioactive material to the
environment takes place, radiation monitoring teams will
begin the task of collecting dose rate information at
offsite locations from surface-deposited radionuclides.
This action is likely to occur within hours of any
significant release of radioactive material to the
environment. The new economic model allows projection of
individual doses during this "emergency phase" period to
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account for the costs of temporarily relocating individuals
in addition to those initially evacuated. The "emergency
phase" relocation criterion is based on dose rate or
projections of short-term individual doses from exposure to
surface-deposited materials. The model assumes that
monitoring of milk and crops begins immediately after any
release of radioactive material to determine the need for
agricultural product disposal.
As improved information becomes available concerning
areas affected by a release of radioactive material,
individuals initially evacuated should be allowed to return
to areas not impacted. This is accounted for in the cost
estimates in the new models. After improved information
becomes available concerning dose-rates in affected areas
and the decay of surface-deposited radionuclides with time,
a second projected individual dose may be used to determine
those areas where high dose rates prohibit reentry of the
population. This time period is referred to as the
"intermediate phase" of protective action implementation in
the model. A projected individual dose from groundshine
exposure during this period is compared to a criterion for
continued relocation from impacted areas.
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After time is available to accurately determine the
dose rates in affected areas, a projected long-term
individual dose from exposure to surface-deposited
materials is used to determine those areas which require
decontamination or interdiction. Interdiction costs are
estimated for those areas where decontamination efforts
cannot reduce dose rates to acceptable levels. Costs of
decontamination and doses to workers are estimated in those
areas where decontamination efforts can reduce dose-rates
to acceptable levels. The cost of population relocation as
necessary during the decontamination process is accounted
for.
The modeling of staged protective measure
implementation is used to provide realistic estimates of
the costs of post-accident population protective measures.
The projection of doses over multiple time periods accounts
for the durations of protective measures which may be
necessary for short- and long-lived radionuclide releases.
The staged implementation of offsite protective measures
after severe LWR accidents is considered to be realistic
because perfect information would not be immediately
available in post-accident situations, and dose-rates may
change rapidly with time.
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4.4 NEW OFFSITE COST MODELS
New models have been developed for estimating the
costs of offsite protective actions and radiation-induced
health effects after severe LWR accidents. The models will
be incorporated into the consequence model in the MELCOR
series of risk assessment codes to estimate the offsite
economic impacts of accidents. The cost of population
evacuation, temporary relocation, agricultural product
disposal, land and property decontamination, land
interdiction, permanent population relocation, and health
impacts which may be incurred after an accident are
included in the models. The models developed for
estimating each of these cost components are described in
this section. The symbols used in the discussion of the
new offsite cost models are defined in Table 4.1.
4.4.1 POPULATION EVACUATION COSTS
Two important protective measures which may be
implemented during a serious reactor accident are
evacuation or sheltering of the population in the immediate
vicinity of the plant. The costs of sheltering individuals
in preparation for and during the passage of a cloud of
-150-
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Table 4.1
Symbols Used in Offsite Model Discussion
Definition
Area affected by protective action
Cost of crop disposal
Cost of decontamination program
Portion of decontamination program costs for
labor
Cost of population relocation during
decontamination
Cost of population relocation during
"emergency phase"
Cost of population evacuation
Cost of population health effects of type j
Cost of land interdiction
Cost of population relocation during
"intermediate phase"
Cost of milk product disposal
Whole-body groundshine dose to
decontamination workers
Cost of farm area decontamination by factor f
Man-years of labor required in
decontamination program
Cost of residential, business, and public
property decontamination by factor f
Individual dose from constant exposure
during the decontamination period
Decontamination worker salary
is] Fraction of farm sales from dairy products
Cost of food, lodging, and transportation for
relocated individuals
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1
Sn bo Un its
'F (dimensionless]
FIj [dimensionless]
Ir, [dimensionless]
'L [dimensionless]
FP [S/acre]
V [S/acre]
C tS/health effect]
[(S/person-day]
Vd [# of workers]
h l [# of health
effects
p [ /year]
j [# of persons]
[, of persons]
ep 1# of persons]
, Ad[# of persons]
in [# of persons]
Rp [# of persons]
r [ /year]
Vr' [dimensionless]
jr [dimensionless]
Table 4.1 (cont.)
Definition
Fraction of area used for farmland
Fraction of farm value in improvements
Fraction of non-farm value in improvements
Fraction of farm decontamination cost for
labor
Annual farm product sales
Value of farm land and improvements
Cost of health effect j
National average personal and corporate
income per-capita
Decontamination workers required for
program
Number of population health effects from
radiation exposure
Depreciation rate for improvements in
interdicted areas
Population in area to be decontaminated
Population relocated during decontamination
Population relocated during the "emergency
phase"
Population initially evacuated
Population in area to be interdicted
Population relocated during "intermediate
phase"
Societal discount rate
Ration of region-specific to national average
per-capita personal income
Fraction of non-farm area decontamination
costs for labor
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Table 4.1 (cont.)
DefinitionSymbol Units
[dimensionless]
[dimensionless]
[years]
[days]
[days]
[days]
[days]
(years]
[days]
[days]
[years]
[dimensionless]
[dimensionless]
[ $ ]1
[1 $ 1
[$/person]
Ratio of region-specific to national average
farm values
Season factor
Duration of decontamination program
Start of "emergency phase" relocation period
End of "emergency phase" relocation period
Duration of evacuation for areas not impacted
End of evacuation period for areas not
impacted
Duration of land area interdiction
Start of "intermediate phase"
End of "intermediate phase"
Duration of milk disposal
Decontamination worker dose reduction factor
for farm areas
Decontamination worker dose reduction factor
non-farm areas
Tangible wealth contained in farm areas
Tangible wealth contained in non-farm areas
National average non-farm tangible wealth
per-capita
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radioactive material are assumed to
Sheltering in homes or in places of
non-disruptive measure which can be
lasts for very short time periods.
relocation following the sheltering
the discussion of "emergency phase"
be negligible.
work is a relatively
rapidly implemented and
The costs of possible
period are included in
relocation costs.
The costs of immediate evacuation are estimated in the
new model using:
C, = P,, , · [E + (I .R)] (4.1)
where
C,,= the cost of the user-specified evacuation ($),
p,= population in area to be evacuated (number of
persons),
t,,= duration of evacuation, measured in the number
of days for individuals to return to unaffected
areas (days),
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E" cost of food, lodging, transportation, for each
evacuee (/evecuee-day) ,
- national average per-capita personal and
corporate income (S/person-day),
R - ratio of region-specific to national average
personal incomes.
The evacuation costs per person (E) include the costs of
housing, food, and transportation using commercial or mass
care facilities, and the cost of evacuation personnel to
supervise the process. These costs were estimated using a
1974 study of evacuation risks [Ha74]. The costs from this
report have been updated to 1982 dollars in Table 4.2 using
housing, food, transportation, and military pay indexes for
evacuation supervision personnel [Pr83,SA83]. The costs
are weighted assuming 80% of evacuated individuals use
commercial care facilities (motels, restaurants, and
private cars), and 20% use mass care facilities [Nu75b].
Using these assumptions the average food, housing, and
transportation cost per evacuee-day is approximately $24.
-155-
Table 4.2
Costs of Evacuation Per Evacuee-Day (1982 ) Ha74]
Commercial Care Facilities:
Housing
Food
Transportation (Private)
Mass Care Facilities:
Housing
Food
Transportation (Mass)
$ 16.90
5.30
$ 24.60/evacuee-day
$ 6.90
3.70
1.30/evacuee-day$ 11.90/evacuee-day
Evacuation Personnel ( 2% of total # of evacuees)
Compensation
Food. Housing, and
Transportation
Total Weighted Cost - (E)
(Based on 80% commercial care.
20% mass care facilities)
$58.00/day
Same as evacuees
- $23.70/evacuee-day
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The lost wages of evacuees and the corporate income
losses due to the evacuation of an area may be included in
evacuation costs. This cost component is modeled by
accounting for lost personal income (not including
interest, divaends, and transfer payments) and corporate
income and profits during an evacuation period. All income
loss estimates are weighted by region-specific factors
which are defined for each grid element to account for
variations in population incomes. The national average
personal income (minus dividends, interest, and transfer
payments) plus corporate profits and interest is estimated
to be $26 per person-day (1982 dollars) [Pr83,SA83].
For very short evacuation periods (=1-3 days) there
may be sufficient flexibility in the economy so that lost
productivity, wages, and profits can be largely recovered
through increased activity after the evacuation has ended.
Therefore, for short evacuation periods the costs of lost
income and productivity may be excluded from evacuation
cost estimates.
The new evacuation cost estimates can be compared to
experience with evacuation costs from the TMI-2 accident in
1979. Many individuals living near the plant evacuated at
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some time during the accident progression and studies have
been performed to evaluate the distance, cost, and total
duration of population movement. It is estimated that
-15,000 persons evacuated during the TMI-2 event, each
travelling an average distance of 100 miles, and staying
away from home approximately 5 days [F180]. The costs
incurred due to population evacuation were covered by
offsite liability insurance. Approximately $1.2-2.0x106
dollars was paid in claims to evacuees. Based on 15,000
evacuees and a five day stay, this corresponds to an
average cost of $16-$26 per evacuee-day. This is in good
agreement with the values derived for use in the new cost
model. The study of TMI-2 evacuation costs reported no
significant loss of income from the movement [F180].
4.4.2 EMERGENCY PHASE RELOCATION
It may be necessary to relocate individuals away from
areas in which radionuclides have deposited after a severe
LWR accident. These individuals may have been evacuated
before the release of material, in which case it is only
necessary to extend their stay out of the area, or movement
of additional individuals from contaminated areas might be
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required. As improved information is gathered concerning
the dose rates from deposited radioactive material,
individuals may be permitted to reenter those areas in
which projected doses do not exceed unacceptable levels.
The new economic consequence model allows
specification of the time period for integration of
emergency phase groundshine doses, the criterion to be
compared to projected individual doses, and the time period
for temporary population relocation in areas where the
specified criterion is exceeded. The protective action
criterion for the "emergency phase" period is defined based
on projections of individual doses from surface-deposited
materials.
The costs of temporary population relocation during
the emergency phase period are estimated including food,
housing, transportation, and income losses:
C., = Pcp . [E + (I R)] [t2c - maz(tI.p, t2..) (4.2)
where
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p" cost of emergency phase population relocation
from area (S) ,
Pp * population affected in area (number of persons),
t2ep time of end of emergency phase relocation
(days),
iep time of start of emergency phase relocation for
areas where no evacuation occurred (days),
t2 ,,= end of evacuation period for areas where
evacuation occurred (days), or 0.0 if evacuation
did not occur,
and the other parameters are defined in Table 4.1. The
comparison between the end of the evacuation period and the
start of the emergency phase relocation avoids
double-counting evacuation and temporary relocation costs.
For very short emergency phase relocation periods it may be
appropriate to exclude wage and income losses.
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4.4.3 INTERMEDIATE PHASE RELOCATION
A time period beyond the emergency phase is modeled in
which it is anticipated that better information concerning
dose felds would be available, the decision process for
long-term protective actions would be started, and
preparations for long-term actions would be made. Like the
emergency phase, an individual dose projection is compared
to the criterion for temporary population relocation from
an area. All previously relocated individuals in areas not
exceeding the intermediate phase criterion are assumed to
resume normal activities in this period.
The cost of intermediate phase relocation from an area
is estimated in a manner similar to emergency phase
relocation costs:
Cip = Pp . [E + (I R)] lt2p - t] (4.3)
where
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C a cost of intermediate phase relocation from an
area (),
A - population to be relocated from the area (number
of persons),
tlCp time of start of intermediate phase relocation
(days),
t 2ip time of end of intermediate phase relocation
(days),
and the other parameters are defined in Table 4.1. It is
assumed that the intermediate phase relocation period does
not overlap with the emergency phase relocation period in
the model (t > ). As in the emergency phase period, it
is likely that relocated individuals cannot continue normal
productivity patterns and income is assumed to be lost
during this relocation period. The parameter R can be
defined for each spatial interval to estimate
region-specific relocation costs.
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4.4.4 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT DISPOSAL
A model very similar to that employed in CRAC2 is used
to estimate the costs of milk and crop disposal which may
be necessary after severe LWR accidents. The method of
projecting maximum individual doses from ingestion of crops
and milk is discussed in the RSS [Nu75b]. The disposal
criteria for milk and crops used in this study are
identical with those used in the RSS.
4.4.4.1 Food (Crop) Product Disposal
Direct deposition of radionuclides on crops from
releases which occur during the growing season can result
in the need to dispose of the agricultural harvest which is
affected. The cost of crop disposal in these cases is
estimated using:
C,- FF. AFP.(1.0-DY).S (4.4)
where
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d0 cost of crop disposal (),
FF fraction of region which is farmland,
As area where doses from ingestion of foods would
be unacceptable (acres),
FP average annual farm production (sales) in area
(S/acre),
DY- fraction of farm sales from dairy products,
S - season factor, - 1.0 in growing season, - 0.0
outside of growing season.
It is assumed that crops in growth are disposed of in all
areas which require the long-term protective measures of
decontamination or land interdiction. Accidents which
occur outside of the growing season result in no crop
disposal costs. The parameters FF, FP, and DY are defined
for each grid element in the consequence calculations.
Dairy products are considered separately in the milk
disposal cost calculations.
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S4.4.4.2 Milk And Dairy Product Disposal
Population dose levels from ingestion of milk could
exceed unacceptable levels after a release of radionuclides
because dairy cows are extremely efficient collectors of
radionuclides deposited on pastureland. The dose
projection models and criterion used for projecting maximum
individual doses from ingestion of milk are the same as
those described in the RSS [Nu75b].
The cost of milk disposal when necessary is estimated
using the following equation:
C,, =FFuAFP*DY.S.*t, (4.5)
where
C, cost of milk disposal (s),
t,, -time for radioactivity levels in milk to reach
acceptable levels for ingestion (years),
and all other parameters are defined in Table 4.1. The
value of one year of dairy product production is assumed to
be lost in all areas requiring the long-term protective
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actions of decontamination or land interdiction. For areas
requiring only food pathway protective actions the duration
of milk interdiction is normally less than 90 days (.25
years). The parameters FF, FP, and DY can be defined for
each spatial grid element. Iodine levels in milk and
projected thyroid doses are normally limiting
considerations for milk interdiction. Because cows are
assumed to be fed with stored feed outside of the growing
season, accidents occurring during this period result in no
milk disposal costs.
4.4.5 LONG-TERM PROTECTIVE ACTIONS
After assessments of dose rates in various areas have
been completed, it would be necessary to make decisions
concerning acceptable doses over long periods of time
(=years) and the return of populations to contaminated
areas. The dominant long-term chronic exposure pathway is
likely to be groundshine from surface-deposited
radionuclides. Two effective methods of reducing long-term
population exposure via this pathway are decontamination
and/or land interdiction with permanent population
relocation. Modeling techniques and equations used in
estimating costs of these two population protective
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measures are discussed in this section.
The need for long-term protective actions is
determined by projecting a long-term individual dose from
exposure to surface-deposited materials and comparing this
dose to a specified criterion for the implementation of
population protective countermeasures. The time period for
dose projection and the protective action criterion are
flexible in the new economic model.
4.4.5.1 Decontamination Of Land And Property
Decontamination is a less disruptive measure than
long-term interdiction of areas because after the cleanup
process is completed normal activities can resume in the
affected areas. Decontamination can restore much of the
initial wealth and economic activity in an area without the
need for permanently moving the population to new
locations.
Recently much attention has been given to the
potential effectiveness and costs of decontamination
techniques after LWR accident releases [Wa82,Li83,0s83].
The experimental data which exist concerning the
effectiveness of decontamination techniques are dependent
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on radionuclides, particle sizes, and the chemical forms
characteristic of deposited materials. Little data exist
which are directly applicable to the small particle sizes
(t0e,1-10 m) and soluble materials which are anticipated in
releases from most severe LWR accidents. The cost and
effectiveness estimates for decontamination contain large
uncertainties, and results of future experimentation with
decontamination techniques should be used to update models
for decontamination.
The cost estimates used in this study for various levels of
decontamination effort in an area are taken from a detailed
review of decontamination effectiveness and costs performed at
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) [Os83]. Cleanup cost
estimates were provided for farmland and residential, business,
and public property based on decontamination techniques which
are currently feasible. The study also considered the large
areas which may require decontamination after the worst
accidents in defining the variety of decontamination techniques
which could be employed.
The study estimated decontamination costs in farm
areas based on low and high level efforts. The cost
estimates for low level effort are based on plowing of
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grassland and cropland areas and reseeding of all grassland
areas. Costs for high level efforts are based on deep
plowing of grasslands and scraping and burial of
contaminated cropland areas (deep plowing could do damage
to the quality of cropland surface soil). The farmland
decontamination cost and effectiveness values employed in
the economic consequence model are presented in Table 4.3.
Three levels of effort are specified in the economic model
with cost estimates, labor cost fractions, and
decontamination effectiveness (in terms of dose rate
reduction factor) specified for each level of effort. The
estimated worker dose reduction factor, which is the ratio
of the estimated worker dose to the total dose from
constant exposure to surface-deposited radionuclides during
the decontamination period, is also shown in Table 4.3 for
each level of effort. The dose reduction factors are
estimated based on the shielding which may be afforded by
tractors and other heavy equipment used in the farmland
decontamination process.
Decontamination costs for non-farm areas were
estimated in the SNL study on a per-capita basis. This
approach was employed in the RSS economic consequence model
and is appropriate for the new offsite cost models for the
following reasons:
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Table 4.3
Decontamination Cost and Effectiveness Values for Farm Areas (0s831
Dose Rate Reduc-
tion Factor After
Decontamination
(f)
3
15
20
Approximate
Costs(S/acre)
(DFf)
160
440
480
Fraction of
Cost for
Paid Labor
(FLf)
.30
.35
.35
Worker Dose Reduction
Factor (Estimated Worker
Dose/Dose From
Continuous Exposure)
(WFf)
.10
.25
.33
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1. angible assets in an area requiring
decontamination should be roughly proportional to
the population in the area.
2. The costs of decontamination should be roughly
proportional to the total tangible assets
requiring cleanup or disposal in an area.
3. Detailed analyses of decontamination costs based
on land usage mapping and estimation of
decontamination costs for specific area types is
not justified for risk models because areas
requiring decontamination are large enough that
average values provide reasonable cost estimates.
The large uncertainties inherent in estimates of
reactor accident radionuclide release processes
(source terms), atmospheric transport and
deposition, decontamination effectiveness, and
decontamination costs limit the usefulness of more
detailed analyses.
The non-farm area decontamination costs and effectiveness
values used in the new economic model are shown in Table
4.4. The decontamination cost estimates incorporate
information on a multitude of possible methods to be used
-171-
Table 4.4
Decontamination Cost and Effectiveness Values for Mon-Farm Areas 0s83]
Dose Rate Reduc-
tion Factor After
Decontamination
(f)
3
15
20
Approximate
Costs
(S/person)
(DRf)
2600
6900
7400
Fraction of
Cost for
Paid Labor
(atLf)
.7
.5
.5
Worker Dose Reduction
Factor (Estimated Worker
Dose/Dose From
Continuous Exposure)
(WR.33
.33
.33
.33
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in the decontamination of non-farm areas, and have been
weighted to account for residential, commercial and
industrial, and public use land areas based on national
average statistics. The methods to be employed for each
level of effort and each type of area include combinations
of decontamination techniques. However, dose rate
reduction factors for decontamination techniques cannot
generally be multiplied to account for combinations or
repeated applications of cleanup techniques. The estimated
factors for combinations of methods will generally be less
than the product of factors for each individual
decontamination method.
The total cost of the necessary decontamination
program in an area is estimated by weighting farm and
non-farm costs for the appropriate decontamination factor
by the farm acreage and population in an area:
Cd = (FF. A.DFf)+ ( . DRf) (4.6)
where
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C( cost of decontamination program in an area ($),
A total area to be decontaminated in interval
(acres),
DF- cost of decontamination of farmland by
appropriate decontamination factor f (S/acre),
P - population living in area before accident
occurrence (persons),
DR/= cost of decontamination of residential,
business, and public property by appropriate
decontamination factor f (S/person),
and the other parameters are defined in Table 4.1.
Decontamination costs are not discounted because it is
assumed that the program would be implemented as quickly as
possible after accident occurrence. Although weathering
and decay of radionuclides would provide incentives to
delay the decontamination process, it is likely that
migration and fixation of radionuclides onto surfaces in an
area with time would make decontamination more difficult
and costly. Also, delay of decontamination in an area
prolongs the societal and economic disruption caused by the
process. Therefore, the most effective approach is to
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complete decontamination of those areas which can be
restored to acceptable levels as quickly as possible.
The portion of the decontamination program costs due
to labor is estimated using the following equation:
C =- (FF A DF . FL,) + (Pd ' DR. RL) (4.7)
where
C/=the labor cost for the decontamination program in
each area (),
FLf= the fraction of farm decontamination cost for
the appropriate factor f which is estimated to be
paid labor,
RLf = the fraction of residential, business, and
public property decontamination cost for the
appropriate factor f which is estimated to be paid
labor,
and the other parameters are defined in Table 4.1. The
estimated labor cost fractions for each level of
decontamination effort in both farm and non-farm areas are
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presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. These values are
estimated based on average decontamination labor costs of
=l$1/man-hour Os83]. The remainder of decontamination
costs are based on necessary cleanup equipment and building
materials.
The total man-years of effort required for the
decontamination program in each area is estimated using:
DMY - = (4.8)DW
where
DAlY the total man-years of effort required in area,
DW= the average cost of decontamination labor
(S/man-year),
and the other parameters are defined in Table 4.1. The
average cost of decontamination labor is estimated to be
=$30,000 per man-year in this study ($10/hour for a 56
hour work week). This cost is estimated based on costs for
military and disaster relief personnel. The total
man-years of effort required is used to estimate the number
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of decontamination workers required to complete the
decontamination program in a specified program duration:
Nd - DMY
td (49)
where
Nd' the number of decontamination workers required
to complete program in the estimated program
duration (number of workers),
td= specified average time required to complete the
decontamination effort (years),
and the other parameters are defined in Table 4.1. For
severe accidents involving large areas to be
decontaminated, many workers would be required to complete
the decontamination program in a short time. Costs and
time periods estimated for decontamination assume that
combinations of military personnel, disaster relief
agencies, and commercial personnel would be employed.
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Doses incurred by decontamination workers during the
decontamination effort are estimated in the model by
accounting for the time workers will be in contaminated
areas and possible shielding which could be afforded for
various levels of decontamination effort:
DD = DT [(F A DF FL WF) + (Pd DR. RLf. WR/)] (4.10)
where
DD- the total dose incurred by decontamination
workers in an area due to exposure to
surface-deposited radionuclides (Man-Rem),
DT= the dose which would be incurred by an
individual from constant exposure to
surface-deposited radionuclides for the entire
decontamination period (Rem),
WFf= ratio of decontamination worker dose for
appropriate level of effort in farm areas to
individual dose from constant exposure during
decontamination period,
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WR/- ratio of decontamination worker dose for
appropriate level of effort in residential,
business, and public areas to individual dose from
constant exposure during decontamination period,
and the other parameters are defined in Table 4.1.
The dose ratios for decontamination workers in
residential, business, and public areas (WRf) are estimated
for all levels of effort assuming that workers work 8 hour
days, are constantly working in areas yet to be
decontaminated, and leave the impacted area at the end of
each day. No dose reduction is afforded by machinery
shielding in non-farm areas since much of the effort is
likely to be manual labor and the radionuclides of concern
are hard gamma emitters. The farm area dose ratios for
decontamination are slightly reduced because the machinery
involved in the cleanup adds distance and shielding between
the radionuclides and the workers exposed. Worker beta
doses from radionuclides deposited directly on skin and
doses from worker inhalation of resuspended radionuclides
are not included in the model. Worker protective measures
would be taken to effectively eliminate these exposure
pathways. The dose to decontamination workers is included
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in the estimates of total population exposure and chronic
health effects. The estimated decontamination worker dose
ratios for each level of effort are presented in Tables 4.3
and 4.4.
Dose rates in certain areas might warrant the
temporary relocation of the population during the
decontamination and cleanup process. Two options are
included in the new economic model to account for costs of
relocating individuals during the decontamination process.
The first option includes a check to determine whether or
not the long-term protective action criterion would be
exceeded if individuals lived in areas decontaminated
during the cleanup process. If,the long-term protective
action criterion is exceeded from inhabitation of the area
during decontamination, then the population is relocated
during the decontamination process. The second option
estimates decontamination factors necessary to meet the
long-term protective action criterion with the assumption
that all individuals are relocated from areas to be
decontaminated during the cleanup process. The number of
individuals to be relocated during decontamination can be
significantly different for the two assumptions.
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The cost of relocating individuals during the
decontamination process is estimated using:
Cd, = Pd. [E + (I. R)]. td, 385 (4.11)
where
, Cd, = the cost of population relocation from an area
during the period of decontamination ($),
Pdr = the population to be relocated from the
decontamination area (number of persons),
td= the average time from start to completion of the
decontamination process (years),
and the other parameters are defined in Table 4.1. The
time from start to completion of the decontamination
process is specified to represent an "average" for those
areas to be decontaminated. It is assumed that normal
activity resumes in an area after the decontamination
program has been completed.
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The new economic consequence model estimates
attributes of the decontamination program which can be
examined with cost estimates to identify potential resource
and logistic limitations for severe LWR accidents. The
model includes estimates of worker doses in chronic health
effect and health effect cost calculations. A large scale
decontamination program is likely to create additional
employment in specific industrial sectors due to the labor,
building materials, and equipment needs of the effort.
4.4.5.2 Land Area Interdiction
In those areas where surface-deposited activity levels
exceed unacceptable levels and decontamination by the
maximum achievable factor is not projected to reduce
individual doses to acceptable levels, land interdiction is
implemented as a population protective measure. The
population originally inhabiting the area is assumed to be
permanently moved to an alternate location. After decay,
weathering, and possible future decontamination efforts, it
is possible that individuals would move back to the area.
Land interdiction costs are estimated using present value
discounting concepts and the important assumption that some
portion of the initial value of the property may be
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recovered if the area can be used in the future.
There are two basic methods for estimating the
economic loss due to land interdiction after a release of
radioactive materials. The first method measures the
production rate (or rate of output) of the land and all
tangible assets contained within a region, and integrates
this value over the interdiction or some other specified
time period. This approach is used in both the BEA
economic model and the ECONO-MARC consequence model. The
BEA analyses predict job losses which occur in the first
year of land interdiction. The ECONO-MARC model estimates
the contribution of an area to Gross Domestic Product and
integrates the total production loss over the entire period
of land interdiction. One problem with this approach is
that all attributes of an area which contribute to societal
productivity are not measured in Gross Domestic Product.
For example, a parcel of land may be productive through a
scenic view which it provides. This productivity is rarely
measured through market transactions, and is not included
in GDP. Another problem with integrating production losses
to estimate interdiction cost is that production can often
resume in other areas or from new capital investments.
Some time period for production resumption must be
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specified to estimate a total cost of land interdiction.
Finally, production integral approaches do not accurately
account for the loss of accumulated tangible assets which
may be contained in an interdicted area. Past investments
in tangible goods may not be accurately reflected by
integrating future production losses.
A second approach to estimating the cost of land
interdiction is to use the concept of wealth to estimate
the total present value of land and tangible assets in an
area. Wealth provides the capability to produce output and
income (including non-market output and income) over a
succession of accounting periods [Ke76a,Ke76b]. The wealth
of the United States has grown constantly over the lifetime
of the nation due to continuous investment in tangible
goods to increase productive capacity. Studies have
examined both the human and non-human wealth of the nation
to determine patterns of investment and wealth formation.
If it were possible to measure the total productive output
of an area, including output contributors like scenic views
which are rarely measured directly in market transactions,
then the present discounted value of all future output from
all items would equal net tangible wealth. Given perfect
measurement techniques and using the broad definition-of
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production, wealth and discounted future production should
be equal.
CRAC2 employs a wealth model for estimating societal
costs of land interdiction. This approach is preferable to
the integrated production output approach because of the
better estimation of total costs of land area interdiction.
Also, implicit in the wealth model is the assumption that
investment can create new wealth in a different area. The
wealth loss in an interdicted area can be estimated using
available data for past integrated capital investments.
Finally, wealth loss estimates are comparable to losses
from historical events which have resulted in significant
costs. Fires, auto accidents, tornadoes, and hurricanes
are examples of events which result in tangible wealth
losses. The costs of these events result from the costs
incurred to restore the tangible property to its initial
(or often an improved) condition.
Wealth and present-value concepts are used to estimate
interdiction costs in the new economic model. Non-tangible
financial assets such as stocks, bonds, and precious metals
are not included in cost estimates since these items would
generally not be affected by a reactor accident.
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Therefore, only land and tangible asset wealth values need
to be included in the analysis.
The wealth value of land and tangible assets contained
within an area can be measured using two approaches. The
first approach is to estimate the market value of each item
as recorded in market transactions. This approach has been
used in the recent Census of Governments to estimate the
average real estate values in various regions of the
country [Ce77]. This approach is useful for assets which
are often traded in the market, but is inappropriate for
those societal assets which are seldom or never valued in
market transactions (e.g., sewer systems, public transit
systems, national parks). For these assets it is most
appropriate to measure wealth by summing total past
investment in these items and subtracting net depreciation
and losses (from accidents, disasters). Possible
appreciation of wealth can also be taken into account.
Accounting for the net wealth stock formation using this
approach is tedious because investment streams from the
start of the creation of wealth in an area must be
included.
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The BEA is in the process of completing a multi-year
study which has employed the net stock formation approach
to estimate the total tangible wealth of the United States
[Lo72,Mu74, Mu76,Mu76b,Mu79,Mu80,Mu82c,Yo71] . Investment
streams dating back to the 1700's have been summed,
depreciated, appreciated, converted to current dollars, and
net losses subtracted to estimate the net tangible wealth
contained in the U.S. versus time. The project has relied
heavily on the National Income and Product Accounts to
estimate investment in new tangible wealth. The current
stocks of private and residential wealth, government
wealth, consumer durables, and business inventories have
been estimated in the study. Research to estimate land
wealth is underway to complete the estimation of total net
tangible wealth in the nation. Once these estimates are
complete, net tangible wealth estimates can be easily
updated in future years by using national income and
product accounts. Results of a previous study performed by
The Conference Board are used in estimating the wealth of
land in the U.S. for this study [Ke76].
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The new economic model estimates wealth contained in
farm areas by using:
VI= FFA.PV.RV1 (4.12)
where
Vf -total farm wealth in
improvements ($),
an area from land and
FV-average market value
in nation(S/acre),
of farm land and structures
RV 1fratio of region-specific to national average
market value of farm land and structures in the
area,
and the other parameters are defined in Table 4.1. The
values for FF and RV can be specified for each spatial
interval in the consequence calculations. Farm land and
structure values are available in the 1978 Census of
Agriculture and have been updated to 1982 dollars using a
farm land and structure value index [Ce78,SA83].
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The total tangible wealth of residential, business,
and public properties in an area is estimated using:
v, = Pn VR R , (4.13)
where
V, Total residential, business, and public wealth in
an area ($),
Pi,-total population in area affected (number of
persons),
VR=National average tangible wealth (not including
farm land or structures) per-capita (S/person),
RV,=Ratio of region-specific to national average
personal income in area.
Total tangible wealth estimates are not available on a
region-specific basis. Therefore, the detailed national
wealth estimates which are available from the recently
completed studies of national wealth are allocated to
affected areas on a per-capita basis. The wealth estimate
is further weighted by region-specific personal income
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statistics since wealth to some extent represents income
producing capacity. Areas with high incomes are likely to
have more tangible wealth and more potential for wealth
creation than low income areas. Interdiction cost
treatment based on per-capita allocation is consistent with
the level of detail treated in the consequence model.
Other more complex methods of wealth allocation could be
employed but are not justified in this type of analysis.
The estimates of wealth included in each interdicted
area are depreciated to account for the societal cost of a
period of land interdiction. It is likely that buildings
and other improvements would depreciate at a faster rate
than land in an interdicted area due to lack of maintenance
and repairs [Nu75a]. A depreciation rate of p=.20/year is
used for improvements in both farm and non-farm areas. The
cost of interdiction of an area is estimated by subtracting
the value of land and improvements when reclaimed after
interdiction from the initial present value of the area:
C, = (V, +V,) - "'t'{v [(.0 - Fif) + Fl -Pt ]
+V,[(1. - FI,) + F, .- Pt']}
(4.14)
where
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OjCSocietal cost due to land area interdiction (),
VtsInitial total tangible wealth in farm land and
improvements in the area affected ($),
Vr-Initial total tangible wealth in non-farm land
and improvements in area (),
FIrFraction of farm wealth in improvements in area,
PI, =Fraction of non-farm wealth in improvements in
non-farm portion of area,
P=Depreciation rate for improvements during the
interdiction period (/year) ,
r=Societal discount rate used in analysis (/year),
ti=Total time land area is interdicted (years).
The parameters FIt, FI,, and t can be defined for each
spatial interval in the new economic model. The
interdiction period is estimated based on the time period
necessary for radioactive decay, weathering, and
decontamination efforts to reduce the integrated long-term
population dose to an acceptable level. If an area is
predicted to be interdicted for more than 30 years, the
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entire initial wealth in the area is assumed to be lost.
The costs of decontamination, interdiction, or a
combination of these measures is estimated for each area
where long-term actions are required and the least cost
alternative is included in cost and health effect
estimation. Decontamination is generally predicted to be
the most cost effective protective measure if the
population can be returned to the area immediately after
the cleanup process.
It is likely that personal and corporate incomes would
be lost for some period due to permanent population
relocation from interdicted areas. Permanent relocation
costs are estimated based on personal income losses for a
100 day transition period and corporate income losses for a
180 day transition period [Pr83,SA83]. Costs of moving
belongings to new areas should be small since all tangible
property in the interdicted area is assumed to be replaced.
Therefore, the cost of permanent relocation results
entirely from temporary income losses in the model. This
cost is estimated to be =$4000/person in the interdiction
area, which is small compared to wealth loss predictions.
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4.64. HEALTH EFFECTS COSTS
Studies Ac73,Co81,Ne83J have been performed to
estimate the societal costs of health effects which result
from various risk sources. There are two general
approaches which have been used to estimate the costs of
health effects. The first approach estimates individual or
societal preferences for avoidance or reduction of health
effect risks. Studies [Ac73, Co8l] using this approach
have concluded that preferences for health effect risk
reduction are dependent upon the activity or circumstance
which leads to the risk. Estimating health effect costs
through evaluation of preferences does have the advantage
that effects hich cannot be quantified directly (e.g.,
mental anguish, pain, suffering) should be appropriately
included in individual preferences. However, the interview
process necessary for elicitation of risk reduction
preferences can be difficult and costly.
A second approach to health effect costs evaluates the
loss in human capital (or human wealth) induced by health
effect occurrence. This approach values the loss in
productivity of an individual caused by the incidence of a
health effect. The loss in productivity can be estimated
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by discounting an individual's expected lifetime loss of
earnings due to the incidence of a particular health
effect. The advantage of this approach is that estimation
of costs is straightforward. However, the estimated health
effect cost from this approach includes only purely
economic costs, and in no way reflects individual
preferences for avoidance of pain, suffering, or anguish.
Health effect values calculated using this approach are
incorporated into the new economic model to represent the
societal economic losses due to the incidence of
radiation-induced health effects at offsite locations.
In using the human capital approach to estimate the
societal losses due to health effect occurrence, it is
necessary to add the direct societal costs of health care
to estimate the total cost of radiation-induced health
effects. A previous study has estimated the direct
(medical care) and the indirect (human capital) costs of
possible radiation-induced health effects after severe LWR
accidents [Ne83]. The study used detailed calculations to
account for the age distribution and earnings distribution
of the population, average medical care costs, and health
effect risk versus time after radiation exposure to
estimate the costs of specific types of health effects
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included in the CRAC2 consequence calculation code. A
computer model was developed in the study to estimate
health effect costs for specific consequences and
discounting assumptions. Estimates of base-case radiation
injury, cancer, and genetic effects costs from the study
are shown in Table 4.5. Early fatality costs were not
directly estimated in the study. The cost estimates are
based on a typical population exposed to radiation after an
LWR accident, a 4%/year real societal discount rate, and a
1%/year real growth rate in medical costs and earnings.
The costs of radiation-induced health effects are
estimated in the new economic model by multiplying the
expected number of health effects by average societal costs
for each type of health effect:
NCa ON HCi (4.15)
where
Chk=Total medical care and human capital cost of
radiation-induced health effects of type j ($),
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Table 4.5
Estimates of Economic Costs of Radiation-Induced Health Effects*[Ne83]
Medical Care and
Productivity Costs (103$)
(Ch )
Health Effects (j)
Radiation Injuries
Prodromal 1
Bone arrow 129
Lung 76
Gastrointestinal 100
Prenatal 281
Average 118
Cancers
Leukemia 131
Lung 27
Gastrointestinal 25
Breast 24
Bone 118
All Others 24
Thyroid 2
Genetic Effects 52
sCost estimates are based on 4 discount rate and 1% real growth rate
in medical care costs. No estimates for early fatality costs are
presented in [Ne83].
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_Ci-Average medical care and human capital cost of
specific health effect j ($/effect),
Nh,=Total number of health effects of type j
predicted to occur in area (number of effects).
The health effect estimates included in the new economic
model include early fatalities resulting from early
exposure+, early injuries resulting from early exposure,
latent cancer fatalities resulting from early exposure,
latent cancer fatalities resulting from chronic exposure,
thyroid health effects resulting from total exposure, and
genetic effects resulting from total exposure. The total
cancer fatality costs include leukemia, lung,
gastrointestinal, breast, bone, and all other fatal cancers
from exposure. The health effect costs also include the
costs of non-fatal effects. All health effect cost
predictions in the new economic model reflect short- and
long-term protective actions which are assumed to be
+ Five times the average value of a radiation injury from
the health effect cost study [Ne83] is used as an estimate
of early fatality costs in this study ($500,000). The
conclusions of this study are insensitive to this value.
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implemented in each area after the accident, including
doses incurred by decontamination workers when appropriate.
The new economic model estimates the societal costs of
radiation-induced health effects using the human capital
approach with estimates of direct costs of medical care.
These cost estimates have been taken from a previous study
of health effect costs for severe LWR accidents (Table 4.5)
[Ne83]. The values represent only societal economic
losses, and do not in any way reflect true individual
preferences for risk reduction from radiation-induced
health effects. Therefore, the health effect costs
presented in this report represent lower-bound estimates.
Dollar values for health effects reflecting societal
preferences for risk avoidance could be incorporated into
the new economic models. However, it is questionable
whether true societal preferences can be appropriately
represented using constant dollar values for health effects
[Ke80a,Ke80b,Ke80c].
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4.5 OFFSITE COSTS NOT INCLUDED IN THE NEW ECONOMIC MODELS
4.5.1 OFFSITE LITIGATION COSTS
After any severe accident resulting in a release of
radioactive material it is likely that parties affected at
offsite locations will seek compensation from liable
parties through litigation. As discussed in section 3.10
on onsite litigation costs, the societal costs of the
litigation process itself are likely to be small. However,
to individual parties involved in litigation, the costs of
the litigation process could be large and should be
included in analyses for these groups. Most damage rewards
for offsite parties represent transfers of losses which are
included in direct societal cost estimates and do not
result in additional net costs. Legal awards for costs not
quantified could be included by augmenting the dollar costs
used in this study. No societal costs for offsite
litigation cases are included in this study.
4.5.2 SECONDARY IMPACTS
It is possible that an accident could have economic
impacts outside of the area directly impacted by population
protective countermeasures. Also, increases in the cost of
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electricity in specific regions could ripple through the
economy affecting prices, employment, incomes, and
productivity in a region. These secondary costs or ripple
effects of accidents are discussed in this section.
One problem in discussing secondary impacts is that
the magnitude of impacts depends on the size of the area
included in the analysis. Negative impacts in one specific
impacted region are often balanced by positive impacts in
another area. For example, increased labor costs on the
East coast of the U.S. could lead to gradual industry
relocation and increased economic activity on the West
coast of the country. This type of secondary impact
results in small net societal costs due to the balancing of
costs and benefits in the economy. However, when viewed
from a regional perspective, this secondary impact of
higher labor costs could be important.
The potential secondary impacts of population
protective measures such as milk disposal, crop disposal,
decontamination, and land interdiction have been estimated
as part of the Bureau of Economic Analysis study of reactor
accident consequences using input-output analysis
techniques. The results and limitations of the BEA
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analyses are discussed in detail in Appendix C. Analyses
for various reactor sites indicate that secondary impacts
of population protective measures will generally be small
compared to the direct cost of measures taken in the
physically affected areas. However, the BEA analyses did
not estimate the potential secondary impacts (which may
largely be beneficial) of a large decontamination program
after severe accidents. In general, it is likely that the
flexibility in the national and regional economies which is
observed after most disasters would result in a lessening
of the secondary impacts from population protective
measures [Pe77,ED74]. It is possible that specific
instances could be found where secondary impacts are
important.
Another potential source of secondary impacts after
accidents which result in reactor plant shutdown is the
increased real cost of electricity in a particular region.
This potential impact has been discussed in studies of the
costs of shutting down operating reactors [St8lb].
Increased electricity prices in a region can have adverse
effects on employment, income, and production in the area.
These effects are normally estimated using simple
multipliers. The multipliers for regional impacts
-201-
of higher electricity prices have ranged from negative
values (indicating a net benefit to electricity price
increases) to positive values of 5.5 (indicating that
secondary impacts are 4.5 times as great as the direct
costs). These multipliers are normally estimated using
region-specific input-output or econometric models to
predict the total regional impact of an energy price
increase. From the societal perspective, it is likely that
secondary impacts will be reduced through cancellation of
costs and benefits in different regions.
Secondary impacts of severe reactor accidents are not
explicitly estimated in this study because costs are
estimated from the societal perspective and the level of
detail and cost necessary to estimate secondary impacts for
a specific event are not warranted for risk analysis
applications. It is likely that secondary costs will
largely be cancelled by benefits when viewed from the
societal perspective. Results of input-output analyses
indicate that the secondary impacts of population
protective measures should be generally small. This view
is supported by data from disaster experience [Pe77,ED74].
The impacts of electricity price increases due to reactor
shutdown could be serious in a particular region, but are
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likely to be balanced somewhat by positive effects in the
society viewed as a whole. Further research in estimating
secondary costs should be considered to estimate the
complete societal costs of severe accidents. No societal
costs for secondary impacts are included in this study.
4.6 COMPARISON OF CRAC2 AND NEW ECONOMIC MODELS
A flowchart of the new offsite economic consequence
model is shown in Figure 4.3. The model estimates direct
costs of population protective measures and public health
impacts at offsite locations after reactor accidents, and
incorporates estimates from onsite cost models in the
calculation of distributions of economic risks. A
flowchart of the CRAC2 economic model is shown in Figure
4.4. The major differences between the new model and the
CRAC2 model are:
1. The new model accounts for short-term emergency
phase and intermediate phase population movement
costs not included in the CRAC2 model.
-203-
Figure 4.3 - Flowchart of new economic model.
NEW ECONOMIC MODEL
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8. Health effect costs and onsite cost components can
be included in the estimation of total accident
costs.
4.7 PROTOTYPE ECONOMIC MODEL USED IN THIS STUDY
A prototype of the new economic model has been
developed as part of this study for development and testing
purposes. The prototype model uses radionuclide
concentration data from CRAC2 analyses as input in
estimating accident economic consequences. A flow diagram
for the prototype model is presented in Figure 4.5. The
new economic models are currently being incorporated into
the MELCOR series of risk assessment codes.
The prototype economic model includes subroutines to
calculate individual doses from exposure to
surface-deposited materials for comparison with offsite
protective action implementation criteria. Many of the
dose projections necessary for the new economic models are
not included in the CRAC2 code. Appendix E contains a
discussion of the equations employed in the prototype model
to integrate individual exposures over various time
periods. Appendix F contains a listing of the prototype
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2. The model accounts for population relocation which
may be necessary during the decontamination and
cleanup process.
3. The model allows user-definition of all protective
action criteria to be applied in post-accident
situations.
4. Most economic parameters can be specified on a
spatial interval basis for site-specific
calculations.
5. All cost values have been updated and expressed in
1982 dollars.
6. Additional attributes of the decontamination
program are estimated in the new economic model.
Dose to decontamination workers is estimated and
included in the health effect calculations.
7. Dose calculations correspond closely to the
protective actions which are implemented in each
area. This provides the ability to estimate both
costs and benefits of various protective actions.
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Figure 4.4 - Flowchart of CRAC2 economic model.
CRAC2 ECONOMIC MODEL
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economic model which requires input information from CRAC2.
The code is written in FORTRAN 77.
4.8 CONCLUSIONS
The new offsite economic model can be used to estimate
the costs of protective actions after any accidental
release of material from an LWR facility. Since routine
forced outage events result in negligible offsite
consequences, there is no need to employ the offsite cost
models to estimate costs for routine forced outage events.
The new offsite cost models are employed in the estimation
of severe accident consequences in Chapter 6 of this
report. The model predictions are compared to previous
predictions from the CRAC2 economic models in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 5
ECONOMIC RISKS FROM SMALL CONSEQUENCE LWR EVENTS
The frequencies and costs of routine LWR outage events
are combined in this section to estimate the economic risks
from these events. Historical data are used to estimate
the frequency of LWR forced outage events and the severity
(or duration) of forced outage events conditional upon
forced outage occurrence. Onsite replacement power and
repair costs for routine forced outage events are estimated
using the onsite cost models described in Chapter 3.
Offsite costs are negligible for this category of
operational events. The possible benefits resulting from
the reduction of the frequency and duration of forced
outage events are discussed.
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5.1 LWR FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS INCLUDED IN CATEGORY I (SMALL
CONSEQUENCES)
The primary goal of this study is to estimate the
economic risks posed by abnormal occurrences or unusual
events which occur at U.S. nuclear power reactors.
Therefore, scheduled plant events such as refueling outages
are not included in estimates of LWR economic risk from
plant operation. The most important contributor to onsite
costs from routine forced outages is the cost of
replacement power due to plant outage time. Events which
do not result in plant outage time are not considered in
this study. These events contribute minimally to the
economic risk from plant operation. Any events which
result in core-damage or radioactive contamination of plant
facilities are included in event categories II and III and
are discussed in Chapter 6.
5.2 DATA BASE FOR LWR FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS
A data base was formed in this study to estimate
U.S. LWR forced outage frequencies by using the annual
reports of nuclear plant operating experience published by
the NRC [AE74,Nu77bNu77c, Nu79a,Nu79beNu8la,Nu81b]. Each
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NRC report presents operating statistics and data for each
plant in commercial operation at the end of a given
calendar year. The data base formed for this study
includes calendar years 1974 through 1980.
Each individual reactor plant outage which occurred
during a calendar year is summarized in the NRC data base.
The plant outage data include the duration of the outage
(in hours) , the type of outage (forced or scheduled) , a
description of the nature of the outage, the cause of the
outage, the reactor shutdown method, and the plant
components involved for each operating U.S. LWR outage.
The data are used to develop estimates of the frequency of
forced outage events and outage durations for LWRs. The
cause of each outage is also considered in the formation of
the distribution of forced outage frequencies in this
study.
Unfortunately, inclusion of all forced outage events
in the formation of the outage distributions is not
appropriate for the purpose of this study. Events such as
regulatory forced outages resulting from NRC mandates for
plant shutdown are included in the NRC data base as forced
outage events. Also, the distinction between forced and
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scheduled outages in the NRC data base is sometimes
questionable. Therefore, the cause of each individual
forced outage event was reviewed and only those events
which resulted from plant operation are included in the
formation of distributions in this study. Judgments
regarding the scheduled or non-scheduled nature of forced
outage events were applied to the data base. All
regulatory forced outages are excluded from the estimation
of economic risks from operation, but are discussed
separately in Appendix B.
Another problem in the NRC operating experience
reports is that the definition of forced outage events
changed during the data collection period of this study.
The changes in forced outage definition applied in the NRC
reports do not significantly affect the categorization of
outages in this study. It is necessary to take proper
account of outages which extend across calendar years by
summing the outage contributions into a single total outage
duration. This summation is not performed in the NRC event
summaries, but is included in this report.
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A listing of the nuclear plant operating experience
data base formed for this study is contained in Appendix A.
The data base contains information concerning the plant
name, calendar year, the date of the start of plant
commercial operation, the date of plant permanent shutdown
(where applicable), the reactor type, the NSSS vendor, the
reactor electrical rating, the total number of forced
outages occurring within each reactor-year, and the
duration (in hours) of each forced outage event which
occurred during each calendar year from 1974 through 1980.
5.3 DISTRIBUTION OF LWR FORCED OUTAGE FREQUENCIES
The newly developed plant operating experience data
base is used to estimate the frequency of forced outage
events at operating of 367 complete reactor-years of
operation which occurred between 1974-1980 are used in the
analysis. Partial years of operation, which occur
immediately after plant startup (i.e., the year of the
start of commercial operation) are excluded from the
analysis because of difficulty in data interpretation+.
+ Some nuclear plants report outages which occur before the
start of plant commercial operation. Therefore, any
partial years of experience at the time of plant startup
are excluded from the analysis.
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The data for the total number of forced outage events
occurring in a given plant year are statistically analyzed
and tests for fits of standard probability distributions
are performed.
The statistical parameters of the data set used to
estimate the forced outage frequency using equal weighting
of all reactor-years are shown in Table 5.1. The total
number of forced outage events included in the set is 3681,
resulting in a mean estimate of 10.0 forced outage events
per reactor-year. The minimum number of forced outage
events observed in a reactor-year is 0, with a maximum of
52 forced outage events observed in a single reactor-year.
The standard deviation of the data is 7.0 events per
reactor-year. Statistics are also shown for PWR and BWR
plants considered separately. Small differences exist in
the data for the two plant types, with BWR plants on
average experiencing slightly fewer forced outage events
than PWR plants over the study period.
A histogram of the number of forced outage events
occurring in each reactor-year of data is shown in Figure
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Table 5.1 - Statistical parameters of data used to
estimate forced outage frequency.
Statistical Parameter PWRs BWRs All LWRs
Total Reactor-Years 219 148 367
Total Forced Outage Events 2370 1311 3681
Mean Forced Outage Frequency
Based on Equal Weighting of 10.8 9.0 10.0
Reactor-Years (per R.-Yr.)
Median Forced Outage Frequency 10 8 9
(per R.-Yr.)
Variance of Forced Outage Frequency 62.0 27.7 49.4
Standard Deviation of Forced
Outage Frequency (per R.-Yr.)
Minimum Forced Outage Frequency 0 0 0
in a Single Reactor-Year
Maximum Forced Outage Frequency 52 31 52
in a Single Reactor-Year
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Figure 5.1 - Histogram
for al l
of forced outage frequency data
LWRs, 1974-1980.
HISTOGRAM OF THE NUMBER OF FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS OCCURRING IN YEAR
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and all LWRs, 1974-1980.
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5.1. The empirical complementary cumulative distribution
functions for PWR, BWR, and all LWR plants are shown in
Figure 5.2+. The distributions show small differences
between BWR and PWR plants in the study period.
The data base was analyzed to estimate the
distribution of plant-specific forced outage frequencies
using all of the years of operational data for each plant
included in the data base. The plant-average forced outage
frequency for each nuclear unit in operation during the
1974-1980 period is included except those plants which
experienced less than 1 full year of commercial operation
during the study period. Simple statistics for the average
forced outage frequency at each nuclear unit during this
period are shown in Table 5.2. A total of 67 nuclear
plants are included with a mean plant-average forced outage
frequency of 10.6 outages per reactor-year. A histogram of
+ Parameters were estimated for fits of the normal,
lognormal, exponential, and Weibull distributions to the
empirical data using a least squares estimation technique
[Ch56]. A Weibull distribution was the only hypothesized
distribution accepted at a .10 level of significance using
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the hypothesis [Gr72].
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Table 5.2 - Statistical parameters of data used to
estimate plant-average forced outage frequencies.
Statistical Parameter PWRs BWRs All LWRs
Total Number of Plants
Mean Plant-Specific Forced Outage
Frequency (per Reactor-Year)
Median Plant-Specific Forced Outage
Frequency (per Reactor-Year)
Variance of Plant-Specific Forced
Outage Frequency
41 26
11.3
11.2
9.4
9.6
24.4 17.0
Standard Deviation of Plant-Specific
Forced Outage Frequency (per R.-Yr.)
Minimum Plant-Specific Forced Outage
Frequency (per Reactor-Year)
Maximum Plant-Specific Forced Outage
Frequency (per Reactor-Year)
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67
10.6
10.4
22.1
4.14.9
2.8
24.3
4.7
2.3 2.3
21.0 24.3
the plant-average forced outage frequency data for all 67
LWRs is shown in Figure 5.3. The plant-average forced
outage frequencies show less variation than the forced
outage frequencies observed in each individual reactor-year
of operation (Figure 5.1). This can be explained by the
balancing of operational years with many and few forced
outage events for each individual nuclear plant. The
complementary cumulative distribution functions for
plant-average forced outage frequencies for BWRs, PWRs, and
all LWRs are shown in Figure 5.4. The data for
plant-average forced outage frequencies are approximately
normally distributed. The variation of plant-average
forced outage frequency is due in part to characteristics
of the portfolio of reactor plants operating during the
1974-1980 study period. Differences in the age, design,
and operation and maintenance programs of each operating
U.S. LWR unit contribute to the observed variation in
plant-average forced outage frequency.
The data base was also used to test for correlations
between the number of forced outages in each reactor-year
and reactor age (during the reactor-year) , reactor size,
reactor type, and NSSS vendor. Significant correlations
were found to exist between reactor age and the number of
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Figure 5.3 - Histogram of plant-average forced outage frequencydata for the years 1974-1980.
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Figure 5.4 - CCDFs of plant-average forced outage frequency for
BWRs, PWRs, and all LWRs, 1974-1980.
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forced outages observed in each reactor-year of data. For
nuclear units with electrical ratings larger than 500 MWe
and less than 1000 MWe, significantly more forced outage
events are experienced in the first few years of plant
operation than in later operation years. This is
consistent with standard "bathtub" failure rate behavior
which is observed in most technological devices. The
higher rate of forced outages in the first few years of
plant life reflects "teething" and wear-in problems which
often arise in engineering devices. Significant
differences in the mean number of forced outage events per
unit time were found for small versus large reactors. No
significant correlations were found between the number of
forced outages per reactor-year and the plant type or NSSS
vendor.
Analyses were performed to check for correlations
between the number of forced outage events in each
reactor-year and the mean forced outage duration. Although
it was expected that smaller numbers of forced outage
events might be correlated with outages of longer duration
(which result in less operating time in which forced outage
events may occur), no significant correlations were found.
In addition, no significant correlations were found between
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plant age and the mean or total forced outage duration in
each reactor-year of data. Results of detailed analyses of
the LWR outage data base are reviewed in Appendix D.
5.4 DISTRIBUTION OF LWR FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS
The LWR forced outage data base is used to estimate
the distribution of forced outage event durations
conditional upon outage occurrence. The durations of 3681
forced outage events (in hours) are included in the
analysis. No outages from partial years of reactor
operation are included. The minimum outage duration in the
NRC reporting system is 1 hour+. The duration of outage
events which extend across calendar years is taken to be
the total summation of all plant downtime resulting from an
initiating event.
The statistical parameters of the forced outage
duration data set are shown in Table 5.3. The forced
outages included in the data base totaled 303,754 hours of
forced outage time (35 reactor years of downtime) between
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+ More recent NRC reports include outage durations less
than 1 hour in duration.
Table 5.3 - Statistical parameters of data used to
estimate forced outage event durations.
Statistical Parameter PWRs BWRs All LWRs
Total Number of Forced Outage
Events
Total Outage Hours from All
Forced Outage Events
Mean Forced Outage Event
Duration (hours)
Median Forced Outage Event
Duration (hours)
Variance of Forces Outage Event
Duration (hours )
184,510 119,244 303,754
77.9
11
91.0
22
121,581 284,163
82.5
15
179,462
Standard Deviation of Forced
Outage Event Duration (hours)
Minimum Forced Outage Event
Duration (hours)
Maximum Forced Outage Event
Duration (hours) 6,941 12,059
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2370 1311 3681
348.7 533.1 423.6
1 1 1
12,059
calendar years 1974-1980. The mean forced outage duration
during this period is approximately 82.5 hours, and the
median outage duration is 15 hours. The standard deviation
of the outage duration data is approximately 420 hours. A
histogram and complementary cumulative distribution
function of forced outage durations from the empirical data
are presented in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. Relatively small
differences exist in the forced outage duration
distributions for PWR and BWR plants during the study
per iod+.
5.4.1 FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF FORCED OUTAGE DURATIONS
A distribution of forced outage event frequency versus
outage duration is obtained by combining the frequency of
forced outage event occurrence and the distribution of
outage durations conditional upon event occurrence. The
+ Parameters were estimated for fits of the normal,
lognormal, exponential, and Weibull distributions to the
forced outage duration data for all LWRs using a least
squares technique. All of the hypothesized distributions
were rejected at a 0.1 level of significance using a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
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Histogram of LWR forced outage event duration
data for the years 1974-1980.
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Figure 5.6 - CCDF of forced outage durations conditional upon
event occurrence for BWRs, PWRs, and all LWRs, 1974-1980.
CCF Vm OUTMR DRATIO CONDITINAL ON io Yt OCCURax. S?4-teee DATA, U.S. LRe IN COMPIECCAL OPERATION
167 ilACTOYEASA . $MI FoCrD OUTAK EVENTS IN DATA IAlE
I
0--
I
ioPM oITAE VENT DURATION IN OURS
-229-
distribution of forced outage event durations is assumed to
be independent of the total frequency of forced outage
events (i.e., the distribution of event severity is
independent of forced outage frequency) in the combination
process. Complementary cumulative frequency distributions
of outage event durations are shown in Figure 5.7 for PWRs,
BWRs, and all LWRs.
5.5 DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC RISK FROM CATEGORY I FORCED
OUTAGES
The complementary cumulative frequency distributions
of forced outage duration can easily be converted to
economic risk distributions for forced outage events by
correlating each forced outage duration to a cost using the
models discussed in Chapter 3 of this report. As discussed
in section 3.2, the real societal discount rate used in
this study is 4% per year. The costs of events in this
category are insensitive to discount rate because of the
short duration of the cash flow streams for routine forced
outage events.
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Figure 5.7 - Complementary cumulative frequency distributions of
forced outage durations for BWRs, PWRs, and all LWRs, 1974-1980.
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The losses for routine forced outage events in
category I are dominated by replacement power costs. As
discussed in section 3.6.1, plant repair costs for these
eventL have historically been small relative to replacement
power costs. The events in this category do not result in
significant plant contamination, and the plant is assumed
to always be repaired for return to operation. Nuclear
power industry costs, litigation costs, and electric
utility business costs are small for this category of
events. No early decommissioning costs or offsite
consequences result from this category of events.
Common-mode failures which result in multiple unit forced
outages at a single site are unlikely for this event
category.
Using the. replacement power correlation from equation
3.4, and assuming no significant escalation in real power
production cost increases occurs over the short time
duration associated with each outage, the discounted
societal cost of a forced outage of duration h can be
estimated using:
D -o (F + R)e-'tdt (.1)
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where
Dgs the discounted societal cost of a plant forced
outage of duration h hours ($),
F- the power production cost increase per hour of
outage duration for the plant under consideration
(S/hour),
R- lant repair cost per hour of outage duration
(=$1000/hour) ,
r the real societal discount rate (4% per year),
h outage duration measured in hours.
A discounted cost is calculated for each outage duration
and the distribution of discounted cost versus event
frequency is formed.
It is important to note that the replacement power
cost model used in this section may significantly
overestimate the actual societal costs due to very short
duration forced outage events. The model does not account
for electric utility options, seasonal effects, and other
considerations which may avert the need for the purchase of
replacement power. However, the model does provide a
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reasonable estimate of the costs due to forced outages of
short duration assuming replacement power purchases or
equivalent cost measures are necessary.
Complementary cumulative frequency distributions for
category I forced outage costs are shown in Figure 5.8.
The curves are based on frequencies estimated for a generic
1000 Mwe nuclear plant. Curves for plants located in the
NPCC, MAAC, and ECAR NERC regions are shown to demonstrate
the effects of replacement power cost variation on economic
risks. A plant repair cost of -$1000 per hour of outage
duration is included in the analyses. The curves are based
on an average total forced outage frequency of 10 events
per reactor-year. The expected values of the economic risk
distributions are also shown in Figure 5.8. The expected
losses due to routine forced outage events vary by a factor
of 4 due to the difference in the costs of replacement
power purchases across NERC regions. Table 5.4 shows the
expected hours of forced outage time and dollar costs per
reactor-year for an average LWR in the MAAC region for
forced outage events of various durations. Outages of less
than 28 days duration account for approximately half of the
expected costs from category I forced outage events.
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Figure 5.8 - Economic risk distribution for category I outages
at an "average" 1000 MWe LWR in 3 NERC regions.
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Table 5.4 - Expected costs of category I forced outage events
per reactor-year of operation - "Average" LWR
plant, 1000 MWe, MAAC NERC region.
Forced Outage
Durations
Expected Outage Hours
Per Reactor-Year
Expected Discounted
Cost (4%) PerReactor-Year
0-6 hours
6-12 hours
12-24 hours
24-72 hours
72-168 hours
7-28 days
28-183 days
6-12 months
>12 months
8
19
37
73
96
205
213
110
64
$2.1x10 S
$5.0x105
$9.8x105
$1.9x106
$2.5x106
$5.4x106
$5.5x106
$2.8x106
$1. 6x106
Total Expectation
Per Reactor-Year 825 $2.1x107
-236-
ii i iiiii ii - -
The forced outage frequency-severity data was also
employed to estimate category I outage economic risks for
PWRs and BWRs based on reactor-year and plant-average
forced outage frequencies. The expected costs of category
I forced outage events are the same for both methods of
analysis. The forced outage frequency is slightly lower
for BWR plants than for PWR plants in the study period, but
the mean outage duration is longer for BWR plants than for
PWR plants. The differences in outage frequency and
severity for the two plant types tend to cancel when
estimating the expected costs of category I forced outage
events.
5.6 PRESENT VALUE OF LIFETIME INTEGRATED ECONOMIC RISKS
It is useful to estimate the total present value of
lifetime risks for each category of reactor accidents for
use in cost/benefit decisions regarding economic risk
reduction measures. The total integrated economic risk
over the remaining life a nuclear plant corresponds to the
amount which society should be willing to spend to reduce
the economic losses from events to zero, assuming expected
value maximization is the decision objective (i.e., risk
neutrality). Measures of risk aversion or proneness to
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events could be incorporated in the analysis but are not
addressed in this study. The integrated economic risks
reflect the present value of expected costs of events over
the remaining plant productive lifetime. The sensitivity
of integrated lifetime economic risks is examined using 0,
4, and 10% real discount rates. It is assumed that real
fossil fuel power production costs do not escalate relative
to nuclear power generation costs over the remaining
lifetime of a reactor.
The lifetime-integrated economic risk from each
category of LWR events is calculated using:
ER= ftso fCif(t)e -' tdt (5.2)
where
ERi= the present value of economic risk from category
i LWR events over the remaining productive plant
life ($),
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lo the remaining lifetime of the reactor plant
(years) ,
fi- the frequency of accident category i, (per
reactor-year) assumed to be constant over
remaining reactor life+,
Ci(t)- the cost of event i which occurs at time t
discounted to the time of event occurrence ($),
r- the real societal discount rate used in the
analysis (per year).
The Surry Unit 2 nuclear power plant is used as an
example for integration of lifetime economic risks in this
study. The 775 Mwe plant, located in the SERC NERC region,
+ The frequency f.in the above formula implicitly allows
repeat events at a reactor. The formula can be corrected
to prohibit this situation, particularly for core-melt
accidents which are likely to result in early plant
shutdown. The correction would considerably complicate
the formula, and because the frequencies of severe
accidents resulting in early shutdown are very low, the
difference in results would be extremely small.
-239-
i
has been in operation for approximately 10 years, with an
estimated remaining productive lifetime of 30 years. The
estimated integrated economic risks for category I outage
events at the Surry plant are shown in Table 5.5. The
estimates are based on generic forced outage frequency and
duration estimates for the 1974-1980 period combined with
the new onsite cost model estimates for the Surry plant.
The integrated forced outage event risks vary by a factor
of =3 for the 0-10% range of discount rates. The present
value of category I outage costs for the remaining lifetime
of the Surry plant results from costs of replacement power
during plant forced outages. The integrated values show
that a significant societal benefit could be realized
through reduction of forced outage time over the remaining
lifetime of the plant.
5.7 PREVIOUS ESTIMATES OF FORCED OUTAGE ECONOMIC RISKS
The frequency versus outage duration spectrum for LWRs
has been previously estimated as part of an EPRI study of
the financial risks of reactor outages and accidents
[St81]. The forced outage frequency-severity curve derived
in the EPRI study is shown in Figure 5.9. The upper
portion of the curve, at high frequency and small repair
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Table 5.5 - Present value of lifetime-integrated category I
forced outage event economic risks for Surry #2,
based on generic event frequency estimates.
Discount Rate
(% per year)
Present Value of Category I Forced Outagj
Event Costs for Remaining Plant Lifetime
0
4
10
$2.7x10l
$1.6x10o
$8.4x10 7
Based on average forced outage frequency of 10 events per
reactor-year over 30 year remaining plant lifetime. All
costs are expressed in 1982 dollars.
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Figure 5.9 - Comparison of forced outage duration distributions
with those from EPRI study.
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time, was estimated from data collected for an earlier
report on nuclear component failure statistics (Ko80. The
report estimated the frequency of forced outages based on
data collected for 54 U.S. commercial nuclear power
reactors larger than 400 MWe and in commercial operation
before June 1978. The maximum time to repair estimated
from the data was approximately 500 hours, at an
approximate frequency of 0.4 per reactor-year. The
frequency of severe accidents with longer repair times was
estimated using the median core-melt frequency and
uncertainty bounds from the Reactor Safety Study [Nu75a],
with the assumption that a core-melt accident would result
in the equivalent of 10-30 years of outage time cost. The
dashed line in Figure 5.9 is an interpolation between the
historical repair time data and RSS estimates. The
interpolation extends from mean repair times of -500 to
=250,000 hours and frequencies of 0.5 to 6X10'5 per
reactor-year.
The BWR, PWR, and LWR outage frequency-outage duration
curves derived in this study are compared to the EPRI
curves in Figure 5.9. The estimates of PWR and BWR outage
frequencies for short duration outages are somewhat lower
than the estimates from the EPRI study. This difference in
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estimates for short duration outages results from the
exclusion of regulatory outages and the use of a more
extensive operating experience base developed in this
study. For outages longer than 500 hours in duration,
historical data agrees with the EPRI interpolation very
well. The maximum outage duration for which historical
data exists for category I events is =12,000 hours.
The estimated economic risk curve for category I
forced outage events for a generic 1000 MWe LWR plant in
the NPCC NERC region is shown in Figure 5.10. The 000 MWe
plant in the NPCC region has replacement power cost
increases on the order of =$1 million dollars per day of
outage time (see section 3.2.1). This curve is compared to
the economic risk curve estimated in the EPRI study for
outages of greater than 10 days duration. The two
estimates of the economic risk curve agree remarkably well.
The expectation value for both curves for outages greater
than 10 days and less than 5000 days in duration is 2$17
million dollars per reactor-year. The total expectation
cost for all category I events is estimated in this study
to be =$34 million 1982 dollars per reactor-year for a 1000
MWe plant in the NPCC region.
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Figure 5.1 - Comparison of category economic risk distributionto electric utility risk distribution from EPRI study.
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5.8 SENSITIVITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES
The estimates of economic risks from category I forced
outage events in this study blend historical frequency data
and simple cost models. The economic risk values presented
do not consider plant-specific attributes which may have
important impacts on forced outage frequencies and costs.
The estimates of category I forced outage frequencies
presented in this study are based on data for the portfolio
of U.S. LWRs in commercial operation during the period
1974-1980. Based on equal weighting of all reactor-years
in the data base, the average forced outage frequency
during this period is 10.0 forced outage events per
reactor-year. As shown in Figure 5.1, the largest number
of forced outage events during a single reactor-year of
operation is ~5 times greater than the mean (52 forced
outage events). Some reactor-years of operation resulted
in no forced outage events. The mean plant-specific forced
outage frequency (based on averaging of multiple years of
plant operation) from the data base is 10.6 outage events
per reactor-year of operation. The highest plant-average
forced outage frequency is about a factor of 2 higher than
the mean, and the lowest plant-average forced outage
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frequency is about a factor of 3 lower than the mean value.
The variation in plant-average forced outage frequency
results from stochastic processes and from plant-specific
attributes including plant age, design, and operations
programs. The estimates of economic risk presented in this
section are based on generic outage frequency estimates
representative of the portfolio of operating reactors
between 1974-1980.
The data base developed in this study can be used to
perform detailed analyses to estimate plant-specific forced
outage frequencies. A detailed analysis of forced outage
frequency would consider the historical experience of a
particular unit, the age of the reactor plant, and other
plant attributes which may have important impacts on forced
outage frequency.
The estimates of U.S. LWR forced outage costs in this
section are based on simple replacement power cost and
plant repair cost models. Actual replacement power costs
based on detailed analyses for specific utilities have
shown variations of less than a factor of 3 from the simple
model results [Bu82]. The contribution of plant repair
costs to total outage costs is small, and the uncertainties
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in plant repair cost estimates are relatively unimportant.
The replacement power cost model is likely to be more
uncertain for short-duration forced outage events, since a
broader range of options exist for compensating for lost
capacity during these outage events. The assumptions which
underlie the simple replacement power cost model also
become more uncertain when projecting costs into future
years. In particular, the assumptions regarding the
availability of generating capacity to produce replacement
power and costs of fossil fuels become more uncertain when
projecting costs for years in the future.
More detailed analyses of replacement power costs for
a specific plant under consideration would take into
account the reactor electrical rating, historical capacity
factor, and utility-specific considerations regarding
replacement power agreements, load variations, and excess
generating capacities which might exist. Plant-specific
cost analysis could substantially reduce the uncertainties
associated with replacement power cost estimates.
The generic estimates of category I economic risk
presented in this section contain uncertainties due to
plant-specific characteristics, stochastic variations, and
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imperfect knowledge regarding forced outage frequencies and
costs in future years. It is estimated that these
variations can lead to actual plant-average category I
event economic risks ranging from a factor of 10 lower to a
factor of 5 higher than those presented. Most of this
variation is due to the variation of forced outage
frequencies based on plant-specific characteristics. More
detailed analysis of plant-specific data for frequencies
and costs could reduced these uncertainties to
approximately factors of 3 and 1/3. This analysis can be
performed within the framework presented using the forced
outage data base developed in Appendix A and detailed
utility-specific replacement power cost estimates. The
uncertainties are larger for future year projections due to
possible changes which affect the assumptions that underlie
the frequency and cost models employed.
5.9 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
LWR event category I is defined in this study to cover
a broad range of events from short duration forced outages
to severe LWR accidents which do not result in significant
core-damage or radioactive contamination of plant equipment
or systems. The best estimate of category I event
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frequencies ranges from l per reactoryear for outages of
any duration to 2xl0 per reactor-year for the most
severe category I LWR events. The expected societal cost
of events in this category is predicted to be z$l-$3X107
per reactor-year based on forced outage event frequencies
and costs for an average 1000 MWe LWR in the U.S.
The large magnitude of the costs for category I events
is important for two reasons. The expected losses result
from the high-frequency of LWR forced outage events.
Because of the predicted power production cost increases
for LWR outages, and the use of nuclear units for base-load
generation of electric power, an event which results in a
period of no power production can result in significant
societal costs. The prevention of forced outages should be
given high priority to reduce the expected forced outage
losses. The expected losses from this category of LWR
events indicate that there may be significant societal (and
electric utility) savings from a well organized plant
maintenance program and a plan to take advantage of plant
outage time as it becomes available.
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There is another potential benefit to the reduction of
the frequency of LWR forced outage events. Every LWR
forced outage event requires that the reactor be shutdown
either by nuclear plant safety systems or by operator
control. Each forced outage event results in some
transient of the nuclear steam supply system. Nuclear
plant transients place demands on systems which are not
required for normal plant operation. Probabilistic risk
analyses have shown that routine plant transients can lead
to system failures which result in severe accidents
involving core-damage [Nu75a]. Transient-induced accidents
can be important contributors to the total public health
risk posed by plant operation. Thus, reduction of forced
outage frequency should result in some consequent reduction
in the public health risk caused by plant operation.
Analyses of forced outage frequencies versus plant age
and electrical rating in Appendix D shows that large LWRs
(>500 MIW.e) have generally experienced larger forced outage
event frequencies early in plant life than in later years.
This is consistent with the failure rate curve which is
observed in most technological devices. There are two
important consequences of this variation in forced outage
frequency over plant life. First, this variation indicates
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that the economic risk of category reactor accidents is
not constant over the life of an LWR. Expected losses from
these events would be larger during the first few years of
operation than over the remainder of plant life. Secondly,
public health risk posed by plant operation may not be
constant over plant life. This is due to the effect of
transient-induced severe accidents resulting from forced
outage events. The analysis in Appendix D indicates that
the frequency of forced outage events early in plant life
may be factors 2-3 higher than for older plants.
Historical experience would support this hypothesis, since
the worst two accidents in U.S. nuclear power plant
operation occurred at large reactors (>500 MWe) which were
in the first years of commercial operation.
Finally, the potential societal costs of routine LWR
outage events have received relatively minor attention
compared to the losses of low probability, severe core-melt
accidents. Because the events in category I are high
frequency events and occur frequently during a normal year
of LWR operation, the costs of these events are continually
being paid, and little attention is drawn to these events
by electric utilities, state rate commissions, the NRC, or
consumers. The relatively minor attention given to costs
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of category I LWR accidents may be in large part a result
of the nuclear power regulation system in the U.S.
The societal costs of routine forced outage events
show up in reduced availability and capacity factors for
LWR plants in operation. Historically, LWRs have achieved
poor capacity factors relative to the projected capacity
factors for plant designs. Part of this decreased capacity
factor has resulted from forced outage events which were
not anticipated. Figure 5.11 shows the complementary
cumulative distribution function of availability loss due
to outage events of various causes from the 1974-1980 data
base. This figure shows that a 10% availability loss in a
reactor-year of operation caused by forced outage events
was not uncommon. The availability loss due to forced
outage events makes a substantial contribution to the total
availability losses due to forced, regulatory, and
scheduled outage events. Over time, the anticipated
availability and capacity factors for LWRs have decreased
based on experience with longer and more frequent plant
forced outages.
-253-
Figure 5.11 - CCDF of LWR plant availability losses during the
1974-1980 period.
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The current U.S, nuclear power regulatory system
provides only small incentives for reduction of the
frequency of routine forced outage events. The NRC is only
concerned with routine LWR forced outage events with regard
to the possible contribution to public health risk from
plant operation. Low probability core-melt accidents have
drawn a large portion of the NRC and public attention.
From the public utility commission viewpoint, routine LWR
forced outage events result in decreased plant capacity
factors and the need for generation of electricity from
higher marginal cost plants. Normally, utilities are
allowed to earn a fair return on their investments, and
small percentage operating cost increases due to the
increased use of higher cost fuels can often be passed on
to consumers. Conversely, if a plant licensee is
successful in reducing the frequency and duration of forced
outage events resulting in higher plant capacity factors,
public utility commissions return most of the costs avoided
back to consumers o that an electric utility does not earn
an excessive profit. This truncation of risks to electric
utilities results in decreased incentives for the reduction
of societal costs from routine LWR forced outages. Public
utility commissions limit many market forces which provide
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incentives for plant licensees to achieve the highest
possible capacity factors for societal benefit.
5.10 CONCLUS ION
The economic risks of category forced outage events
are important because of the high frequency (10 per
reactor-year) of routine forced outages. A typical 1000
MWe U.S. LWR in operation is estimated to lose
approximately $10-30 million dollars per reactor-year in
benefits from plant operation due to the availability
losses caused by routine forced outage events. The
frequency of forced outage events at LWRs has shown a wide
variability, and may be dependent upon reactor age, design,
and plant operations programs. The variation in plant
forced outage frequencies indicates that it may be possible
to reduce forced outage losses through improved operation
and maintenance programs for plants in operation. A
reduction in the number and duration of forced outage
events could result in significant societal economic
benefits from increased plant availability and capacity
factors. The expected costs of routine forced outage
events relative to more severe accidents are discussed in
Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 6
ECONOMIC RISKS FROM MEDIUM AND LARGE CONSEQUENCE LWR EVENTS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
A range of economic risks from category II and III
core-damage and core-melt accidents is estimated in this
section. The effort is hindered to some extent by the
limited understanding of severe accident physical processes
and human interactions and because core-damage event
frequencies have not been explicitly addressed in current
probabilistic risk analyses (PRAs). Therefore, category II
and III economic risks are considered jointly in this
study. It is assumed that the core-melt accident
frequencies from current PRAs include both core-damage and
core-melt accident sequences. A range of severe accident
economic risks is estimated for the Surry 2 plant using
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the median PWR core-melt frequency from the RSS, with the
assumption that either all sequences lead only to
core-damage (category XI event costs) or that all sequences
proceed to core-melt (category I event costs). The
latter assumption is consistent with those employed in PRAs
which estimate public health risks. These assumptions
should bound the severe accident economic risks if the
total frequency of core-melt events estimated in current
PRAs includes all dominant core-damage and core-melt
accident sequences. However, this range does not include
the uncertainties in total severe accident frequencies.
The large uncertainties in the total severe accident
frequency estimates are discussed later in this section.
Estimates are developed for the Surry plant which show
that total severe accident economic risks are not very
sensitive to assumptions regarding the relative likelihood
of core-damage versus core-melt accidents because of the
large contribution of onsite costs to economic risks.
Results of other probabilistic risk studies are used to
estimate the variation in economic risks from medium and
large consequence events at other U.S. reactor sites.
Sensitivity studies of offsite core-melt accident
consequences and potential applications of the newly
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developed offsite cost models for cost/benefit analyses of
offsite emergency planning, emergency response, and
post-accident countermeasure implementation are discussed.
Estimated economic risks from category I forced outages and
category II and III severe accidents at the Surry 2 plant
are compared. The uncertainties in the estimates of
core-damage and core-melt accident costs are also discussed
in this section.
6.2 ESTIMATED SEVERE ACCIDENT ECONOMIC RISKS BASED ON
CATEGORY I COSTS
An estimate of severe accident economic risks for the
Surry 2 plant is calculated using the median core-melt
frequency from the RSS with the assumption that all severe
accidents result in limited core-damage and do not cause
direct breach of the reactor vessel or result in a
significant release of radionuclides to the environment.
This assumption is clearly unrealistic and leads to a
"lower bound" estimate of severe accident economic risks.
The cost models from Chapters 3 and 4 are used to estimate
category II accident consequences at the Surry 2 plant.
The cost of precautionary offsite population evacuation for
category II events is shown to be negligible compared to
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the expected onsite costs of core-damage events.
6.2.1 PLANT REPAIR AFTER CATEGORY It EVENTS
As discussed in section 3.5, any severe core-damage
event results in the need for a plant decontamination
program to remove radioactive materials which have been
released from the reactor core. Following plant
decontamination, a decision must be made concerning plant
repair or permanent plant shutdown and decommissioning.
This decision is likely to be delayed until the end of the
plant decontamination process so that full knowledge of
plant equipment damage from the accident is available. The
decision concerning the ultimate repair of the TMI-2 unit
has not been made yet. The present value of
lifetime-integrated category II accident risks is
relatively insensitive to assumptions regarding
post-accident plant repair or decommissioning (less than a
factor of 2 variation).
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6.2.2 EZMRGENCY RESPONSE COSTS FOR CATEGORY II EVENTS
It is anticipated that public protective measures
would be implemented at offsite locations during most
accident sequences which result in core-damage. The new
offsite evacuation cost model is used to estimate the range
of offsite emergency response costs for category II events.
It is assumed that the area within 10 miles of the reactor
site is evacuated for a period of 3 days as a precautionary
measure during accident sequences leading to significant
core-damage. This action is predicted to result in offsite
protective measure costs of $7X10 to $1Xl10 for the range
of current U.S. reactor sites. The variation in offsite
costs results from differences in the number of people
moved for various reactor sites. This offsite emergency
response cost is small compared to onsite losses for
core-damage accidents.
6.2.3 PRESENT VALUE OF LIFETIME-INTEGRATED ECONOMIC RISKS
FOR SURRY 2
The societal costs of category II accidents are
dependent upon the time during the life of an LWR plant
when the accident occurs. An accident which occurs early
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in plant life results in a larger societal cost than one
which occurs near the end of an LWR plant's productive
lifetime because little of the capital value of the plant
is recovered early in the plant life. This variation of
accident economic risk is accounted for in the integration
of economic risk over the remaining lifetime of the reactor
plant (Eq. 5.2).
Estimates of the present value of lifetime-integrated
severe accident economic risks at Surry 2 are shown in
Table 6.1. The estimates are based on the bounding
assumption that all severe accidents result in only in
limited core-damage (i.e., PCategory II Events) =
P(Core-Melt from RSSJ, and PCategory III Events = 0}).
The risk estimates are based on category II event costs and
an assumed core-damage accident frequency of 6X105 per
reactor-year of operation. The core-damage frequency is
assumed to be constant over the reactor lifetime in the
economic risk integration. The integrated economic risks
are shown for real discount rates of 0, 4, and 10%. The
present value of offsite evacuation costs is estimated to
be $2-8X103 dollars over the 30 year remaining plant
lifetime. The present value of onsite economic risks
including plant decontamination, replacement power, and
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Table 6.1 - Present value of severe accident economic risks
based on category II event costs, remaining
lifetime of Surry #2 plant.
Assumed Core-Damage Accident Frequency 6xl0-5/reactor-year
Present Value of Lifetime Economic Risks
Discount Rate Offsite Costs (Evacuation) Onsite Costs
$8.4x103
$4.8x103
$2.6x103
$3.9x106
$2.1x106
$1.0x0l6
All costs are expressed in 1982 dollars.
Estimates based on the median core-melt frequency from the
RSS with the assumption that all severe accident sequences
result only in limited core-damage (category II event
consequences). This assumption is clearly unrealistic and
is used to provide lower bound estimates of severe accident
(category II and III event) economic risks.
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0%
4%
10%
plant repair or capital costs is predicted tobe -$1-4x106
dollars over the remaining plant lifetime for the -10%
range of discount rates. The integrated onsite costs are
2-3 orders of magnitude higher than integrated offsite
losses for category It accidents. Most of the onsite costs
result from replacement power and plant capital losses,
with about one fourth of the lifetime risk from category II
accidents resulting from plant decontamination and cleanup
costs for these accidents. The total present value of
lifetime risks varies by a factor of =4 for real discount
rates of 0%-10%.
The potential loss of multiple reactor units at a site
due to a single core-damage accident is an important
consideration for category II events. The TMI-2 accident
resulted in the need to cleanup and restore shared plant
systems to operation before TMI-1 restart. This operation
could have been completed within months of the accident.
Unrelated plant equipment problems and regulatory concerns
after the accident have forced continued shutdown of the
TMI-1 plant for nearly 5 years. The cost of replacement
power for the undamaged TMI-1 unit has been an important
contributor to the total cost of the TMI-2 accident. For
identical units at the same site (like Surry 1 and 2),
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shutdown of both units after all category II events for an
equivalent time period results in a lifetime-integrated
economic risk 60% higher than that for single unit
shutdown. Because category II accidents are limited in
scope to exclude core-melt accidents which breach the
reactor vessel, and most multiple unit reactor sites have
some separation of plant systems, forced shutdown of
multiple units caused by plant equipment problems should be
unusual. It is more likely that regulatory concerns could
result in multiple unit shutdowns after category II
core-damage accidents. The large cost of multiple unit
shutdowns like that which occurred after the TMI-2 accident
should be considered in post-accident regulatory
decision-making.
6.3 ESTIMATED SEVERE ACCIDENT ECONOMIC RISKS BASED ON
CATEGORY III COSTS
An estimate of severe accident economic risks for the
Surry 2 plant is calculated in this section using the
source terms defined for PWR core-melt accidents in the
RSS. It is assumed that all core-melt accident sequences
cause direct breach of the reactor vessel and possibly
result in a significant release of radionuclides to the
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environment (i.e.,P(Category III Events) - P(Core-Melt from
RSS)}, and P{Category II Events) 0)). This is consistent
with the assumption used in the RSS for estimating public
health risks from plant operation.
The events in category III may impact public health
and safety at offsite locations. The costs of
countermeasures to protect the public from radiation
exposure after severe accidents with environmental releases
of radioactive material are estimated using the new offsite
cost models. The offsite consequence estimates for an
accident are dependent on the site-specific demographic
characteristics of the areas surrounding the reactor.
Also, the meteorological conditions, wind direction, and
emergency response measures implemented during a severe
accident have important impacts on the public health
effects from a release of radioactive material to the
environment. These considerations are incorporated
probabilistically using the prototype offsite economic
consequence model. The prototype model interfaces with the
CRAC2 consequence model for input to the economic
calculations (see Fig. 4.5).
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6.3.1 RSS PWR CORE-MELT ACCIDENT SOURCE TERMS
The source terms defined in the RSS based on analysis
of the Surry plant are shown in Table 6.2. Seven
categories of PWR core-melt accidents were defined in the
RSS for input to the offsite consequence analysis.
Specific core-melt accident sequences were assigned to one
of the seven release categories. Two categories of
accidents less severe than core-melt events were defined in
the RSS (PWR8-PWR9) to estimate the potential impacts of
design basis accidents. Because the offsite economic
consequences of the PWR8-PWR9 event categories are
dominated by initial evacuat n costs+, and since these
events are predicted to result in very limited damage to
the reactor plant (fuel cladding failure), these accidents
are not included in the discussion of category II and III
accidents.
The RSS PWR source terms are used in the offsite
economic risk calculations in this study. Recently, there
has been concern that these source terms may be
conservative or non-realistic for most LWR accident
sequences [Le81,Nu8lc]. Research is underway to redefine
LWR accident source terms based on detailed accident
-267-
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phenomonology studies for LWRs SN83,Sp831. The new
economic model has been designed to incorporate any new
source term definitions with minimum effort, without
invalidating the assumptions which underlie the model.
Economic risks from core-melt accidents can be reevaluated
when new source term definitions are available. The
sensitivity of offsite economic consequences to source term
definition is discussed in section 6.6.
6.3.2 SITE-SPECIFIC DATA USED IN THE OFFSITE ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS
The new offsite economic consequence model provides
the capability to use site-specific economic data in
estimating the costs of emergency response and population
+ Calculations performed with the prototype economic model
indicate that =90% of PWR8 offsite costs and =99% of PWR9
offsite costs result from population evacuation. Although
these events have higher frequencies than core-melt
accidents, they contribute minimally to the total economic
risks because the onsite and offsite costs of these
accidents are small relative to category II and III
accidents resulting in severe plant damage.
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protective countermeasures after an accident. County
economic data for annual farm product sales, tho fraction
of each area used in farmland, market values of farmland
and improvements, and the fraction of farm sales from dairy
products are used in the offsite economic consequence
calculations for the Surry reactor site. These data are
taken from .the 1978 Census of Agriculture and updated to
1982 dollars (where appropriate) using cost inflators
[Ce78a,SA83]. County data for per-capita personal income
are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Local Area
Personal Income Series for 1982 [BE83a].
County economic data are allocated to a 16X34 interval
polar grid which is normally used for consequence
calculations with the CRAC2 code [Ri831. A computer code
was developed to allocate county economic data to each
polar grid element based on the nearest centroid of county
population to the geometric center of each polar grid
element. The locations of county population centroids are
taken from the Bureau of the Census PICADAD data base
[CE78c]. This data allocation scheme leads to slight
errors in the assignment of county economic data to
consequence model grid elements. However, this allocation
scheme is appropriate since economic data generally vary
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smoothly around small counties, and much averaging is
performed to allocate Census population data to the
consequence model grid. County-average economic data are
assigned to grid elements within 100 miles of the reactor
site for the calculations in this study. National-average
economic data are used in areas beyond 100 miles from the
reactor site due to the large size of grid elements, the
large uncertainties associated with atmospheric transport
and deposition calculations at these distances, and since
accident economic consequences are generally small in these
areas.
A graphics display code was developed in this study to
provide a map of county boundaries surrounding a reactor
site with an overlay of the consequence model calculation
grid. The code employs county boundary data from the
Bureau of the Census DIME data base along with the county
centroid population data from the PICADAD data base to map
the area surrounding a reactor site [Ce78b,Ce78c]. The
scale of a map is user-specified, allowing detailed mapping
of the area immediately surrounding a site, or mapping of
the entire consequence calculation grid. Maps of the Surry
reactor site with the 16X34 consequence calculation grid
overlay are shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. The graphics
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Figure 6.1 - Map of counties and consequence calculation grid
within 500 mile radius of Surry site.
SURRY REACTOR SITE, 0-500 MILES
X
'N
IONGITUIDE
-272-
E
Figure 6.2 - Map of counties and consequence calculation grid
within 5S mile radius of Surry site.
MAP OF SURRY SITE, 0-50 MILES
LUNII TfLE
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routine is used to clearly identify those grid elements
which cover ocean areas only. The economic data for ocean
intervals are set equal to zero since no significant
economic consequences occur in these areas.
6.3.3 POPULATION PROTECTIVE MEASURE ASSUMPTIONS
The offsite economic consequences of any large
accident at a nuclear power reactor are strongly dependent
on the population protective measures which are assumed to
be taken. Based on current guidance, the calculations in
this section assume that the entire population within 10
miles of the reactor site is evacuated during all core-melt
accidents [Nu80b]. Individuals are returned to areas not
impacted by a release of radioactive material 3 days after
the initiation of evacuation. An integrated groundshine
exposure of 1 Rem in the time period 1-7 days after
deposition of radionuclides in an area is used as a
criterion for emergency phase relocation from contaminated
areas. An integrated groundshine exposure of 2 Rem in the
time period 7-30 days after deposition of materials in an
area is used as the criterion for intermediate phase
relocation. A long-term protective action criterion of 25
Rem integrated groundshine exposure during the period 30
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days - 30 years after deposition of radioactive materials
is used in the calculations. The dose levels and organs
considered for disposal of contaminated agricultural
products are the same as those used in the RSS [Nu75b].
The economic consequences and public health impacts of
an accident are strongly affected by the user-specified
protective action implementation criteria. The criteria
chosen in this study are based on sensitivity studies
performed with the new economic model, and guidance
provided by the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Federal Radiation Council, and the RSS [EP75,FR64,Nu75b].
The sensitivity of offsite economic consequences to offsite
protective action implementation criteria is examined in
section 6.6.
6.3.4 DISTRIBUTIONS OF CORE-MELT ACCIDENT ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES AT SURRY 2
The new onsite and offsite economic consequence models
are employed to estimate risks using the RSS source terms
for the Surry reactor. The consequence calculations are
based on 100 samples of Washington, D.C. meterological data
using the metbin sampling technique [Ri81] and the yearly
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average wind rose for the Surry reactor site. All economic
data have been updated and results are presented in 1982
dollars.
The complementary cumulative distribution function for
core-melt accident economic consequences over the remaining
lifetime (30 years) of the Surry plant is shown in Figure
6.3. The figure shows the probability of occurrence of,
core-melt accidents with economic consequences greater than
specified magnitudes over the remaining lifetime of the
Surry plant. The lowest probability accident consequences
shown have an estimated chance of one in a million of
occurring during the entire remaining life of the reactor
plant. Consequences with probabilities lower than one in a
million over the remaining plant life have a negligible
contribution to expected costs. The expected values of all
of the cost component curves for lifetime core-melt
accident risk are also shown in Figure 6.3. The cost
estimates presented are discounted to the time of accident
occurrence at 4% per year. The economic risks in future
years are not discounted to the present in the economic
consequence distributions in Figure 6.3. Discounting of
future accident risks is appropriate for calculating the
total present value for risk-reduction expenditure
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Figure 6.3 - Distributions of core-melt accident economic risks
for remaining lifetime of Surry #2 plant
(based on loss of single unit).
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decisions; however this leads to difficulty in
interpretation of economic consequence distributions.
The economic risk distributions and means presented in
Figure 6.3 show some important characteristics of the
core-melt economic risks at the Surry plant. The onsite
costs of replacement power, plant capital losses, and plant
decontamination after a core-melt event dominate the
offsite property damage and public health effects costs
except for very low probability accidents at this site.
The economic consequence distributions show that the most
likely core-melt accidents would result in small offsite
consequences relative to the onsite costs of plant loss and
cleanup. Expected offsite property damage and health
effect costs of core-melt accidents are a factor of 10
lower than expected onsite losses.
The economic risk distributions in Figure 6.3 are
based on the loss of a single 775 Mwe unit at the Surry
site after a core-melt accident. Because of the severity
of core-melt accidents with reactor vessel breach, and the
potential for large releases of radioactive material
contaminating the site to high levels, it is possible that
the generation capacity of both units at the Surry site
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would be lost in the event of a core-melt accident. Figure
6.4 shows the economic risk distributions based on the
assumption that both units of the Surry reactor site are
forced out of service after a core-melt accident at Unit 2.
The figure includes replacement power and capital losses
for both units of the Surry site after a core-melt accident
at Unit #2. The total expected core-melt accident costs
over the remaining lifetime of the Surry Unit 2 plant are
approximately 1/3 higher assuming both units 1 and 2 are
lost after a single core-melt accident. The risk
distributions in Figure 6.4 show an even larger dominance
of onsite costs over offsite cost components for the Surry
#2 plant.
The contribution of each of the RSS PWRlA-PWR7
core-melt accident release categories to expected costs
over the lifetime of the Surry plant is shown in Table 6.3.
The contribution of each release category to onsite costs
is directly proportional to the accident category frequency
since the onsite cleanup, replacement power, and capital
losses are approximately the same for all core-melt
accident categories. The high-frequency core-melt
accidents resulting in small releases of radioactive
material to the environment are the largest contributors to
-279-
Figure 6.4 - Distributions of core-melt accident economic risks
for remaining lifetime of Surry 2 plant(based on loss of both units).
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expected onsite costs. In contrast, 909% of expected
offsite costs result from low probability PWR2 and PWR3
release categories. The offsite core-melt accident
economic risks are dominated by low frequency, large
consequence accidents. The expected onsite accident costs
are larger than expected offsite accident costs for all
release categories.
The RSS estimate of offsite costs for the PWRlA-PWR7
release categories for a "composite" reactor site is also
shown in Table 6.3. Although the "composite" site estimate
is not directly comparable to the results presented for the
Surry reactor site, the rough comparison in Table 6.3 shows
that the new model predictions are similar in magnitude to
those from the RSS.
Table 6.4 summarizes the expected costs of core-melt
accidents over the remaining Surry plant lifetime based on
the RSS source terms. The expected offsite costs from
core-melt events at this site are small compared to the
expected costs of replacement power, capital losses, and
plant cleanup after core-melt accidents. However, offsite
impacts of core-melt accidents could be much higher for
more densely populated sites. As discussed in section
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Table 6.4 - Lifetime Core-melt accident economic risks for
Surry 2 based on loss of single generating unit.
Expected Costs
Over Plant Lifetime Due
Cost Component to Core-Melt Accidents
Onsite Replacement Power, Capital Costs
Onsite Decontamination/Cleanup Costs
Offsite Property Damage
Offsite Public Health Impacts*
$1. 9x106
$3.4x106
$3. 7x10 5
$6. Ox104
Total $5.7x106
Based on purely economic costs of medical care and productivity
losses due to early fatalities, early injuries, and latent
health effects.
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4.4.6, the public health effect dollar values used in the
analysis are based on purely economic costs, and do not
include societal preferences for avoiding health risks.
Larger health effect costs which reflect preferences for
risk avoidance could easily be incorporated into the new
offsite economic consequence model if desired. The dollar
values for offsite health effects must be increased by
factors of 50-100 to make them important contributors to
the expected costs of core-melt accidents at the Surry
site. This supports the conclusions of earlier studies
which found the total costs of core-melt accidents to be
relatively insensitive to health effect dollar values even
including preferences for health effect risk reduction
[St82].
6.3.5 PRESENT VALUE OF LIFETIME-INTEGRATED CORE-MELT
ECONOMIC RISKS FOR SURRY $2
Estimates of the present value of lifetime-integrated
economic risks of core-melt accident costs for the Surry 2
plant are shown in Table 6.5. The economic risk estimates
are based on the core-melt accident frequencies and source
terms defined in the RSS. The integrated onsite and
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Table 6.5 - Present value of severe accident economic risks
based on category III event costs, remaining
lifetime of Surry 2 plant,
Core-Melt Accident Frequency - 6X10-S/reactor-year
Discount Rate
Present Value of Lifetime Economic Risks
Offsite Costs Onsite Costs
i , I u im lil i
$4.4x105
$2.5x10s
$1.3x105
$5.5x106
$3.3x106
$1.7x106
All costs are expressed in 1982 dollars.
*
Estimates based on the median PWR core-melt accident frequencies
and source terms defined in the RSS with consequence
calculations for the Surry site (category III events).
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0%
4%
10%
offsite economic risks are shown for real discount rates of
0, 4, and 10%. The frequency of each core-melt accident
category is assumed to be constant over the reactor
lifetime in the economic risk integration. The present
value of total offsite core-melt accident costs is
estimated to be _$1-4Xl0 dollars over the 30 year
remaining plant lifetime. The present value of onsite
economic risks including plant decontamination, replacement
power, and plant repair or new plant capital costs are
predicted to be S$2-6x10 dollars over the remaining plant
lifetime for the 0-10% range of discount rates. The
integrated onsite costs are approximately a factor of 10
higher than integrated offsite costs for core-melt
accidents at the Surry site. Most of the onsite costs
result from plant decontamination and cleanup costs,
replacement power cost increases, and plant capital losses
for these accidents. The total present value of lifetime
risks varies by a factor of -4 for real discount rates of
0%-10%.
The estimates of total severe accident economic risks
based on category III costs (Table 6.5) are about a factor
of 2 higher than the estimates based on category II event
costs (Table 6.1). This factor results from the assumption
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that all category III accidents would result in early plant
shutdown, and the higher plant decontamination cost
estimates for category III accidents. The costs of offsite
property damage and health effects for core-melt accidents
also contribute to the difference in economic risk
estimates.
6.4 UNCERTAINTIES IN ECONOMIC RISK ESTIMATES
Uncertainties in the category II and III event
economic risk estimates are dominated by uncertainties in
event frequencies. The event frequency estimates from
probabilistic risk studies are highly uncertain due to
imperfect information regarding severe LWR accident
initiators and physical processes. The uncertainties in
the RSS core-melt frequencies were estimated to be factors
of 5 and 1/5 [Nu75a]. However, a critical review of the
RSS concluded that uncertainties were significantly
underestimated in the study [Le78]. Uncertainties in the
relative frequencies of core-damage versus core-melt
accidents are also large. However, these uncertainties
result in only a factor of 2 variation in severe accident
economic risk estimates. Thus, uncertainties in the total
LWR severe accident frequencies are more important in
-287-
determining the uncertainties in severe accident economic
risks.
Uncertainties in onsite costs for category II
accidents are dominated by uncertainties in replacement
power cost increases, plant decontamination costs, and the
duration of plant outages after category II accidents. For
the entire range of core-damage accidents, it is estimated
that the total onsite costs could range from a factor of 3
higher to a factor of 5 lower than those presented. This
range is dominated by uncertainties in plant outage
duration and plant decontamination costs for core-damage
accidents. Because offsite costs of category II events are
small relative to onsite costs, the uncertainties in
offsite costs contribute negligibly to the total
uncertainties in total category II accident costs.
Uncertainties in onsite costs for category III
accidents are dominated by uncertainties in plant
decontamination costs, replacement power cost increases,
and replacement generating capacity capital costs. The
total onsite costs are estimated to range from a factor of
3 higher to a factor of 5 lower than those presented for
core-melt accidents. The uncertainties in offsite costs of
-288-
core-melt accidents are dominated by uncertainties in
offsite property decontamination costs and the criteria
chosen for implementation of long-term population
protective measures after contaminating events. The total
offsite cost for core-melt accidents are estimated to range
from a factor of 5 higher to a factor of 5 lower than those
presented for a defined release of radioactive material.
The uncertainties in onsite costs are the most important
contributor to uncertainty in total societal core-melt
accident costs for the Surry 2 plant.
6.4.1 RANGE OF RISKS FOR OTHER PLANTS
The range of severe accident economic risks at other
plants is largely determined by plant-specific accident
frequencies. Many plant-specific probabilistic risk
studies have been performed to estimate the core-melt
frequency and/or the public health risk from plant
operation. A comparison of the plant specific core-melt
frequencies from probabilistic safety studies performed
since the RSS is shown in Figure 6.5 [Ha83]. The values
presented represent median or "point" estimates of
core-melt accident frequencies at each plant unless
otherwise indicated in the figure. Comparison of the
-289-
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plant-specific frequency estimates can be misleading
because the studies have not been performed using
consistent methodologies and assumptions. The predicted
range of core-melt frequencies spans approximately two
orders of magnitude from 2xl0 - 10 per reactor-year.
This range is consistent with the best-estimate of
core-damage event frequency from the TMI-2 accident and
U.S. LWR experience (2x10 per reactor-year). Some
variation in core-melt frequencies results from the use of
different techniques and assumptions in the risk studies
for each plant. Plant-specific design characteristics also
contribute significantly to the variation in core-melt
frequency estimates.
Calculations were performed to examine the importance
of site demographic characteristics in determining offsite
economic risks from core-melt accidents. The new offsite
cost models were employed to estimate core-melt risks for
the Surry 2 plant (RSS PWR source terms) at the Indian
Point site. The expected offsite consequences of each of
the PWRlA-PWR7 accident categories at the Indian Point site
are approximately a factor of 10 greater than for the
equivalent plant at the Surry site. This results in
comparable offsite and onsite economic risks for core-melt
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accidents at the Indian Point site. The total estimated
onsite and offsite economic risks at the Indian Point site
are approximately a factor of 2 greater than those for an
equivalent plant at the Surry site. Site demographic
characteristics significantly impact offsite economic
risks, but have less impact on total economic risks because
they do not influence onsite accident consequences.
Based on the range of core-melt accident frequencies
from plant-specific probabilistic risk studies, historical
experience, and U.S. LWR site demographic characteristics,
crude estimates of category II and III economic risks at
other U.S. LWR plants might range from :6 times lower to
=30 times higher than those presented for Surry #2. The
variation in core-damage event frequency is likely to be
the dominant contributor to the total variation in
core-damage event economic risk estimates for specific
plants. Site-specific demographic characteristics are also
important for determining the total offsite economic risks
from core-melt accidents at other U.S. LWR sites.
Calculations have been performed to estimate the
lifetime severe accident economic risks for other reactor
sites using the new onsite and offsite economic consequence
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models. Economic risks for the Peach Bottom reactor site
based on the RSS release categories BWR1-BWR4 are similar
to those presented for the Surry reactor site. Results for
sites with higher population densities show higher offsite
costs for core-melt accidents than those presented for the
Surry site. However, for all sites which have been
examined, the offsite costs of severe accidents are
predicted to be small relative to onsite costs except for
low-probability core-melt accidents which result in large
releases of radioactive material.
6.5 COMPARISON OF CORE-MELT ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCE ESTIMATES
WITH RESULTS OF PREVIOUS STUDIES
The results of previous studies of core-melt accident
economic consequences are compared to results calculated
with the new economic model in this section. Results of
offsite costs predictions from the CRAC2 economic model are
compared to results from the new economic model.
Differences in the results calculated with the two models
are discussed.
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CRAC2 estimates the economic consequences of
post-accident population protective measures which are
implemented after a release of radioactive material to the
environment. The CRAC2 code has recently been employed in
a study of the financial consequences of core-melt
accidents (NUREG/CR-2723) [St82] which used the Sandia
Siting Study Source terms SST1-SST3 [A182] to explore the
lifetime integrated costs of core-melt accidents. Simple
models were employed in the study to estimate onsite
cleanup and replacement power costs. A comparison of
lifetime integrated SST1 accident cost estimates from that
study [St82] and the new economic models is presented in
Table 6.6. The table shows that the total cost estimates
for the Surry reactor site are very similar. Significant
differences exist in health effect costs due to the use of
health effect dollar values which include preferences for
risk reduction in NUREG/CR-2723. The new economic model
includes genetic effect and thyroid health effect costs
which were not included in the previous estimates. The
estimate of onsite cleanup costs in this study is higher
than the estimate from NUREG/CR-2723. However, the total
estimated lifetime SST1 accident financial consequences are
very similar as shown in Table 6.6.
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Table 6.6 - Comparison of new model predictions and results
from NUREG/CR-2723 for the SST1 release, Surry reactor.
NEW MODEL RESULTS VS. NUREG/CR-2723
Expected Value of Accident Costs for Plant Life*
Economic Risks for SST1 Release Category, Surry Reactor
Cost Component Considered NUREG/CR-2723 New Economic Models
Offsite Health Effects 1.0 x 1010 x f 0O.6 x 101°0 x f!
Offsite Property Costs 3.2 x 1010 x f 3.5 x 1010 x f
Onsite Cleanup 2.5 x 1010 x f ! 5.4 x 1010 x f!
Onsite Total Costs 5.7 x 1010 x f 8.6 x 1010 x fl
Total Costs 9.9 x 1010 x f | 1.3 x 101 1 x f.
* fl is defined to be the SST1 release category frequency (per reactor-year). Multiplication
by f in the table yields the total expected costs of SST1 accidents over the remain-
ing plant lifetime in dollars.
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A comparison of the mean offsite cost components for
an SST1 release at the Surry plant from the CRAC2 and new
economic consequence models is shown in Table 6.7. The
CRAC2 model does not have the capability of estimating
emergency phase relocation costs, intermediate phase
relocation costs, or costs for population relocation during
the decontamination period. The results of both models
indicate that the cost of property decontamination is the
most important contributor to total offsite costs for an
SST1 release at the Surry plant. The cost of property
interdiction in areas where decontamination cannot reduce
dose rates to acceptable levels is the second most
important contributor to offsite costs for this large
release of radioactive material. The costs of offsite
health effects are also predicted to be relatively
important for this large source term. The emergency phase
relocation, intermediate phase relocation, and
decontamination period relocation costs are relatively
small for this accident release category. However, these
costs dominate the initial evacuation costs which are the
only population relocation costs included in the CRAC2
models. Updated costs of decontamination, interdiction,
and relocation in the new economic model result in total
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cost estimates less than a factor of 2 higher than those
from the CRAC2 model.
Additional attributes of SST1 accident consequences
estimated in the new economic model are shown in Table 6.7.
The implementation of population protective measures
(including decontamination, interdiction, and relocation)
results in a factor of four reduction in total population
dose incurred in the first 100 years after accident
occurrence. The dose to decontamination workers during the
decontamination period is estimated to be about 2% of the
total population dose incurred in this period. A total of
=11,000 man-years of effort is involved in the
decontamination program to reduce population exposure from
the accident. Based on a mean time to completion of 90
days for the decontamination efforts, this program would
require a work force of =46,600 men. Clearly, a large
decontamination program after a severe reactor accident
would have some important beneficial economic impacts in an
affected area. However, manpower limitations may force an
extended period for completion of the offsite
decontamination program after large releases of radioactive
material.
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Calculations performed for various U.S. LWR sites have
shown that the new offsite economic model predictions of
offsite costs are generally factors of 2-4 higher than
those predicted by the CRAC2 code. This difference results
from more accurate accounting for costs, inclusion of more
cost components, indexing of costs to 1982 dollars,
improved estimates of decontamination costs and
effectiveness, and the use of county-level economic data
with the new economic models. One important difference
between CRAC2 and the new model is that the new model
provides direct estimates of the benefits of population
protective measures in terms of population dose avoided.
These benefit estimates can be used in cost/benefit
analysis of protective measure implementation as discussed
in the following section.
6.6 SENSITIVITY STUDIES OF CORE-MELT ACCIDENT OFFSITE
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
The new offsite economic consequence models have been
used to evaluate the sensitivity of offsite costs to
assumptions regarding source terms and offsite public
protective measure implementation criteria. An example
cost/benefit analysis of offsite protective measure
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implementation is also presented.
6.6.1 SENSITIVITY OF OFFSITE COSTS TO SOURCE TERMS
There has been concern expressed recently that the
source terms defined in probabilistic safety studies may
overestimate the releases of radioactive material to the
environment from severe LWR accidents [Le81]. The
conclusions of research aimed at defining new source term
values based on detailed accident physical progression
studies can be incorporated into future economic risk
studies [SN83,Sp83]. The reduction of source term values
would result in small or no changes in onsite cost
estimates for severe LWR accidents. The offsite costs of
necessary protective measures and public health effects
could be substantially impacted by significant source term
reductions.
The sensitivity of core-melt accident offsite costs to
source term magnitude is examined for the SST1 release
category at the Surry reactor site. Table 6.8 shows the
results of offsite economic consequence calculations for
the Surry reactor site conditional on the SST1 source term,
and for the SST1 source term with release fractions for all
-300-
C) 0 0 C 00000
-4 r4 c4 r- rP-4 r4
x x x x x x x x x x
rl 4n lw m w rl m 4 %D C Y%
M 1r rl VD v- rl ; 4:r0Jq r sl,.
En V> t#) V> ri V0V V> V0
4. 4. N
000040 -O r- t
v-I r r-q r-
x x x x
Ln- q c,4 Lfl4 v-4 _I2X X X X-u} v5 N In*P * *I @
4D N C C
-i r- . I -4
E- Xu X XD X
U) * 0 0 0
V)C V> V> V>
. 0 0 D c 0
O 0 0 0 oo
x x x x x x
%D 0D o i uc
V> VX V> V> V>- V>
X X X X
0C %D W ND
03:
O 4 C:0(0
- 0 A': 4- O 0
0O 0 0 4-)a
4) 4 0
m .C a o
o 1 -to l - a
n cn )r-i4 4 ) r 0 O1) 5- 04 e O4
: 0 (0W cc P o D 
c:0
0
o
4
-- 1 )
ra O
0) O4J 00
54
(0 4
0D 0
o I
X X
V> V-I
4'0
)444-
,.i(0a)
4-4
a
0) 0
U a
'a C)
rO4-I
0 U
, 00 (o .444 4'
a
L) oXx w
a) 144 4)t.
0 
4' 0 4=
U 10
O
ICIO
o U 
cn C) u )G~II -k) O
0)4- 4'0
4'0- 0)5-40)-4 0
00 5-45-44 r0
,o (0
0( 2-
02-
w.41
'-10 E-
Cl) >1Cl>1 U).Cl.0 -
0)
0)0
C)
O
Q)4')
0
E-4
-301-
0
4o
0
U)
4- rI
10
W"
0
0
0
0
4'
054
m
Ov-4
OE
0
01 IOh
4
On)4 04
4 -I
0RI4I
.rq 044uODQ
v3 
(1
E-
4'
0
0
0a
8uC)
4'
0
0
4'
.3-I
m44I..I
4410
0
4'
rzO
W
elements except noble gases reduced by factors of 10 and
100. The table shows that the mean total offsite economic
consequences vary approximately linearly with the source
term release fractions. Property interdiction costs and
interdicted population relocation costs vary non-linearly
due to the threshold nature of these effects. The cost of
evacuation is independent of source term and becomes more
important relative to total costs for small source terms.
The sensitivity of offsite costs to source term
magnitude is important for consideration of offsite
economic risks. However, since onsite costs contribute
significantly to the economic risks from core-melt
accidents, and these costs are not sensitive to source term
values, the total economic risk from core-melt accidents is
less sensitive to source term definition.
6.6.2 SENSITIVITY OF OFFSITE COSTS TO PROTECTIVE MEASURE
IMPLEMENTATION CRITERIA
The offsite costs of a release of radioactive material
from an LWR accident are dependent upon post-accident
decisions regarding population protective measure
implementation in each area impacted by the release. The
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post-accident decision-making process is modeled in the
offsite economic consequence model by comparing projected
individual doses to criteria specified for protective
measure implementation. The sensitivity of offsite
economic consequences to the long-term protective action
implementation criterion is examined in this section.
The dependence of the mean offsite costs for the SST1
release category at the Surry reactor on the long-term
protective action criterion is presented in Table 6.9. The
long-term protective action criterion is based on
individual doses integrated from 30 days to 30 years after
deposition of radioactive materials. The Surry economic
risks presented are based on the 25 Rem criterion in this
period. Results are shown in Table 6.9 for criteria
ranging from 5-500 rem individual whole-body exposure
during this period. The total offsite accident costs vary
by approximately a factor of 5 for the range of protective
action criteria examined. As more stringent criteria are
applied, the costs of population protective measures
increase because larger areas and populations are affected.
However, the costs of offsite public health effects
decrease as the population exposure to radioactive material
is reduced. The new economic model is useful for
-303-
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performing sensitivity studies regarding population
protective measure implementation criteria because both
costs and benefits of countermeasure implementation are
estimated.
The offsite economic consequences of LWR accidents are
strongly dependent upon the population protective measure
implementation criteria defined in the new offsite economic
consequence model. Offsite cost estimates could be
increased by large factors based on the assumption that
very stringent criteria are applied in post-accident
decision-making. However, this assumption may be
unrealistic given the limited benefits and potential
resource limitations which would result from such actions.
6.6.3 -COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF POST-ACCIDENT
COUNTERMEASURES
The new economic consequence model can be applied to
cost/benefit studies of post-accident public protective
action implementation criteria. An example of this
application of the model s presented in this section.
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The prototype economic model estimates the population
exposure avoided (man-rem) in the emergency phase,
intermediate phase, and long-term periods. The costs of
protective measures implemented in each post-accident
period are calculated in the model. For exposure beyond
the acute time period, each population man-rem incurred has
approximately an equivalent impact on predicted
radiation-induced public health effects. Therefore, for
population protective measures beyond the acute time
period, man-rem avoided is a useful measure of the benefit
of implementing population protective measures.
Results of sensitivity studies of protective measure
implementation criteria are presented in Figure 6.6. The
figure is based on results of calculations performed
conditional on an SST1 release at the Surry site. The
emergency phase period is defined to extend from 1-7 days,
the intermediate phase from 7-30 days, and the long-term
phase from 30 days-30 years after the deposition of
materials. The figure shows the mean cost/benefit ratio in
terms of dollars per man-rem averted during each of these
protective measure periods for a wide range of protective
measure implementation criteria. Curves are shown for both
the average and marginal cost per man-rem averted for
-306-
Figure 6.6 - Mean cost/benefit ratios for offsite protective
measures after an SST1 release at the Surry site.
COST bENEFIT RATIOS FOR EMERGENCY PHASE, INTERMEDIATE PHASE, AND
LONG-TERM POPULATION PROTECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES AFTER AN SSTI RELEASE
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protective action criteria in each defined time period.
The figure shows that the cost/benefit ratios based on
average cost are smaller than those based on marginal cost.
This behavior is observed because a large portion of
protective measure costs and benefits are incurred in areas
where dose rates are high. As more restrictive criteria
are applied, additional costs and additional man-rem
averted are small relative to total costs and benefits.
A more useful measure of costs and benefits for
decision-making is the marginal cost/benefit ratio. This
ratio is the cost of avoiding an additional man-rem (at the
margin) by applying a more restrictive criterion for
population protective measure implementation. Unlike the
average cost per man-rem averted, the marginal cost per
man-rem averted is determined exclusively by costs and
benefits in those areas which only marginally exceed a
protective action criterion. This ratio explicitly
demonstrates the costs and benefits of avoiding each
additional man-rem as the protective action implementation
criterion is decreased.
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Cost/benefit studies of protective action criteria can
be useful for decision-making regarding recommended
individual exposure limits for different time periods. For
post-accident response beyond the acute time period the
marginal cost incurred to avoid population exposures should
be roughly equivalent for efficient use of societal
financial resources. The dotted lines in Figure 6.6
demonstrate the protective action criteria in each time
period which lead to an equivalent marginal cost of S$500
per man-rem averted. The new economic model can be
employed in the future to develop consistent, efficient
population protective measure implementation criteria for
use in post-accident situations. The costs and
effectiveness of evacuation plans for severe LWR accidents
could also be evaluated on a site-specific basis using the
new models.
6.7 COMPARISON OF ROUTINE OUTAGE AND SEVERE ACCIDENT
ECONOMIC RISKS FOR SURRY #2
The present values of lifetime economic risks from
category I and category II and III events for Surry #2 are
compared in Table 6.10. The risk estimates for category I
outages are based on the generic frequency estimates from
-309-
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Chapter 5 combined with outage costs for the Surry plant
estimated with the new onsite cost models. The economic
risks for category II and III events are based on the PWR
core-melt frequencies and source terms from the RSS with
offsite consequence calculations for the Surry site. The
large uncertainties in the RSS core-melt accident
frequencies are not reflected in the economic risk
estimates in Table 6.10. Results are shown for societal
discount rates of 0, 4, and 10%. Societal economic risk is
predicted to be dominated by category I forced outage
events. The contribution of category II and III accidents
to economic risk is predicted to be a factor of 50-80 lower
than the risks from routine forced outage events. The
expected offsite economic risks of severe accidents are
predicted to be a factor of 500 lower than the onsite
risks from all event categories. In contrast to public
health risk which is dominated by low frequency, large
consequence events, economic risks from LWR operation are
dominated by high frequency, low consequence events. This
cost has been paid historically through reduced LWR plant
availability and capacity factors.
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The uncertainties in estimated category event risks
are relatively small (factors of 3 and 1/5) because of the
high frequency of these events (10 per reactor-year) and
the data availability for routine outage costs. The
estimates of category II and II economic risks are highly
uncertain because of the large uncertainties in the
estimates of total core-damage and core-melt accident
frequencies and the limited understanding of severe
accident physical processes. Results of probabilistic risk
studies predict that core-melt accident frequencies range
from 2X10 3 to =10-5 per reactor-year for U.S. LWR plants.
The uncertainties in plant decontamination costs,
replacement power cost increases, and new plant capital
costs and are the most important contributors to the
uncertainties in total severe accident cost estimates.
Uncertainties in core-melt accident source term
definition are extremely large and have important impacts
on offsite accident consequence projections. Changes in
source term definitions would have smaller impacts on total
cost estimates for core-melt accidents because onsite
losses are not significantly influenced by source term
definitions. Uncertainties in offsite cost estimates for a
given source term are dominated by uncertainties in
-312-
decontamination costs, which are factors of approximately 5
and 1/5. A detailed uncertainty analysis of offsite
core-melt accident economic consequences is planned as part
of the MELCOR program. The new economic consequence model
is structured for ease of implementation of uncertainty
analysis techniques.
The comparison of economic risks from the entire
spectrum of LWR events indicates that societal economic
risks are dominated by high frequency, low consequence
forced outage events. Also, the offsite economic risks
from severe LWR accidents are predicted to be small
relative to onsite risks. These conclusions are not
significantly influenced by uncertainties in severe
accident frequencies and source terms.
6.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Calculations performed with the new economic
consequence models indicate that the expected costs of
category II and III accidents at the Surry site are
dominated by onsite costs of post-accident decontamination,
replacement power cost increases, and plant capital losses.
For all sites which have been examined, the offsite costs
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of severe accidents are predicted to be small relative to
onsite costs except for low-probability core-melt accidents
which result in large releases of radioactive material.
The offsite costs of population protective measures are
dominated by land and property decontamination costs. The
costs of offsite public health effects are small based on
purely economic costing of health care and health effects.
Calculations performed for various U.S. LWR sites indicate
that offsite cost predictions from the new model are
generally factors of 2-4 larger than those from the CRAC2
code.
The new offsite models have been used to examine the
sensitivity of offsite economic consequences to source-term
and population protective measure assumptions. The offsite
cost predictions are sensitive to source term definition.
Offsite costs can also be significantly affected by offsite
protective measure implementation criteria. The new
economic models have been used in example cost/benefit
analyses which demonstrate the usefulness of marginal
cost/benefit ratios in planning for post-accident
population protective measures. It is recommended that the
newly developed offsite economic models be exercised in
further studies of costs and benefits of LWR accident
-314-
population protective measures.
The new onsite and offsite cost models have been used
to estimate the economic risks at the Surry 2 plant with
frequency estimates from generic outage data and the RSS.
The example economic risk calculations for the Surry Unit 2
plant result in the following conclusions:
1. Unlike public health risks, economic risks from
LWR operation are dominated by high frequency,
small consequence forced outage events. The
societal costs of these events result from reduced
availability and capacity factors and the need for
use of higher marginal cost fuel sources for
generation of electricity.
2. The economic risks from LWR operation are
dominated by onsite losses including replacement
power cost increases, plant capital losses, and
plant decontamination costs. Only very low
probability core-melt accidents with large
releases of radioactive material are predicted to
result in offsite costs as large as onsite plant
costs.
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These conclusions result from the comparison of economic
risks from various categories of operational events at the
Surry 2 plant, with the assumption that society is
risk-neutral to all economic losses. The conclusions are
not sensitive to the large uncertainties inherent in the
estimates of the economic risks from severe LWR accidents.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The primary goal of this study was to develop models
to be used for analyses of economic risks from events which
occur during US. LWR plant operation. These models have
been developed for potential use by both the nuclear power
industry and regulatory agencies in cost/benefit analyses
for decision-making purposes. The newly developed models
include capabilities to estimate both onsite and offsite
costs of LWR events ranging from routine plant forced
outages to severe core-melt accidents resulting in large
releases of radioactive material to the environment. The
models developed are useful for estimating societal
economic risks based on either generic or plant-specific
economic data. The models can easily be modified for use
in economic risk studies for particular interest groups in
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the U.S. nuclear power industry.
The new onsite cost models estimate societal losses
from power production cost increases, new plant capital
costs, plant decontamination costs, and plant repair costs
which may be incurred after LWR operational events. Early
decommissioning costs and plant worker health impact costs
are included but do not contribute significantly to the
onsite losses from LWR events. The dominant cost for most
LWR outage events is the power production cost increase
caused by the need for using generating facilities with
higher fuel-cycle costs. Replacement power purchase cost
increases are estimated based on the mix of units available
in each region of the U.S. Plant repair costs for routine
forced outage events have historically been small relative
to replacement power cost increases. Plant decontamination
costs and capital costs of replacement power generation
facilities are important for severe LWR accidents resulting
in core-damage or core-melt. Electric utility business
costs, nuclear power industry costs, and litigation costs
for severe LWR accidents are likely to be small from the
societal perspective. However, these costs may be
important and warrant careful consideration for specific
groups within the U.S. nuclear power industry.
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The newly developed offsite economic models estimate
the costs of post-accident population protective measures
and public health impacts. The costs of population
evacuation and temporary relocation, agricultural product
disposal, land and property decontamination, and land
interdiction are included in the economic models for
population protective measures. Costs of health impacts
including medical care costs are also included in the new
offsite economic consequence models. The new offsite
models offer several advantages over the CRAC2 economic
models, including more accurate accounting of short-term
population relocation costs, accounting for population
relocation costs during land and property decontamination,
flexibility of all time periods and protective action
implementation criteria, incorporation of site-specific
economic data, estimation of additional decontamination
program attributes, calculation of both costs and benefits
(in terms of population exposure avoided) of population
protective measures at offsite locations, and estimation of
medical care and health effects costs. A prototype model
was developed in this study for development and testing of
the new offsite economic models. The new models will be
incorporated into the MELCOR consequence calculation code
-319-
which is currently under development.
A computer data base of LWR experience from 1974-1980
was developed to estimate the frequency-severity spectrum
of unscheduled, non-regulatory forced outage events at
U.S. LWRs. The data base was combined with the new onsite
economic cost models to estimate the expected losses from
routine forced outage events. The losses from routine LWR
forced outage events are large due to the high frequency
(-10 per reactor-year) and power production cost increases
for these events (see Table 6.10). The costs of LWR forced
outage events are paid through reduced availability and
capacity factors for plants in operation. During the
1974-1980 study period, forced outage events caused an
average 10% availability loss per reactor-year of U.S. LWR
operation. Forced outage events caused by regulatory
concerns showed a consistently increasing trend during the
1974-1980 study period. The average availability loss due
to regulatory forced outage events increased by roughly a
factor of 5 to approximately 6% in 1980. The total plant
availability losses due to forced outage events result in
significant societal costs from the use of higher cost fuel
sources.
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Detailed analyses of the forced outage data base
showed that forced outage events occur more frequently at
LWR plants in the first years of operation than later in
plant life. This trend is consistent with "bathtub"
failure rate behavior observed in most technological
devices. This behavior is important because it indicates
that economic risk from forced outage events and
transient-induced core-melt accident risks are not constant
over the life of LWR plants. Risk management programs in
the U.S. LWR industry should direct special attention to
plants in the first few years of commercial operation.
Historical accident experience supports the hypothesis that
risks are increased in the first years of LWR commercial
operation. Wear-out related increases in forced outage
frequency were not apparent in the 1974-1980 operation
data.
The new onsite and offsite economic consequence models
have been applied in an example calculation to estimate the
economic risks from core-damage and core-melt accidents at
the Surry 2 plant. The analysis included the assumption
that the median core-melt accident frequency from the RSS
included all accident sequences resulting in either limited
core-damage or full scale core-melt. The present value of
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expected costs of severe accidents over the remaining life
of the Surry #2 plant is less than 6 million dollars, based
on the RSS median core-melt accident frequencies (see Table
6.10). The dominant contributors to expected core-damage
or core-melt accident costs are plant decontamination
costs, power production cost increases, and new generation
facility capital costs. The expected offsite property
damage and health effects costs are an order of magnitude
lower than expected onsite costs for the RSS PWR source
terms. The economic costs of offsite health effects are
small for most core-melt accident categories. The dominant
offsite cost for large accident release categories is the
cost of land and property decontamination. The total
expected offsite costs of core-melt accidents for the
remaining Surry plant life are predicted to be less than $1
million dollars. Only for extremely low probability events
are offsite costs equal to or greater than onsite costs.
The expected core-melt accident costs are small compared to
the expected losses from high frequency routine forced
outage events. The uncertainties in the economic risk
estimates are large and are dominated by the uncertainties
in event frequencies for severe accidents, and by
replacement power cost uncertainties for routine forced
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outage events.
The example applications of the new onsite and offsite
economic risk models in this study lead to some important
conclusions concerning LWR economic risks. Current
probabilistic risk analyses predict core-melt frequencies
ranging from 2X10 3 per reactor-year to 1X10-5 per
reactor-year for U.S. LWR plants in operation. The general
conclusions from the analysis are not sensitive to this
range of core-melt frequencies. In contrast to public
health risks from LWR operation which are dominated by low
frequency core-melt accidents, societal economic risks from
plant operation are dominated by high frequency routine
forced outage events. From an economic perspective,
assuming society is risk-neutral to economic losses, the
maximum economic benefit could be achieved through
reduction of routine forced outage frequencies and
durations. The economic risk calculations performed in
this study indicate that reduction of core-melt accident
frequencies should result in smaller economic benefits.
Thus, although reduction of core-melt accident frequencies
and consequences is important for controlling public health
risks, economic analyses indicate that limited societal
financial resources might be more productively used in
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controlling routine forced outage losses. Reduction of
routine outage frequencies would also reduce the frequency
of plant transients and would thus have some impact on
core-melt accident frequency and public health risks as
well.
The analysis of LWR economic risks indicates that
focusing U.S. nuclear power regulation completely on severe
accidents may be economically inefficient, and that the
most productive expenditures for plant improvements might
be made to increase the availability and capacity factors
of operating LWR units by reducing forced outage
frequencies and costs. Expenditures for core-melt accident
prevention are likely to produce larger benefits than
expenditures for systems which mitigate the offsite
consequences of core-melt accidents since a large portion
of the expected costs of core-melt accidents result from
the loss of physical plant.
The newly developed onsite and offsite economic
consequence models have many applications beyond the
example calculations presented in this report. The new
models will be used in detailed sensitivity and uncertainty
analyses as part of the MELCOR severe accident risk
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assessment program to more accurately quantify the range of
economic risks from severe accidents. The LWR forced
outage data base has already been used in support of
actuarial analyses within the nuclear insurance industry.
It is recommended that the new offsite economic consequence
models be used to perform cost/benefit analyses to assess
post-accident population protective measure implementation
criteria in the future. The newly developed models
represent flexible tools to be used in support of
decision-making in both regulatory and nuclear industry
agencies.
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APPENDIX A
U.S. LWR OPERATION EXPERIENCE DATA BASE
The data base of LWR operating experience developed in
this study to estimate the frequency of LWR forced outage
events is presented in this section. The data base for
1974-1980 is available on magnetic tape in either ASCII or
binary data formats.
The data base was formed from annual publications of
forced outage data from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission [AE74,Nu77b,Nu77c,Nu79a,Nu79b,Nu81a,Nu81b].
Only forced outage events (not scheduled) have been
included in the new data base. Also, all regulatory
outages have been excluded from the data base for the
purpose of this study. Finally, the total duration of a
single forced outage event is recorded in the calendar year
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in which the forced outage event was initiated. Only those
outage hours which occurred between January 1, 1974 and
December 31, 1980 are included in the data. The plant
name, plant type, NSSS vendor, plant electric rating,
startup and shutdown year+, and the number of forced outage
events observed are tabulated for each recorded plant year
of data.
+ The plant start and end of operation are reported to the
nearest 0.1 year. The shutdown year is reported as.0.0
for plants still in commercial operation.
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ASCII FORCED OUTAGE DATA, ALL PLANTS, 1974-1980 4203 PTS.
CALENDAR YEARS 1974 THROUGH 1980
PLANT NAME - BIG ROCK POINT 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 00072
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1963.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 2
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 253 792
PLANT NAME = BROWNS FERRY 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.6, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 26
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 14 31 136 24 7
10 14 19 226 18 21 10 15 445 58 15 24 211 10 11 6 7 7 11 12
7
PLANT NAME = COOPER 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 778
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 19
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 70 11 14 18 176
16 56 63 9 61 3 16 8 13 24 11 18 19 71
PLANT NAME = DRESDEN 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 200
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1960.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 3
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 1453 1096 39
PLANT NAME = DRESDEN 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 794
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PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1972.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 16
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 144 329 57 12
116 1 1 1 1 1 112 35 14 580 9 99
PLANT NAME = DRESDEN 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 794
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.9, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 18
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 164 6 37 17 19
193 95 19 62 7 14 183 13 72 6 32 12 35
PLANT NAME = FORT CALHOUN 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 457
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 304 284 19 6
PLANT NAME = CONNECTICUT YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 575
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1968.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 7 5 4 12 660 4 4
4 8 6 9 8 12
PLANT NAME = HUMBOLDT BAY 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 063
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1963.7, 1976.5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 3
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 1 18 9
PLANT NAME = INDIAN POINT 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 265
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1960.8, 1974.8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 20
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 383 54 21 14 113
42 20 7 7 6 236 14 24 59 21 10 7 15 113 7
PLANT NAME = INDIAN POINT 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 873
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PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 52
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 605 3 3 3 1238 1
4 3 11 16 1 1 2 4 2 4 58 5 9 184 3 18 1 20 3 5 2 9 25 7 2 7
17 32 9 8 7 2 14 1 1 3 3 7 4 11 16 4 2 1 1 3
PLANT NAME = KEWAUNEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 535
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 31
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 8 12 15 135 30
29 16 9 12 6 3 4 19 7 3 9 40 28 4 7 28 6 2 4 12 5 13 12 2
62 8
PLANT NAME = LACROSSE 1 CALENDAR YEAR - 1974
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = ALLIS CHALMERS
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 050
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1969.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 18 8 26 2 2 93
294 33 25
PLANT NAME = MAINE YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 790
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 7 57 5 7 31 7 10
13
PLANT NAME = MILLSTONE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 652
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 52 23 4 7 15 9 5
8 15 8 34 1 2
PLANT NAME = MONTICELLO 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 536
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 3 63 29 5 10 10
15 10 142
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PLANT NAME NINE MILE POINT 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1974
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 610
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1970.0, .0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 3
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 42 16 261
PLANT NAME OCONEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1974
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) 887
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1973.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 12
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 36 70 12 45 40
53 9 2 20 25 74 17
PLANT NAME OCONEE 2 CALENDAR YEAR 1974
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 887
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1974.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 11
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 32 441 2907 91
91 92 40 34 8 10 194
PLANT NAME = OYSTER CREEK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 650
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1970.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 105 676 58 30
176 84
PLANT NAME = PALISADES 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 805
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1972.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 6570 5 236 1451
PLANT NAME = PEACH BOTTOM 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 18
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 9 181 78 56 17
16 9 6 20 13 10 13 74 9 13 136 9 28
-348-
PLANT NAME PILGRIM 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1974
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 655
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 3 115 66 33 20
102
PLANT NAME - POINT BEACH 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1974
PLANT TYPE - PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 497
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1971.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 3 4 5 1 48
PLANT NAME - PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1974
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 530
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR - 1974.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR - 20
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 5 75 8 704 37 13
75 3 1590 15 65 87 13 10 5 10 11 3 6 11
PLANT NAME = QUAD CITIES 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE - BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 789
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 14
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 147 22 12 6 12
30 12 79 8 66 124 34 2 10
PLANT NAME = QUAD CITIES 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 789
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 16
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 36 56 36 11 173
136 22 6 35 18 150 288 11 23 6 37
PLANT NAME = ROBINSON 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 712
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 15
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 2 2 2 3 13 1 16
4 11 12 48 2 7 3 3
-349-
PLANT NAME SAN ONOFRE 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1974
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 430
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1968.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 516 55 5 7
PLANT NAME SURRY 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1974
PLANT TYPE - PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 822
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 19
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 23 8 10 38 71 11
2 15 2 2 263 1 1 2 48 2 2 20 19
PLANT NAME - SURRY 2 CALENDAR YEAR - 1974
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR - WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 822
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR - 1973.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR - 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 8 12 1 85 1 93
2787
PLANT NAME = THREE MILE ISLAND 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) 819
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 1
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 97
PLANT NAME = TURKEY POINT 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 693
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 25
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 11 6 4 1 12 7 9
17 2 6 2 20 2 9 7 2 13 7 2 5 4 4 22 1 23
PLANT NAME = TURKEY POINT 4 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 693
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 17
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 3 1 12 10 82 4
35 14 1 2 1 2 153 6 21 20 87
-350-
PLANT NAME VERMONT YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1974
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 514
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1972.9, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 20 41 4 34 10 15
75
PLANT NAME YANKEE ROWE 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1974
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 175
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1961.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 2
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 9 6
PLANT NAME - ZION 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1974
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 1040
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1974.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 16
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 10 8 18 30 97 68
21 28 22 11 305 83 23 146 16 11
PLANT NAME ZION 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1040
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 38
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 4 22 664 8 36 13
7 82 3 4 13 251 3090 100 93 4 72 21 20 14 11 7 21 15 6 11
27 5 25 14 198 5 14 11 5 20 2 34
PLANT NAME = GINNA 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1974
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 490
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1970.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 2737 9 9 139 43
47 16
PLANT NAME = ARKANSAS 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 00850
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 48 29 18 28 8 9
-351-
16 11 50 5 41 8 258
PLANT NAME BIG ROCK POINT 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1975
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 00072
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1963.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 3
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 3421 6 45
PLANT NAME - BROWNS FERRY 1 CALENDAR YEAR - 1975
PLANT TYPE - BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1974.6, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 13 195 9 12059
PLANT NAME BROWNS FERRY2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 25 43 124 10 13
12 11457
PLANT NAME = BRUNSWICK 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 821
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.8, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 28
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 6 9 24 16 9 842
20 10 20 60 25 124 7 14 182 4 34 472 38 13 28 12 18 26 11
12 32 24
PLANT NAME = CALVERT CLIFFS 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 845
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 15
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 140 15 8 37 18
105 288 25 9 111 16 7 12 10 16
PLANT NAME = DC COOK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1054
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 16
-352-
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 85 10 19 5 11 8
9 18 59 12 7 18 12 29 7 9
PLANT NAME COOPER 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1975
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR - GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 778
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR - 1974.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 11 135 13 9 12
22 23 8 178 15
PLANT NAME DRESDEN 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1975
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 200
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1960.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 23 2 462 34 12
84 39 408
PLANT NAME = DRESDEN 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 794
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1972.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 15 10 31 48 126
41 8 24 10 26
PLANT NAME = DRESDEN 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 794
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.9, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 105 8 225 217 15
10 95 17
PLANT NAME = DUANE ARNOLD 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 538
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.1, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 25 223 11 127 12
34 60 17 14 23 13 57 49
PLANT NAME = FITZPATRICK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 821
-353-
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1975.6, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR - 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 36 36 5 152 125
69 29 229 14
PLANT NAME FORT CALHOUN 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1975
PLANT TYPE - PWR NSSS VENDOR COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 457
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1974.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEA? 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 42 16 3 7 8 63
PLANT NAME GINNA 1 CALENDAR YEAR - 1975
PLANT TYPE - PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 490
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1970.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 9 9 44 6 12 4 97
87 12 44
PLANT NAME = HATCH 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 764
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 35
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 10 10 13 22 14
29 194 40 10 23 42 8 68 4 53 20 13 13 11 11 26 15 16 20 9
18 34 33 24 76 91 23 33 18 10
PLANT NAME = CONNECTICUT YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 575
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1968.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 3
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 39 5 3
PLANT NAME = HUMBOLDT BAY 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 063
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1963.7, 1976.5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 38 10 63 8 7 19
PLANT NAME = INDIAN POINT 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 873
-354-
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1973.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 40
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 43 2 12 9 2 4 9
21 7 5 4 12 9 19 7 19 1 10 4 2 2 3 18 2 4 6 9 350 3 3 1 1 1
10 1 5 5 20 1 3
PLANT NAME KEWAUNEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1975
PLANT TYPE PWP NSSS VENDOR - WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 535
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1974.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR - 26
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 25 2 31 14 104 3
13 8 8 11 6 44 3 1 9 6 125 12 13 205 28 38 12 5 5 6
PLANT NAME LACROSSE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR = ALLIS CHALMERS
PLANT RATING (MWe) 050
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1969.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 32 4 19 7 20 2 8
5 190 3 6 7 15
PLANT NAME = MAINE YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 790
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 9 145 8 11 25 14
20 14 12 7
PLANT NAME = MILLSTONE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 652
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 14
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 9 87 55 35 16 5
8 961 15 19 223 9 8 66
PLANT NAME = MONTICELLO 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 536
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 2
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 23 12
-355-
PLANT NAME NINE MILE POINT 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1975
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 610
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1970.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 98 14 20 9 27 4
37 43 24 8 10 8 20
PLANT NAME OCONE 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1975
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 887
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1973.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR - 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 13 6 3 31 7 9 17
10 7 8 13 17 30
PLANT NAME = OCONEE 2 CALENDAR YEAR 1975
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 887
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 5 1142 14 10 128
4 263 7 22 41 14 29 236
PLANT NAME = OCONEE 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 887
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 17
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 107 42 1 7 5 10
2 342 7 5 6 28 8 7 5 281 28
PLANT NAME = OYSTER CREEK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 650
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1970.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 133 174 49 15
105 58 155 64 30 161
PLANT NAME = PALISADES 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 805
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1972.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 2205 3 14 227 8
-356-
46 15 135 9 95
PLANT NAME PEACH BOTTOM 2 CALENDAR YEAR 1975
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR - 1974.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 15 12 522 20 67
128 24 84 25 8
PLANT NAME PEACH BOTTOM 3 CALENDAR YEAR 1975
PLANT TYPE - BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR - 12
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 24 334 96 164 56
21 49 7 15 7 24 34
PLANT NAME PILGRIM 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1975
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 655
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR - 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 324 294 9 168 8
96 46 49 16 29 48 62 751
PLANT NAME = POINT BEACH 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MW9) = 497
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 2
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 910 352
PLANT NAME = POINT BEACH 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 497
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 2
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 6 203
PLANT NAME = PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 530
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 12
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 8 6 6 8 4 3 3 3
-357-
266 10 69 
PLANT NAME PRAIRIE ISLAND 2 CALENDAR YEAR 1975
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWs) 530
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 20
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 10 4 6 176 10 6
5 7 18 16 145 8 217 6 5 23 8 6 1 158
PLANT NAME QUAD CITIES 1 CALENDAR YEAR - 1975
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 789
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1973.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 955 24 7 10 8 45
18
PLANT NAME - QUAD CITIES 2 CALENDAR YEAR 1975
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 789
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1973.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 2 47 8 19 87 216
137 14 9
PLANT NAME = RANCHO SECO 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 918
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 9 9 6 5 10 1 13
5770
PLANT AME = ROBINSON 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 712
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 16
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 59 22 3 6 4 132
610 4 132 67 2 2 23 21 17 15
PLANT NAME = SAN ONOFRE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 430
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1968.0, 0.0
-358-
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 2
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 4 10
PLANT NAME SURRY 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1975
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 822
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 23
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 3 3 2 3 4 14 20
2 75 1 1 12 38 59 209 32 107 133 1 1 7 2 3
PLANT NAME SURRY 2 CALENDAR YEAR 1975
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 822
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1973.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 17
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 80 8 15 3 16 4 4
2 121 4 3 11 12 114 4 4 53
PLANT NAME THREE MILE ISLAND 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 819
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 40 14 214 9 16
144 20 4 27 24 303 104 3
PLANT NAME = TURKEY POINT 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 693
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 18
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 3 2 1 6 3 128 1923133834133
PLANT NAME = TURKEY POINT 4 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 693
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 2 5 2 5 2 5 4
PLANT NAME = VERMONT YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 514
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1972.9, 0.0
-359-
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 10 75 8 9 249 7
PLANT NAME YANKEE ROWE 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1975
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 175
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1961.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR - 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 5 6 7 2 4 3
PLANT NAME ZION 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1040
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 20
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 6 1 94 69 30 4
22 5 59 13 4 8 10 4 839 3 80 1 20 4
PLANT NAME = ZION 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1975
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1040
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 31
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 236 14 3 183 156
21 12 4 5 23 15 4 3 9 3 4 4 122 8 2 238 599 9 1 565 8 51 3
5 1 24
PLANT NAME = ARKANSAS 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 850
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 60 313 26 207 14
5 671 6 38 34
PLANT NAME = BEAVER VALLEY 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 852
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.8, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 39
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 8 311 8 17 5 10
7 7 207 3 6 4 116 417 7 32 51 387 11 9 7 315 12 47 6 47 9
90 32 101 40 9 10 5 6 4 990 35 37
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PLANT NAME BIG ROCK POINT 1 CALENDAR YEAR - 1976
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 00072
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1963.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 2
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 18 66
PLANT NAME BROWNS FERRY 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATINJ (MWe) 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.6, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 1 22 9 5 8 10 53
15
PLANT NAME = BROWNS FERRY 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 194 14 8 10 14
23 16 60
PLANT NAME = BRUNSWICK 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 821
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.8, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 25
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 44 37 27 11 201
16 34 120 81 3 16 9 42 10 95 2 34 1 23 24 52 20 8 793 17
PLANT NAME = CALVERT CLIFFS 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 845
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 38 6 22 7 16 16
18
PLANT NAME = COOPER 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 778
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 2
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 298 26
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PLANT NAME DC COOK 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1976
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 1054
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1975.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR - 11
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 11 6 9 8 7 23 2
22 11 62 16
PLANT NAME DRESDEN 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1976
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 200
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR - 1960.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 631 37 46 65 32
16 60 7 .p PLANT NAME - DRESDEN 2 CALENDAR YEAR 1976
PLANT TYPE - BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 794
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1972.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 78 15 19 157 45
7 6 90 11 18
PLANT NAME = DRESDEN 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 794
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.9, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 10 117 31 12 9
105 24 14
PLANT NAME = DUANE ARNOLD 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 538
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.1, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 27 15 14 29 58 8
24 29 11 9 32 22 18
PLANT NAME = FITZPATRICK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 821
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.6, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 15
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 24 30 59 39 30
12 21 86 167 18 53 92 87 39 41
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PLANT NAME FORT CALHOUN 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1976
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR - COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) 457
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR - 1974.4 0.00
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR - 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 4 15 1 13 6 41 2
10
PLANT NAME - CONNECTICUT YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR - 1976
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR - WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 575
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR - 1968.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 17 37 6 5 13 7
PLANT NAME HATCH 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1976
PLANT TYPE - BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 764
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 31
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 17 8 18 14 37 13
13 9 9 8 8 20 13 14 260 12 13 33 18 11 23 13 17 3 37 16 9
20 12 15 11
PLANT NAME = ROBINSON 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 712
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 5 112 2 2 3 10 2
39 13 6 2 7 6
PLANT NAME = HUMBOLDT BAY 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 063
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1963.7, 1976.5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 24 281 6 10 9
PLANT NAME = INDIAN POINT 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 873
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 20
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 54 2 12 1 1 22 3
30 1 1372 1 40 11 2 1 1 8 3 3 2
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PLANT NAME INDIAN POINT 3 CALENDAR YEAR 1976
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 873
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR - 1976.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 2 3 22 12 12 3 8
PLANT NAME KEWAUNEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1976
PLANT TYPE - PWR NSSS VENDOR - WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 535
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1974.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 12
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 22 36 8 3 4 4 12
1 254 7 3 7
PLANT NAME - LACROSSE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = ALLIS CHALMERS
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 050
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1969.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 17 59 1 40 18 15
14 168
PLANT NAME = MAINE YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 790
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 14 9 4 10 11 17
11
PLANT NAME = MILLSTONE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 652
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 42 85 132 64 205
45 51
PLANT NAME = MILLSTONE 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 828
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 39
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 13 38 33 14 121
3 134 9 297 19 18 17 24 5 31 111 15 7 10 6 5 5 7 8 15 280
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62 12 23 21 11 18 20 19 4 40 27 7 293
PLANT NAME MONTICELLO 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1976
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 536
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1971.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR - 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 6 29 12 7 10 21
PLANT NAME NINE MILE POINT 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1976
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 610
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1970.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 61 6 630 8 16 20
23 25 129
PLANT NAME = OCONEE 1
PLANT TYPE = PWR
CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 887
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 82 2 11 6 4
32 7 11 368 436 324
9 4
PLANT NAME = OCONEE 2
PLANT TYPE = PWR N
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 887
CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
[SSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 12
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 19 8 201 40
9 16 174 15 10 492 14
919
PLANT NAME = OCONEE 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 887
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 12
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 21 6 212 678 6 3
4 239 3 40 5 10
PLANT NAME = OYSTER CREEK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 650
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1970.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 2
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FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 19 108
PLANT NAME PALISADES 1 CALENDAR YEAR - 1976
PLANT TYPE - PWR NSSS VENDOR COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) 805
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1972.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 17
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 384 1 7 146 75
45 17 18 5 9 16 166 2 129 22 32 32
PLANT NAME - PEACH BOTTOM 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 11
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 25 6 17 82 9 20
57 80 35 18 48
PLANT NAME = PEACH BOTTOM 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 17
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 1 13 18 203 7 48
8 4 11 17 108 51 16 258 132 31 7
PLANT NAME = PILGRIM 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 655
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 2 19 312 9 727
23 18 19 26
PLANT NAME = POINT BEAC
PLANT TYPE = PWR
;H 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 497
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 1
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 4
PLANT NAME = POINT BEACH 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTI
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 497
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
NGHOUSE
-366-
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 23 5 3 1
PLANT NAME PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1976
PLANT TYPE - PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 530
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1974.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 29 17 2 147 9 7
17 15 248 14
PLANT NAME = PRAIRIE ISLAND 2 CALENDAR YEAR - 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 530
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 11
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS). 473 18 7 4 6 10
76 9 18 30 5
PLANT NAME = QUAD CITIES 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 789
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 7 7 13 181 9 11
125 9 12 8
PLANT NAME = QUAD CITIES 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 789
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 55 11 91 8 114 7
10 10
PLANT NAME = RANCHO SECO 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 918
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 5 25 4539 14 1744187
PLANT NAME = GINNA 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 490
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1970.2, 0.0
-367-
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR - 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 66 5 5 40 308 10
5 8 7 50 668 511 12
PLANT NAME - SAN ONOFRE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE - PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 430
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1968.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 7 4 9 7 20 8 3
101
PLANT NAME = SURRY 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 822
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 16
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 18 156 2 115 3
126 58 178 1 136 1 5 2 1 2 157
PLANT NAME = SURRY 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 822
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 12
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 203 201 134 3 2
2 93 2286 91 3 1 2
PLANT NAME = THREE MILE ISLAND 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 819
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 46 55 7 467 116
11 54 31 616
PLANT NAME = TROJAN 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1130
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 10 3 11 5 6
PLANT NAME = TURKEY POINT 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 693
-368-
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 2 2 1 1 1
PLANT NAME TURKEY POINT 4 CALENDAR YEAR 1976
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 693
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1973.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR VEAR = 22
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 2 4 1 1 16 36 2
88 46 3 6 1 1 3 5 1 122 1 2 2 3 1
PLANT NAME = VERMONT YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 514
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1972.9, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 26 20 135 33 25
PLANT NAME = YANKEE ROWE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 175
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1961.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 447 2 86 120 10
PLANT NAME = ZION 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1040
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 11
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 32 2 462 10 28
17 11 20 5 637 7
PLANT NAME = ZION 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1976
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1040
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 19
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 104 929 2 1 37 4
240 15 18 21 113 27 956 17 19 3 24 21 27
PLANT NAME = ARKANSAS 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 00850
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.0, 0.0
-369-
0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 2
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 12 361
PLANT NAME BEAVER VALLEY 1 CALENDAR YEAR - 1977
PLANT TYPE - PWR NSSS VENDOR - WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 00852
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1976.8, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 43
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 8 6 1447 4 8 7 6
77 6 17 228 11 94 21 36 8 3 12 7 4 5 8 20 6 3 5 7 14 35 5
49 6 14 18 3 33 74 13 267 8 16 18 8
PLANT NAME = BIG ROCK POINT 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 00072
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1963.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 1
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 88
PLANT NAME = BROWNS FERRY 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.6, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 12
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 150 1 13 12 10 9
9 29 54 13 10 13
PLANT NAME = BROWNS FERRY 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 18
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 39 47 29 121 14
25 19 8 7 12 61 8 1 9 15 1348 19 12
PLANT NAME = BROWNS FERRY 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 27
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 37 1 21 13 17 16
128 2 35 21 33 11 11 9 2 69 17 11 65 12 69 90 46 1 23 1 11
PLANT NAME = BRUNSWICK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 821
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PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1977.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 25
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 22 52 9 19 160
20 39 1698 1 1 22 30 55 313 19 11 14 18 14 53 37 333 45 29
44
PLANT NAME - BRUNSWICK 2 CALENDAR YEAR 1977
PLANT TYPE - BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 821
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1975.8, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 19
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 19 23 74 83 17
27 26 19 41 8 24 26 76 19 39 107 25 14 140
PLANT NAME = CALVERT CLIFFS 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 845
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 141 19 10 10 10
8 8 4 37 5 20 10 40
PLANT NAME = CALVERT CLIFFS 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 810
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 14
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 6 7 8 28 37 24 3
18 86 15 11 8 1 19
PLANT NAME = DC COOK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1054
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 16
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 22 14 3 4 46 12
9 5 7 21 20 3 12 70 5 5
PLANT NAME = COOPER 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 778
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 69 18 34 11 37
41
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PLANT NAME CRYSTAL RIVER 3 CALENDAR YEAR 1977
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) 825
PLANT STARTUPt SHUTDOWN YEAR - 1977.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 29
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 8 4 44 1 22 33
14 4 7 2 1 150 9 135 22 19 14 10 1 4 3 108 5 3 1 12 4 6 4
PLANT NAME DRESDEN 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1977
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 200
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1960.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 8 53 72 22 900
88 77 18 24
PLANT NAME = DRESDEN 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 794
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1972.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 37 44 14 24 23
15 16 428
PLANT NAME = DRESDEN 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 794
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.9, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 11
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 97 87 58 45 168
11 7 10 60 30 89
PLANT NAME = DUANE ARNOLD 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 538
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.1, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 40 17 15 16 8 56
11 5 8
PLANT NAME = FITZPATRICK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 821
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.6, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 12
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 21 69 8 1 20 28
-372-
20 45 62 19 18 99
PLANT NAME FORT CALHOUN 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1977
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 457
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR - 1974.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 77 9 5 25 39
PLANT NAME - GINNA 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1977
PLANT TYPE - PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 490
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1970.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR - 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 15 188 81 48 30
18
PLANT NAME = CONNECTICUT YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 575
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1968.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 11 7 5 7
PLANT NAME = HATCH 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 764
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 23
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 14 38 33 176 92
94 36 23 13 55 13 17 11 24 54 44 8 281 24 19 96 48 16
PLANT NAME = INDIAN POINT 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 873
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 20
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 1 109 3 9 4 2 1
4 7 2 2 8 868 4 8 17 4 2 3 3
PLANT NAME = INDIAN POINT 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 873
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 5 3 10 2 266 7
-373-
23 7 7
PLANT NAME KEWAUNEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1977
PLANT TYPE - PWR NSSS VENDOR - WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 535
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 3 12 21 41 3 5 2
11
PLANT NAME - LACROSSE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR = ALLIS CHALMERS
PLANT RATING (MWe) 050
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1969.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 2 17 18 58
PLANT NAME = MAINE YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 790
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 15 22 16 6
PLANT NAME = MILLSTONE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 652
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 15
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 49 12 36 9 11 8
10 132 6 10 37 37 66 55 269
PLANT NAME = MILLSTONE 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 828
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 6 164 266 129 24
PLANT NAME = MONTICELLO 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 536
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 2
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 22 11
-374-
PLANT NAME NINE MILE POINT 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1977
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 610
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1970.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 2
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 26 19
PLANT NAME = OCONEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 887
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 17
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 222 21 169 304
178 102 2 11 382 4 12 1 10 9 13 92 5
PLANT NAME = OCONEE 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 887
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 7 196 48 34 8 32
497 202 8 20 120 13 181
PLANT NAME = OCONEE 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 887
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 12
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DU[ATIONS (IN HOURS): 222 36 5 6 6 213
179 292 36 7 10 152
PLANT NAME = OYSTER CREEK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 650
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1970.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 3
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 77 27 23
PLANT NAME = PALISADES 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 805
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1972.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 11
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 11 8 5 36 13 21
224 64 51 18 35
-375-
PLANT NAME PEACH BOTTOM 2 CALENDAR YEAR 1977
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1974.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 202 44 15 17 100
64 13 16 43 17
PLANT NAME PEACH BOTTOM 3 CALENDAR YEAR 1977
PLANT TYPE - BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 9
FORCED OTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 49 47 24 32 19
67 62 140 24
PLANT NAME PILGRIM 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE - BWR NSSS VENDOR - GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 655
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 17 42 8 131 478
PLANT NAME POINT BEACH 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 497
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 4 2 51 191
PLANT NAME POINT BEACH 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 497
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 2 2 3 2
PLANT NAME = PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 530
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 14 17 9 3
-376-
PLANT NAME PRAIRIE ISLAND 2 CALENDAR YEAR 1977
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 530
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR a 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 7 10 5 23 7 3
PLANT NAME QUAD CITIES 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1977
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR - GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 789
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1973.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 16
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 8 5 63 15 23 7
28 7 9 6 103 1 10 14 31 59
PLANT NAME - QUAD CITIES 2 CALENDAR YEAR 1977
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 789
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1973.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 11
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 11 57 10 7 6 10
68 65 13 8 10
PLANT NAME = RANCHO SECO 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 918
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 13 9 30 12 5 12
PLANT NAME = ROBINSON 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 712
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 12
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 3 4 3 278 34 30
148 11 7 4 712 2
PLANT NAME = SALEM 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1090
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 16
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 14 7 113 2 10 8
7 168 142 8 11 94 11 4 7 10
-377-
PLANT NAME SAN ONOFRE 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1977
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 430
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR - 1968.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 27
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 26 27 14 10 4 2
4 25 45 3 8 200 332 5 64 12 6 110 4 3 4 15 13 11 4 4 10
PLANT NAME - SURRY 1 CALENDAR YEAR - 1977
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 822
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR - 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 11
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 80 4 2 4 7 8 7 8182
PLANT NAME - SURRY 2 CALENDAR YEAR - 1977
PLANT TYPE - PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 822
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1973.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 11
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 5 1432 8 303 16
13 2 2 223 2 1
PLANT NAME THREE MILE ISLAND 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 819
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 3
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 7 261 8
PLANT NAME = TROJAN 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1130
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 23
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 4 8 28 36 90 8
254 1 7 7 57 21 29 2 16 8 110 8 8 11 21 19 19
PLANT NAME = TURKEY POINT 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 693
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 17
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 1 1 5 1 12 1 3
10 11 7 11 71 2 8 2 24 1
-378-
PLANT NAME TURKEY POINT 4 CALENDAR YEAR 1977
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 693
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1973.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 2 2 4 2 5 90 2 3
2 4 2 3 17
PLANT NAME a VERMONT YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1977
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 514
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YAR - 1972.9, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS):
PLANT NAME YANKEE ROWE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 175
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1961.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 4 94 3 92
PLANT NAME = ZION 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1040
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 14
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 7 8 13
3 26 26 13 5 25 5
PLANT NAME = ZION 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1977
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1040
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 16 7 4
10 58 11 7 28 22
3 10 8 48
4 6 4 20
PLANT NAME = ARKANSAS 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 00850
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 506 127 8 21 11
12 13
-379-
PLANT NAME BEAVER VALLEY 1 CALENDAR YEAR - 1978
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 00852
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1976.8, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 23
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 46 14 13 31 4 24
10 8 1 8 6 19 18 24 12 5 5 3 4 3432 18 21 18
PLANT NAME - BIG ROCK POINT 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE - BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 00072
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR - 1963.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 43 22 111 1281
PLANT NAME - BROWNS FERRY 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE - BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.6, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 15
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 16 17 61 20 44 9
8 9 9 7 57 23 5 159 9
PLANT NAME = BROWNS FERRY 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 14
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 46 6 11 8 40 11
10 20 6 11 4 5 95 5
PLANT NAME = BROWNS FERRY 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 16
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 8 134 12 14 154
13 58 11 7 10 10 88 7 38 5 50
PLANT NAME = BRUNSWICK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 821
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 15
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 335 39 52 11 16
34 105 8 34 10 27 12 13 18 28
-380-
PLANT NAME BRUNSWICK 2 CALENDAR YEAR 1978
PLANT TYPE - BWR NSSS VENDOR - GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 821
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR - 1975.8, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 17
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 22 81 17 26 37
37 37 122 15 23 13 215 247 85 24 193 20
PLANT NAME - CALVERT CLIFFS 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 845
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 14
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 22 26 6 6 11 16
31 99 10 51 14 4 12 771
PLANT NAME CALVERT CLIFFS 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 810
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 18
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 21 13 15 13 8 22
23 18 43 14 143 132 13 18 21 4 3 14
PLANT NAME = DC COOK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1054
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 12
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 35 21 4 4 5 12
18 13 15 19 13 41
PLANT NAME = DC COOK 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1082
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1978.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 17 2 26 6 33 4
149 15
PLANT NAME = COOPER 1
PLANT TYPE = BWR
CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 778
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 1
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 25
-381-
PLANT NAME CRYSTAL RIVER 3 CALENDAR YEAR 1978
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 825
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1977.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR - 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 6 16 4 15 4768
203 6 1 14
PLANT NAME DAVIS BESSE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 890
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.8, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 21
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 28 258 18 11 18
15 127 17 33 64 27 4 9 13 70 300 113 13 25 49 385
PLANT NAME = DRESDEN 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 200
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1960.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 81 32 14 215 17
30
PLANT NAME = DRESDEN 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 794
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1972.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 12
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 19 13 29 50 27
76 27 20 10 199 22 20
PLANT NAME = DRESDEN 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 794
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.9, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 256 51 10 15 8
201 16 1592
PLANT NAME = DUANE ARNOLD 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 538
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.1, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 13 4 7 8 78 6392
-382-
PLANT NAME FARLEY 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1978
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 804
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1978.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 32
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATTONS (IN HOURS): 11 12 9 8 5 6 11
87 10 7 19 3 4 12 14 8 2 18 7 13 7 69 7 34 7 7 6 35 22 23
56 20
PLANT NAME FITZPATRICK 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1978
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 821
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.6, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 26 53 70 35 25
16 32 23 39
PLANT NAME = FORT CALHOUN 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 457
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 3
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 23 231 6
PLANT NAME = GINNA 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 490
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1970.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 212 19 18 32
PLANT NAME = CONNECTICUT YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 575
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1968.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 12 27 51 42 23 6
3 38 12 3
PLANT NAME = HATCH 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 764
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 15
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 23 3 13 6 17 996
13 24 12 67 20 49 21 59 12
-383-
PLANT NAME INDIAN POINT 2 CALENDAR YEAR 1978
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR - WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 873
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1973.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR - 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 1 5 4 3 2 238
PLANT NAME - INDIAN POINT 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE - PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 873
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1976.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 171 3 4 12 20 4
8 174 8
PLANT NAME = KEWAUNEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 535
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 5 3 2 4 7
PLANT NAME = LACROSSE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = ALLIS CHALMERS
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 050
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1969.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 14
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 19 74 41 368 56
89 28 25 38 22 25 13 66 150
PLANT NAME = MAINE YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 790
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 260 27 9 7
PLANT NAME = MILLSTONE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 652
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 14 22 16 100 1
44
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PLANT NAME MILLSTONE 2 CALENDAR YEAR 1978
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 828
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1976.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 744 24 57 28 23
43 36
PLANT NAME MONTICELLO 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1978
PLANT TYPE - BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 536
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1971.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 12
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 31 10 20 10 10
11 74 18 10 8 10 52
PLANT NAME NINE MILE POINT 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE - BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 610
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1970.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 3
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 21 18 30
PLANT NAME = NORTH ANNA 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 850
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1978.5, .0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 4 6 12 11 16 5
19
PLANT NAME = OCONEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 887
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 16
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 9 8 766 9 6 180
13 42 19 34 7 6 17 10 14 2
PLANT NAME = OCONEE 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 887
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 14
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 7 191 263 3 108
35 227 10 24 16 79 99 22 11
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PLANT NAME OCONEE 3 CALENDAR YEAR 1978
PLANT TYPE - PWR NSSS VENDOR BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) 887
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 11
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 120 29 8 6 3 3
10 15 11 158 5
PLANT NAME OYSTER CREEK 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1978
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 650
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1970.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 55 38 28 124
PLANT NAME = PALISADES 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 805
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1972.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 23
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 32 239 16 9 13
20 5 6 13 8 12 8 20 357 79 95 123 134 10 278 4 89 27
PLANT NAME = PEACH BOTTOM 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 27 87 68 17 17
13 12 20
PLANT NAME = PEACH BOTTOM 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 39 19 5 18 18 27
23
PLANT NAME = PILGRIM 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 655
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 39 19 85 29 11
15 438 7 10
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PLANT NAME POINT BEACH 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1978
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 497
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1971.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 1 76 6 63
PLANT NAME POINT BEACH 2 CALENDAR YEAR 1978
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR - WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 497
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1973.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 3
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 8 2 19
PLANT NAME = PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 530
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 16 3 13 126 4
PLANT NAME = PRAIRIE ISLAND 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 530
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 13 9 5 8
PLANT NAME = QUAD CITIES 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 789
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 11
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 60 16 13 11 7
128 39 9 1 14 10
PLANT NAME = QUAD CITIES 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 789
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 4 10 6 7 26 19
24
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PLANT NAME RANCHO SECO 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1978
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) a 918
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1975.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 12 22 7 1 1 125
11 5 439 3 32 4 4
PLANT NAME ROBINSON 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 712
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 40 118 5 3 114
24 6 5 191 3
PLANT NAME = SALEM 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1090
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 29
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 4 12 66 39 15 8
6 115 43 11 2179 26 30 22 15 76 46 49 62 112 72 65 528 67 1
34 144 20 22
PLANT NAME = SAN ONOFRE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 430
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1968.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 4 5 4 10
PLANT NAME = ST LUCIE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 802
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 12
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 4 9 1 7 8 5 12 1
8 8 6 64
PLANT NAME = SURRY 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 822
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 2 5 5 519
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PLANT NAME = SURRY 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE - PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 822
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 32 129 6 3 22
PLANT NAME = THREE MILE ISLAND 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 819
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 2
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 214 4
PLANT NAME = TROJAN 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1130
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 1
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 22
PLANT NAME = TURKEY POINT 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 693
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 4 6 10 3 3 24 6
2 2 3 2 9 10
PLANT NAME = TURKEY POINT 4 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 693
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 1 6 4 9 1 1 1 11
PLANT NAME = VERMONT YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) 514
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1972.9, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 26 12 11 82 1042
26 229 19
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PLANT NAME = YANKEE ROWE 1 CALENDAR YEAR - 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 175
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1961.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 31 130 7 6 6
PLANT NAME = ZION 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1040
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 12
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 54 15 6 4 40 25
52 3 5 10 15 98
PLANT NAME = ZION 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1978
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1040
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 1
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 19
PLANT NAME = ARKANSAS 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 00850
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 3
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 14 810 25
PLANT NAME = BEAVER VALLEY 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 00852
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.8, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 16
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 348 25 4 13 11 4
2 4 44 26 36 10 89 17 21 2
PLANT NAME = BIG ROCK POINT 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 00072
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1963.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 2
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 18 4847
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PLANT NAME = BROWNS FERRY 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.6, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 14
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 25 12 9 111 19 5
5 27 17 33 14 51 9 29
PLANT NAME = BROWNS FERRY 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 14
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 12 12 11 17 10
13 1 8 10 21 10 21 9 53
PLANT NAME = BROWNS FERRY 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 9 13 19 266 9 22
10 7 57 401
PLANT NAME = BRUNSWICK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 821
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 52 67 18 13 15
16 12 18 141 263 219 79 2
PLANT NAME = BRUNSWICK 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 821
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.8, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 12
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 14 7 336 32 14
17 42 76 22 25 17 52
PLANT NAME = CALVERT CLIFFS 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 845
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 5 9 463 15 17 8
-391-
7 16 9 6 8 8 11
PLANT NAME = CALVERT CLIFFS 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 810
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 11
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 23 24 15 9 11 19
144 140 17 4 248
PLANT NAME = DC COOK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1054
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 19 25 40 1000
350 14
PLANT NAME = DC COOK 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1082
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1978.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 6 16 9 22 10 46
15 1077
PLANT NAME = COOPER 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 778
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 22 37 34 63 149
PLANT NAME = CRYSTAL RIVER 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 825
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 15
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 17 23 8 22 361
1000 2 18 7 18 11 680 4 10 24
PLANT NAME = DAVIS BESSE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 890
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.8, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 7
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FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 25 23 32 17 41
142 630
PLANT NAME = DRESDEN 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 794
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1972.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 49 16 44 29 1 12
49 19 15
PLANT NAME = DRESDEN 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 794
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 197109, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 1484 5 4 14 9 13
7 25 7
PLANT NAME = DUANE ARNOLD 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 538
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.1, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 64 19 10 87 29
32 43 6
PLANT NAME = FARLEY 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 804
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1978.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 14
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 29 8 5 22 3 3 2
9 3 84 10 10 29 18
PLANT NAME = FITZPATRICK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 821
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.6, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 1
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 81
PLANT NAME = FORT CALHOUN 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 457
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.4, 0.0
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FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 6 15 16 48 116
PLANT NAME = GINNA 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 490
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1970.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 3
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 1 13 416
PLANT NAME = CONNECTICUT YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 575
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1968.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 1
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 30
PLANT NAME = HATCH 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 764
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 38 215 2 19 16
22 18 616
PLANT NAME = HATCH 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 773
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1979.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 41 109 13 14 19
PLANT NAME = INDIAN POINT 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 873
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 18
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 7 8 4 3 12 2 18
9 3 20 5 12 21 4 16 3 2 156
PLANT NAME = INDIAN POINT 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 873
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 7 13 8 33 24 11
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PLANT NAME = KEWAUNEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 535
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 15 17 3 638 167853
PLANT NAME = LACROSSE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = ALLIS CHALMERS
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 050
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1969.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 269 37 9 26 34
15 20 34 12 137 247 30 27
PLANT NAME = MAINE YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe, = 790
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 11 4 13 30 18
PLANT NAME = MILLSTONE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 652
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 269 30 32 10 30
52
PLANT NAME = MILLSTONE 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 828
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 3
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 235 461 829
PLANT NAME = MONTICELLO 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 536
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 12 19 107 11 7
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PLANT NAME = NINE MILE POINT 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 610
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1970.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 2
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 53 4
PLANT NAME = NORTH ANNA 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 850
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1978.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 167 7 11 783
27 1 3
PLANT NAME = OCONEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 887
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 15
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 4 12 6 355 1
24 309 5 157 353 11 39 6 13
PLANT NAME = OCONEE 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 887
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 20
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 3 139 94 9 17
56 37 45 38 68 9 30 10 26 127 1 27 51 1
15
28
45
PLANT NAME = OCONEE 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 887
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 3 101 8 172
PLANT NAME = OYSTER CREEK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 650
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1970.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 86 17 316 728 32
57
-396-
PLANT NAME = PALISADES 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 805
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1972.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 19 25 22 67 42
503 23 15 21 23
PLANT NAME = PEACH BOTTOM 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 2
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 32 22
PLANT NAME = PEACH BOTTOM 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 20 6 75 25 12 19
63 18
PLANT NAME = PILGRIM 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 655
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 111 28 154 12 85
26 13 13 12
PLANT NAME = POINT BEACH 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 497
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 1
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 269
PLANT NAME = POINT BEACH 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 497
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 1
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 5
-397-
PLANT NAME = PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 530
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 6 12 10 731 497
16 248
PLANT NAME = PRAIRIE ISLAND 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 530
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 6 4 5 6 26 3
PLANT NAME = QUAD CITIES 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 789
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 5 36 9 67 23 78
38 13
PLANT NAME = QUAD CITIES 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 789
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR - 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 9 8 8 10 35
PLANT NAME = RANCHO SECO 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 918
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 7 15 57 16 98 5
8 8 70 2 2 3 56
PLANT NAME = ROBINSON 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 712
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 38 5 11 3 147 7
7 9 10 9 17 3 6
-398-
PLANT NAME = SALEM 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1090
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 31 36 2389 564 8
PLANT NAME = SAN ONOFRE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 430
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1968.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 82 4 234 133
PLANT NAME = ST LUCIE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 802
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 12
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 7 140 10 12 4 9563646
PLANT NAME = SURRY 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 822
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 2
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 2 250
PLANT NAME = SURRY 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 822
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 1
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 6941
PLANT NAME = THREE MILE ISLAND 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 880
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1979.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 12 413 17 13563
PLANT NAME = TROJAN 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1130
-399-
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 13 17 2 4 63 3
PLANT NAME - TURKEY POINT 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 693
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 14
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 1 5 8 14 85 3 35732622
PLANT NAME = TURKEY POINT 4 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 693
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 1 1 24 4 4 4 9
148 2 2 62 1 122
PLANT NAME = VERMONT YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 514
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1972.9, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 2
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 88 13
PLANT NAME = YANKEE ROWE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 175
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1961.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 3
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 10 80 85
PLANT NAME = ZION 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1040
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 20
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 17 11 18 11 18
15 4 156 15 7 4 26 206 3 4 90 24 28 26 26
PLANT NAME = ZION 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1979
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1040
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.7, 0.0
-400-
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 14
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 106 20 5 19 17 9
20 14 17 3 30 1 48 26
PLANT NAME = ARKANSAS 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980.
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 00850
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 105 21 715 10
449 10 550 6 20
PLANT NAME = ARKANSAS 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 858
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1980.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 27
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 42 15 6 12 16 16
25 278 18 4 76 14 192 14 12 13 5 9 26 642 16 28 50 30 284
18 45
PLANT NAME = BEAVER VALLEY 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 00852
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.8, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 12 30 17 3 4 322
PLANT NAME = BIG ROCK POINT 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 00072
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1963.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 4 5 15 15
PLANT NAME = BROWNS FERRY 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.6, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 20
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 76 55 74 37 15
31 24 8 11 10 37 8 12 10 18 10 13 10 19 22
PLANT NAME = BROWNS FERRY 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
-401-
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 16
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 10 18 347 58 21
8 75 20 15 9 11 10 8 65 14 23
PLANT NAME = BROWNS FERRY 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 15 45 15 11 13
76 51 15
PLANT NAME = BRUNSWICK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 821
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 44 40 62 30 125
51 20 518 59 43
PLANT NAME = BRUNSWICK 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 821
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.8, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 11
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 52 57 69 77 54
23 35 12 38 69 107
PLANT NAME = CALVERT CLIFFS 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 845
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 10 24 16 14 104
23 168
PLANT NAME = CALVERT CLIFFS 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 810
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 18 20 15 5 28 9
-402-
PLANT NAME DC COOK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1054
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 9
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 7 18 7 6 2 18 28
24 177
PLANT NAME = DC COOK 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) - 1082
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1978.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 11
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 10 15 11 8 7 18
14 8 1270 12 28
PLANT NAME = COOPER 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 778
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 24 17 46 48
PLANT NAME = CRYSTAL RIVER 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 825
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 15 47 238 11 7
10
PLANT NAME = DAVIS BESSE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 890
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.8, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 6 6 109 75 1 1
23 20 21 110
PLANT NAME = DRESDEN 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 794
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1972.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 14 11 10 11 78
84 18 28 73 45
-403-
PLANT NAME DRESDEN 3 CALENDAR YEAR 1980
PLANT TYPE BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 794
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.9, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 15
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 21 7 1 10 10 5 6
9 13 16 11 15 14 16 1
PLANT NAME = DUANE ARNOLD 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 538
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.1, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 11
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 151 16 20 5 19 9
96 125 9 8 23
PLANT NAME = FARLEY 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 804
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1978.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 21
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 27 7 12 4 18 16
15 9 6 6 11 13 85 12 9 23 4 7 22 12 82
PLANT NAME = FITZPATRICK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 821
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.6, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 81 31 20 21 13
92
PLANT NAME = FORT CALHOUN 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 457
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 3
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 10 4 4
PLANT NAME = GINNA 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 490
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1970.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS):
-404-
PLANT NAME = CONNECTICUT YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1.980
PLANT TYPE - PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 575
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1968.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 14 19 14 33
PLANT NAME = HATCH 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 764
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 28
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 58 67 6 21 8 1
341 150 3 15 257 116 130 11 19 17 11 16 21 46 3 19 6 7 16
29 20 20
PLANT NAME = HATCH 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 773
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1979.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 13
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 16 27 174 24 12
69 46 36 40 44 11 16 21
PLANT NAME = INDIAN POINT 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 873
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 14
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 134 4 7 16 37 4
217 11 17 5 12 90 120 1701
PLANT NAME = INDIAN POINT 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 873
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 24
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 33 7 10 5 187 1
16 4 10 303 4 3 16 23 8 33 5 7 356 3 7 61 373 7
PLANT NAME = KEWAUNEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 535
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 8
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 15 159 106 4 5
-4 0.5-
42 131 13
PLANT NAME = LACROSSE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = ALLIS CHALMERS
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 050
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1969.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 75 194 254 320
32 27
PLANT NAME = MAINE YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 790
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAP YEAR = 14
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 29 9 8 6 6 11 9
15 255 13 25 15 116 338
PLANT NAME = MILLSTONE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 652
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 1
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 13
PLANT NAME = MILLSTONE 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 828
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1976.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 24 16 19 29 18
19 26 8 21 3
PLANT NAME = MONTICELLO 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 536
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 8 151 390 11 8
PLANT NAME = NINE MILE POINT 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 610
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1970.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 3
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 352 11 43
-406-
PLANT NAME = NORTH ANNA 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 850
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1978.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 17
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 8 4 93 3 81 4
305 8 6 16 3 9 7 1 6 10 20
PLANT NAME = NORTH ANNA 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 898
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1980.9, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 11
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 18 2 2 3 4 25 4
286 6 3 11
PLANT NAME = OCONEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 887
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 311 95 8 5 11 11
3 4 83 6
PLANT NAME = OCONEE 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 887
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 12 48 18 4
PLANT NAME = OCONEE 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 887
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 12
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 10 89 52 33 437
4 5 12 7 6 78 33
PLANT NAME = OYSTER CREEK 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 650
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1970.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 2
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 116 185
-407-
PLANT NAME = PALISADES 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 805
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1972.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 205 163 17 27 35
22
PLANT NAME = PEACH BOTTOM 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 12 44 13 48 26
41 2
PLANT NAME = PEACH BOTTOM 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1065
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 170 265 286 18
10 14
PLANT NAME = TURKEY POINT 3 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 693
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 1
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 113
PLANT NAME = PILGRIM 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 655
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 26 18 57 119 33
21 196
PLANT NAME = POINT BEACH 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 497
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1971.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 2 1 7 32
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PLANT NAME = POINT BEACH 2 CALENDAR YEAR 1980
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 497
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 3
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 352 10 10
PLANT NAME = PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 530
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 2
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 176 8
PLANT NAME = PRAIRIE ISLAND 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 530
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 8 3 2 4 11 18
PLANT NAME = QUAD CITIES 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 789
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 7
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 12 66 64 1 5 36
9
PLANT NAME = QUAD CITIES 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 789
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.2, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 11
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 39 78 13 67 25
21 16 91 22 109 15
PLANT NAME = RANCHO SECO 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = BABCOX AND WILCOX
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 918
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1975.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 5
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 29 27 8 532 11
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PLANT NAME - ROBINSON 2 CALENDAR YEAR 1980
PLANT TYPE PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) .s 712
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1971.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 15
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 322 448 14 3 2 5
225 4 7 3 8 7 19 357 40
PLANT NAME SALEM 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 1090
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 11
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 37 25 60 67 32
69 5 9 5 18 37
PLANT NAME = SAN ONOFRE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 430
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1968.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 38 8 11 3453
PLANT NAME = ST LUCIE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 802
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1977.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 16 468 4 6 6 2
PLANT NAME = SURRY 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 822
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 3
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 2 19 241
PLANT NAME = SURRY 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 822
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.3, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 10
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 16 2 24 14 12 9
4 3 4 14
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PLANT NAME TROJAN 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1980
PLANT TYPE - PWR NSSS VENDOR - WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) 1130
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR 1976.4, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 21
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 22 2 637 9 7 6
18 2 6 12 3 68 3 3 7 6 2 2 20 17 236
PLANT NAME = TURKEY POINT 4 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 693
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1973.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 3 1 4 3 3 3
PLANT NAME = VERMONT YANKEE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = BWR NSSS VENDOR = GENERAL ELECTRIC
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 514
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1972.9, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 6
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 27 52 9 30 723
107
PLANT NAME = YANKEE ROWE 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 175
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1961.5, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 4
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 1680 6224 24 10
PLANT NAME = ZION 1 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1040
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.0, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 20
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 72 3360 276 9 15
4 1 3 50 22 19 44 12 16 13 33 19 132 16 22
PLANT NAME = ZION 2 CALENDAR YEAR = 1980
PLANT TYPE = PWR NSSS VENDOR = WESTINGHOUSE
PLANT RATING (MWe) = 1040
PLANT STARTUP, SHUTDOWN YEAR = 1974.7, 0.0
FORCED OUTAGE EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR = 20
FORCED OUTAGE EVENT DURATIONS (IN HOURS): 16 4 33 4 9 12
22 211 11 33 16 5 36 39 11 83 12 3 8 111
END OF PLANT DATA
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APPENDIX B
ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY FORCED OUTAGES FROM 1974-1980
Nuclear plant outages caused by regulatory orders are
explicitly excluded in the forced outage data base
developed in this study. The economic risk profile
presented in this report includes only losses from those
events resulting from plant operation, not risks which
result directly from regulatory policies or mandates. The
regulatory outages which occurred during the calendar years
1974-1980 are discussed in this section.
Figure B.1 shows the total number of U.S. commercial
LWR reactor years of experience which were recorded in each
calendar year from 1973-1980 inclusive. The number of
U.S. operating reactors more than doubled during this
period of study, beginning with under 30 in 1973 and
-412-
Figure B.1 - Total number of commercially operating
U.S. nuclear power plants versus time.
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concluding with nearly 70 operational LWRs at the end of
1980. This period of rapid growth is also marked with
fundamental changes in the character of U.S. LWRs. The
size (in terms of electrical power rating) of new reactors
grew throughout this period finally peaking at -1000 MWe
per unit at the end of the study period. Thus, the
portfolio of U.S. LWRs was constantly changing with time
during the study period.
The average availability (the percentage of the year
each power plant is available for electricity generation)
of U.S. LWRs in each calendar year during the study period
is shown in Figure B.2. From the years 1973-1977, the
average availability fluctuated between approximately
68-73%, averaging about 70% during this period. U.S. LWRs
experienced a very good year in 1978 averaging a 75%
availability during the calendar year. In 1979, regulatory
impacts of the TMI-2 event and other unrelated regulatory
impacts sent the average availability down nearly 9
percentage points to about 67%. Finally, in 1980,
regulatory and industry changes resulting from the accident
were instituted and the drop in availability continued.
The average availability of U.S. LWRs dropped nearly 11% in
the two years between 1978-1980.
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Figure B.2 - Average U.S. LWR availability versus time.
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The LWR regulatory outages recorded between 1974-1980
were analyzed to determine the impact of changing
regulatory policies and standards on the availability of
U.S. LWRs. Figure B.3 shows the approximate decrease in
reactor availability due to regulatory forced outage events
in each calendar year+. This figure shows a striking
increase in the impact of regulatory forced outages
throughout the study period. In 1974-1975, less than 1% of
the available commercial reactor years were lost due to
regulatory causes. From 1976-1978, regulatory outages
accounted for a 2-3% loss in average plant availability.
Finally, due to the regulatory impacts of the TMI-2
accident and other concerns, nearly 11% of all available
reactor years were lost due to outage events in 1979.
Regulatory outages decreased somewhat in 1980, but the loss
of availability was still higher than in pre-TMI years.
The total number of hours of reactor operation removed
by regulatory outages in each calendar year is shown in
Figure B.4. Since the total number of reactors operating
+ This is only approximately correct since if fewer
regulatory outages did occur, it is likely that outage
hours from other causes may have increased.
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Figure B.3 - Total percentage of reactor-years lost in
regulatory outages.
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Figure B.4 - Total reactor hours involved in regulatory outages.
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increased throughout the study period, this data shows an
even larger increasing trend than the average availability
loss data. In 1980, approximately 30,000 reactor hours
were involved in regulatory outages (nearly 4 full reactor
years). Assuming the reactors involved would have operated
at an average 70% capacity factor had the regulatory
outages not taken place, and using the simple replacement
power cost model discussed in Chapter 3, the societal cost
of these outages in 1980 is estimated to be between 0.4 and
0.9 billion dollars. The large number of regulatory outage
events in recent years resulted in very large costs.
Finally, the average U.S. LWR forced and scheduled
outage percentage throughout the study period is shown in
Figure B.5. Again a general increasing trend in the time
lost due to scheduled outages (outages which can be delayed
until at least the start of the next weekend) is observed
in the study period. Part of this increase is due to the
increase in regulatory outages in the period, most of which
are reported as "scheduled" outages. The annual forced
outage percentage shows signs of inverse correlation to the
scheduled outage percentage. This is to be expected since
more downtime is available during scheduled outages to
perform maintenance which may otherwise have required a
-419-
Figure B.5 - Average forced and scheduled outage
time of U.S. LWRs.
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forced outage for completion. The forced and scheduled
downtime percentages in a given calendar year can be added
to determine the total average availability loss due to all
outages. The average availability decreased from 70% in
1973 to =65% at the end of 1980.
The analysis of regulatory outages over the study
period shows a consistent increasing trend in the number of
plant downtime hours attributable to regulatory actions.
In recent years, regulatory actions have become
increasingly important in determining the average LWR
performance in the U.S. The inclusion of regulatory forced
outages in the analysis of LWR performance can
significantly bias results downward. Regulatory outages
are excluded in the estimation of event frequencies in this
report to remove the influence of past regulatory policies.
Therefore, the outage frequency and severity estimates
contained in Chapter 5 include only events which result
from plant operation, not those resulting from regulatory
mandates or policies.
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APPENDIX C
BEA ECONOMIC ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
Recently the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) within
the U.S. Department of Commerce has applied an input-output
economic model, RIMS II+, to estimate the potential impacts
of severe nuclear reactor accidents. The basic conceptual
methodology and the results of the BEA analyses are
reviewed in this section.
C.1 BASIC INPUT-OUTPUT METHODOLOGY
The essential principles of the input-output method of
economic analysis are most easily understood through a
transaction table, which summarizes the transactions which
-422-
+ Regional Input-Output Modeling System II
occur in an economy during some period of time. Table C.1
shows a hypothetical transaction table for the economy in a
particular region. The horizontal rows of figures show how
the output of each sector of the economy is distributed
among other economy sectors. The vertical columns show how
each sector obtains needed inputs of goods and services
from other sectors. Each entry in a horizontal row is also
an entry in a vertical row, thus the table shows the fabric
of the economy, the flows of trade and services by which
all of the sectors are linked together. The composition of
the transaction table is based on transfers of goods and
services in a region, and may be constructed using
available industrial transaction statistics. The
transaction table used in the RIMS-II model is based on the
1972 BEA national I-O table which contains 496 individual
industrial sectors (a 496 X 496 matrix).
Input-Output economic analysis is most often used to
show the effect on a regional economy of a change in demand
for goods in one sector of the economy. For example, using
Table C.1 one can see that an increase in the final demand
for agricultural output would affect the demand for
construction, manufacturing, trade, and service sector.
outputs which are used as inputs in the production of
-423-
Table C.1 - Example of a regional transaction table [Ca82J.
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Purcharlng Industry Final deean .
iii5 io ii i i 
Construction 2) 5 20 IS 5 S0 0 40 0 40 90
Nnufactvurng (3) 10 30 30 10 10 I9) 5 S 5I 10S
Trade (4) S 30 10 IS 10 SO 10 7 S 22 72
Servlces (S) iS S S 20 S So IS S 0 20 70
Total ntermediate
purchases (local) 45 70 65 52 30 262 40 67 38 14S 407
Houshold earnings IS I5 25 5 IS 75 2 1 0 3 70
Other value added S 1 3 4 S 8 0 0 0 0 38
Imp torts S 4 12 11 20 S2 1 0 0 1 53
X Total final
paymnts 2 20 40 20 40 145 3 1 0 4 149
Total Inputs 70 90 105 72 70 407 43 68 38 149 SS6
agricultural output. A change in one industrial sector
inevitably affects the entire economy, each sector
appropriately adjusting to approach a new equilibrium in
the region. Because -0 analysis does reflect the
fabric-like nature of the economy, it is a very powerful
tool for predicting economy-wide effects of changes in
demand for goods in one economic sector (demand-driven
analysis). The -0 methodology can also be modified to
predict economy-wide effects of input shortages in specific
economic sectors (supply-constrained analysis). The basic
mathematics used in these forms of regional I-0 analysis
are discussed in BEA reports [Ca82].
In order to use the I-O methodology in modeling severe
LWR accident impacts, it is necessary to specify the areas
which are affected and the impact on industrial output in
each area affected. The BEA analyses divide the entire
region considered into the "physically affected" area which
is contaminated by the accident, and the "physically
unaffected" area, which is the area immediately surrounding
the contaminated area. The physically affected area is
divided into the interdicted, decontamination, crop
interdiction, and milk interdiction areas based on the mean
results of CRAC2 analyses for a given accident source term.
-425-
The assumptions used in the analyses for the percentage of
annual output lost due to post-accident countermeasures in
each area are defined in Table C.2. These estimates of
output lost are used to drive the -O analyses for each
region. The analyses are intended to account only for the
first year after accident occurrence, therefore the maximum
output loss in any region is defined to be 100% of annual
production.
One problem with the RIMS-II analysis of post-accident
countermeasure impacts is that the areas affected are
defined at the county level. Only entire counties are
included in each area specification and no sub-county land
areas are included. The assignment of counties to
production loss categories for the St. Lucie reactor site,
conditional upon an SST1 release and a WNW wind direction,
is shown in Table C.3. A map of the St. Lucie site, with
an overlay of a typical straight line Gaussian plume
coverage area as predicted by CRAC2 for the WNW wind
direction is shown in Figure C.1. The inclusion of the
entire area in each affected county leads to large
differences in the basic problem for the BEA versus the
CRAC2 economic analyses. Even for the widest plume
coverage areas predicted by CRAC2 (70 °), the areas
-426-
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specified in the BEA St. Lucie site analyses are much
larger as shown in Figure C.2. Thus, the BEA analyses may
overpredict impacts due to the inclusion of entire counties
in specification of the affected areas. Further work is
underway using RIMS-II to more accurately model the areas
affected after an accident [BE82c]. Comparison of results
to CRAC2 predictions is currently difficult because the
specifications of affected areas differ substantially.
C.2 ANALYSIS OF BEA RESULTS
Although the BEA analyses do not exactly correspond to
predicted areas of contamination for specific accident
sequences, the results are useful for analysis because they
provide estimates of impacts based on a detailed economic
analysis technique. The BEA analyses estimate secondary
impacts, or impacts which occur outside of the physically
affected area. The results of the BEA analyses predict the
secondary impacts to be small relative to effects in the
contaminated area. This result, which seems intuitive
based on economic principles, is useful because secondary
effects are not accounted for in the CRAC2 or new economic
models.
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The BEA predictions of jobs lost after accidents at
different sites were checked for correlation with the
population within the counties ssumed to be interdicted.
This correlation would be important because the CRAC2 and
new economic models assume that interdiction and
decontamination costs will be directly proportional to the
population in a given area. Studies performed with the
British ECONO-MARC economic impact model indicated that
per-capita interdiction cost models provide reasonable
estimates when compared with more detailed analyses based
on land usage maps C182].
BEA analyses have been performed for a variety of
reactor sites with a wide range of affected populations.
Figure C.3 shows the total employment in each of the study
areas which were available for analysis. The total
employment in the study areas ranged from under 1 million
to over 12 million persons.
Three predictions of accident area employment impacts
are presented in the BEA analyses based on different
assumptions used in the I-O analyses. The maximum direct
job losses predicted include all jobs lost in the
physically affected area, assuming no output increase in
-432-
Figure C.3 - Total study area employment for sites
considered in BEA studies.
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the physically unaffected area and that all affected
households do not resume normal consumption expenditures.
Partially compensated job loss predictions are based on the
assumption that output increased to the maximum desired
capacity in the physically unaffected area, but directly
affected households do not resume normal consumption
expenditures. Finally, fully compensated job loss
predictions are based on the assumption that output
increases to the desired capacity in the physically
unaffected area, and that affected households resume normal
consumption expenditures. Each of these predicted results
was correlated to the population in the area assumed to be
interdicted. Figures C.4-C.6 show the maximum direct,
partially compensated, and fully compensated job losses
predicted for each reactor site, accident, and wind
direction considered in the BEA studies [Ca82,BE82b,Ne82b].
The results of linear regression performed on the results
are also shown in the figures. The predicted job losses
from the BEA analyses are remarkably linear with the
interdicted area population, all three correlation
coefficients being in the range of 0.95. The results of
the BEA studies predict the losses in the directly affected
area to vary approximately linearly with the population in
-434-
Figure C.4 - BEA non-compensated direct job loss
predictions versus interdicted area population.
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Figure C.5 - BEA partially compensated direct job loss
predictions versus interdicted area population.
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Figure C.6 - BEA fully compensated direct job loss
predictions versus interdicted area population.
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the area.
The BEA reactor accident economic impact studies are
useful because of the application of a different economic
modeling technique to the estimation of reactor accident
economic impacts. The 1-0 modeling technique is very data
intensive and computationally expensive and is therefore
inappropriate for use in risk-analysis applications
requiring analysis of hundreds of accident sequences,
weather scenarios, and wind directions. The RIMS-II model
has also been used with areas defined at the county level
which results in large differences from CRAC2 predictions.
Since the CRAC2 code employs a simple Gaussian plume
atmospheric dispersion model, the areas defined in the BEA
analyses should be considered carefully in interpreting
impact predictions.
The BEA results indicate that secondary or spillover
effects will generally be small relative to the direct
effects in physically contaminated areas. Also, the BEA
results indicate that losses will generally be a linear
function of the population living in the affected area.
This result agrees with the comparisons of land-usage based
and per-capita based interdiction losses predicted by the
-438-
ECONO-MARC model. The use of per-capita cost estimates and
the exclusion of secondary or spillover effects in the
CRAC2 and newly developed economic consequence models is
supported by results obtained using different modeling
techniques. Future research and assessments of indirect
effects and population based loss predictions should be
analyzed for verification of the assumptions underlying the
new offsite impact model.
-439-
APPENDIX D
ANALYSIS OF LWR FORCED OUTAGE DATA BASE
This appendix reviews the results of detailed analyses
performed on the LWR forced outage data base developed in
this study. The data were analyzed to determine impact of
reactor size (electrical rating), age, NSSS vendor, and
reactor type (BWR vs. PWR) on the forced outage frequency
observed in each calendar year. Regression analyses were
performed to check for possible correlations between forced
outage event durations, forced outage event frequencies,
and reactor age. Regulatory forced outages are excluded
from all analyses in this section.
-440-
D.1 FORCED OUTAGE FREQUENCY VERSUS REACTOR PLANT AGE
Figure D.l shows the number of forced outage events
occurring in each reactor-year versus the age of the LWR
during the year. The raw data include 367 U.S. commercial
reactor years of operation between 1974-1980. The high
density of raw data points for small reactor ages reflects
the large number of plants which began commercial operation
during the study period. The raw data points also show a
trend towards larger numbers of forced outage events in the
first few years of reactor operation. A moving average of
plants in 3-year age groups, including all of the raw data
points, is shown in Figure D.l. Collectively, all plants
averaged about 15 forced outage events in the first year of
operation, dropping steadily to about 10 forced outage
events in the fifth year of plant operation. After 10
years of plant operation the plants included in the
1974-1980 data averaged about 5 forced outage events per
reactor year. Thus, the initial years of plant operation
show an average forced outage frequency approximately three
times as large as the forced outage frequency for older
plants.
-441-
Figure D.1 - Forced outage frequency versus plant age forplant size groups.
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The curve for the number of forced outage events
versus reactor age is consistent with a "bathtub" failure
rate curve and the learning curve observed in many
technological devices [Gr72]. The high incidence of forced
outage events for new reactors is caused by "teething" or
wear-in problems with the system. As the reactor becomes
older, wear-in problems become less important, and the base
forced outage rate is approached. As the reactor plant
nears the end of its productive lifetime (projected to be
240 years from startup), an increase in the forced outage
rate would be expected due to wear-out failures. Since
none of the reactors included in the data sample are more
than 20 years old, the lack of wear-out related effects is
not unexpected. Also, regular maintenance work may be
effective in correcting wear-out related problems before a
forced outage events occur.
Figure D.1 also shows curves for the yearly forced
outage rate versus LWR age based on various size categories
of plants. The curve including all plants under 500 MWe
differs significantly from the curve for all plants
considered collectively, exhibiting a relatively constant
forced outage rate of 7 forced outage events per reactor-
year over all LWR ages. The curves for plants between 500
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MWe and 1000 MWe in size show significant wear-in forced
outage rate effects. Finally, large LWRs (> 1000 MWe) have
not shown significant wear-in effects, and the forced
outage rate has remained relatively constant at _12 per
reactor year. However, no large reactors in the data base
were more than 5 years old.
Figure D.2 shows the forced outage rate versus LWR age
for PWR and BWR plants considered separately. Only very
small differences can be seen between the average PWR and
BWR forced outage frequencies for a given plant age group.
Both types of LWRs do show significant wear-in or learning
curve effects during the first few years of plant
operation. Figure D.3 shows the forced outage frequency
versus LWR plant age for plants based on the NSSS vendor.
The curves for all four U.S. NSSS vendors show similar
wear-in or learning curve effects.
The results of the above analyses indicate that for
LWRs larger than 500 MWe and smaller than 1000 MWe, the
plant forced outage frequency is a function of plant age
measured from the date of start of commercial operation.
During the study period 1974-1980, the average forced
outage frequency for these plants decreased during the
-444-
Figure D.2 - Forced outage frequency versus LWR age for
plant type groups.
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Figure D.3 - Forced outage frequency versus LWR age for
plant NSSS vendor groups.
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first few years of operation, leveling off after about 8
years of operation at approximately 1/3 of its initial
value. This trend in mean forced outage frequency is
observed for LWRs independent of plant type and NSSS
vendor, except for those plants smaller than 500 MWe or
larger than 1000 MWe. For the smallest plants, the mean forced
outage frequency was approximately constant for all plant
ages. Possible explanations for this small plant behavior
include small system simplicity, improved system
reliability, or extensive operations experience in the
U.S. with small reactor startup and operation. For large
plants, the forced outage frequency did not show a
significant decrease with reactor age. This could be
explained by the small amount of data included for large
plants, a lack of experience with large reactor startup and
operation, or decreased system reliability due to increased
size and complexity.
The decrease of forced outage frequency observed with
longer commercial operation of an LWR plant may have
important implications on the economic and public health
risks posed U.S. LWR operation. Many safety analyses
performed on LWRs to date have found transient-induced
accident sequences to be an important contributor to risk
-447-
from LWR operation Nu75a]. Each forced outage event at an
LWR facility results in at least some transient of the
reactor system to achieve either a hot or cold shutdown
condition. Each forced outage event results in demands
placed on systems required for transient operation, and
possible demands for engineered safety systems if normal
systems fail to operate correctly. Since transient
frequency can be important in determining the risk from
plant operation, the risk from plant operation may reflect
a "bathtub" curve over plant life. Risk reduction or
control programs should focus efforts on very new and very
old (if LWR system wear-out is indeed an observed effect)
plants in operation. This conclusion is supported by
historical experience with the worst two U.S. commercial
reactor incidents+ occurring at reactor facilities in
commercial operation less than 1 year. The dependence of
risks on reactor age should be seriously explored. The
maximum potential for economic losses exists in the first
years of plant operation since little of the capital value
+ The worst two U.S. commercial reactor incidents are
considered to be the TMI-2 accident in March, 1979 and the
Brown's Ferry Fire in March, 1974.
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of the plant has been recovered in this period.
D.2 POSSIBLE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FORCED OUTAGE DURATION,
FREQUENCY, AND PLANT AGE
It may be expected that some correlation would exist
between the number of forced outage events in a reactor
year and the duration of each individual forced outage
event. The occurrence of fewer forced outage events may be
the result of very long outage durations in which the plant
is not operating. Large numbers of forced outage events
might be in part due to the short duration of each
individual outage event allowing increased operating time
for more forced outage events to occur. Also, forced
outage durations may be dependent on plant age, older
plants requiring longer outages for major system repairs.
The operations data base developed in this study is checked
for such correlations in this section.
Figure D.4 shows the mean duration of forced outage
events versus the total number of forced outage events
observed in each reactor year included in the data base.
The data shows much variation and no clear correlation is
observed in the raw data. Using standard linear regression
-449-
Figure D.4 - Mean duration of forced outages versus number of
forced outage events in each reactor-year.
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the correlation coefficient between the two parameters (R2)
is less than 0.20. The duration of forced outage events
shows little consistent variation with the total number of
forced outage events which occur in a reactor year. This
result supports the basic assumption which underlies the
calculations in Chapters 3 and 5, that the distribution of
forced outage severity (or duration) is independent of the
observed forced outage frequency. The assumption that the
distribution of severity is independent of frequency is
used in performing actuarial analyses for many types of
insurance (i.e., fire, floods, auto accidents).
As discussed, the frequency of LWR forced outage
events shows a strong dependence on reactor age for most
LWRs. Analyses were performed to check for possible
correlations between reactor age and forced outage event
severity (or duration). Figure D.5 shows the mean duration
of forced outage events in a reactor year versus the age of
the LWR at the time the data were recorded. The data show
very little consistent variation and the R2 of a linear
regression is very small (< 0.10). Figure D.6 shows the
total duration of forced outage events in each reactor year
versus the age of the reactor plant. Again, no correlation
is shown and linear regression results in a very low
-451-
Figure D.5 - Mean duration of forced outage
events versus LWR age.
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regression coefficient. Thus, the total duration of forced
outage events appears to be independent of LWR age.
D.3 CONCLUSIONS
Based on the results of detailed analyses of forced
outage frequencies and durations from the LWR data base,
forced outage frequency shows some dependence on LWR age
and LWR electrical rating. However, there is no
significant difference between forced outage frequencies
based on reactor type (BWR vs. PWR) or NSSS vendor. The
variation of forced outage frequency with reactor age is
consistent with a "bathtub" shape due to wear-in effects,
but increases in forced outage frequency due to wear-out
effects are not observed in the data base. The data base
should be continually updated in the future and analyses
performed to check for wear-out induced effects.
The increase in forced outage frequency due to wear-in
effects for large LWRs (> 500 MWe) has important
implications for the variation of risk from reactor
operation with time. Based on the analyses performed it is
expected that risk from transient-induced accidents would
be approximately three times as large in the first years of
-454-
operation as in the middle of reactor plant life. This
hypothesis is supported by historical experience with two
serious U.S. LWR accidents occurring in the first years of
reactor operation. The variation of transient-induced
accident risk with reactor age could have important
implications for risk reduction and risk mitigation
programs.
The analysis of the data base to check for
correlations between forced outage durations and forced
outage frequency showed that no significant correlation
exists. This supports the assumption of forced outage
severity distribution and frequency independence which is
used in Chapters 3 and 5. The mean and total duration of
forced outage events also showed no significant correlation
with reactor age. Thus, the assumption of frequency and
severity distribution independence is used in all actuarial
analyses contained in this report.
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APPENDIX E
DOSE PROJECTIONS IN THE PROTOTYPE OFFSITE ECONOMIC MODEL
Dose rates from surface-deposited radioactive
materials are projected in the prototype economic model by
accounting for radioactive decay, weathering, and shielding
provided by structures and geometry using the RSS model:
RD(t) = SF DC, SD . [al e-x' + -2.'*]-, (E.1)
where
RDi(t) = the dose rate from isotope i as a function of
time after deposition (Rem/Year),
-456-
SF the shielding factor to account for dose rate
reduction afforded by buildings, etc.
(dimensionless),
DCi' dose conversion factor which relates deposited
activity levels for isotope i to whole-body doses
({Rem/year)/{Ci/m**2),
SDI- initial surface deposition level of isotope i
(Ci/m** 2 ) ,
Ni s radioactive decay constant of nuclide i (/year),
al weathering constant from RSS (0.63),
a2 = weathering constant from RSS (0.37),
).-= weathering coefficient from RSS (1.13/year),
XWs = weathering coefficient from RSS (0.0075/year).
This model is based on data collected for dose rates from
cesium-137 versus time but is employed for all deposited
radionuclides in the RSS model [Nu75b]. This equation is
integrated between two points in time, tland t2, to project
a maximum individual dose from constant exposure to
deposited radionuclides during a specified time period:
-457-
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where
Dl-ta= integrated dose commitment during period t t
for isotope i (Rem),
T1/2 = half-life of isotope i (years),
t1,t 2 =beginning and end of dose integration period
(years),
where all other parameters have been defined. This
equation is used to project individual doses from exposure
to surface-deposited materials in the emergency phase,
intermediate phase, and long-term protective actions
periods. The equation is summed over all deposited
isotopes in an area to estimate total dose to an individual
during each period. Details on the derivation of this
equation are provided in the RSS [Nu75b].
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Calculations were performed to identify the isotopes
which must be considered to accurately project doses from
groundshine exposure in different time periods. Reduction
of the number of isotopes which must be considered can
considerably reduce the computational expense using
Equation E.2. Figure E.1 shows the contribution of
important isotopes to integrated groundshine exposures in
various time periods after deposition for the SST1 source
term [A182]. Over a period of many years, the cesium
isotopes dominate the projected groundshine doses for this
source term. The same is true for other LWR severe
accident source terms. The CRAC2 model includes 10
isotopes in the projection of 0-30 year groundshine doses.
The prototype economic model considers 54 isotopes in the
projection of groundshine exposures for the following
reasons:
1. The prototype model allows user specification of
the integration periods for projecting doses for
protective action implementation. These
integration periods may be only a few hours or
many years, therefore consideration of both short-
and long-lived isotopes may be necessary.
-459-
Figure E.1 - Contributions of isotopes to whole-body
groundshine doses for the SST1 release category.
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2. Future changes in source terms may change the
relative contributions of short-and long-lived
isotopes to groundshine doses.
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APPENDIX F
LISTING OF PROTOTYPE OFFSITE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCE MODEL
LOW ACID PAPER
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